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Abstract 
As of today approximately 3.19 billion people worldwide, i.e. 42 percent of the 
world’s population, are malnourished. Out of them 811 million are undernourished 
and 2.38 billion people are overweight or obese. Both undernutrition and 
overnutrition are a health risk for the affected individuals, and lower their productive 
capacities and labour market perspectives. This thesis provides evidence on how 
public policy can create an incentive architecture which is conducive to healthy 
nutrition behaviour in low and middle income countries (LMICs). 
The first paper analyses whether the conditional cash transfer programme 
Bolsa Familia in Brazil has influenced food consumption and nutritional outcomes 
among its beneficiaries. The results show that the bulk of the cash transfers is spent 
on food, with a disproportionate increase in the consumption of dairy and sugary 
products, but no overall impact on overweight and obesity.  
The second paper investigates whether the free health insurance programme 
Seguro Popular in Mexico has altered nutritional choices and outcomes among low-
income families in Mexico. The analysis suggests that the programme has increased 
obesity among those who were already overweight at baseline, and that beneficiaries 
have reduced the consumption of carbohydrates in favour of meat. 
The third paper focuses on the importance of gender norms in determining 
nutritional outcomes and describes the growing disparities in obesity rates between 
women and men. It shows that female empowerment leads to lower gender obesity 
gaps in a worldwide sample of countries, but that this effect is entirely driven by the 
MENA region.   
 The fourth paper focuses on peer effects and social learning. It assesses the 
impact of a behaviour change campaign to reduce child malnutrition in 
Mozambique. The paper shows that the programme did not only improve nutritional 
practices among the programme’s participants, but also among untreated neighbours, 
suggesting the presence of social learning effects. 
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1. Introduction  
More and more low- and middle-income countries (LMICs)1 are affected by a 
‘triple-burden of malnutrition – persisting undernutrition goes hand in hand with 
micronutrient deficiencies as well as rising levels of overweight and obesity. All 
three phenomena have dramatic consequences for the health and wellbeing of the 
affected individuals and can pose an obstacle to economic development at large. 
                                               
1 LMICs are defined following the World Bank’s definition: Gross National Income per capita < USD12,536 
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Malnutrition in all of its forms negatively affects the human capital available in an 
economy and can put the sustainability of public health systems at risk.  
In this context, this thesis provides evidence on how public policy can create an 
incentive architecture which is conducive to healthy nutrition behaviour. It analyses 
the effectiveness of different incentives for healthy nutrition behaviours and aims at 
closing – or at least narrowing – a number of research gaps in the area. In particular, 
it investigates on four topics for which there has only been scarce evidence before:  
• Monetary incentives / social cash transfers: the intended and unintended 
impacts of conditional cash transfers on food consumption and nutritional 
outcomes among low-income households in Brazil 
• In-kind incentives / free health insurance: the potential of free health 
insurance to counteract overnutrition in a context of sharply rising obesity 
rates in Mexico 
• Social incentives / gender norms: the importance of patriarchal gender 
norms in explaining rising disparities in obesity between men and women, 
with a focus on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region 
• Social incentives / social learning: the role of social learning in promoting 
healthy nutrition behaviours in rural villages of Mozambique which are 
characterised by a high prevalence of undernutrition and food insecurity 
This introductory chapter will illustrate the relevance of this research by 
analysing recent trends related to both undernutrition and overnutrition (section 1.1), 
and presenting previous research on their causes and consequences (section 1.2). 
Section 1.3 will discuss the role of individual behaviours in determining nutrition-
related outcomes, based on both theoretical and empirical literature. Based on this 
discussion, section 1.4 identifies a number of research gaps and presents the research 
questions to be addressed in this thesis.  
 
1. Prevalence and trends in underweight, overweight and obesity 
Today approximately 3.18 billion people worldwide are malnourished – this 
corresponds to almost 42 percent of the world’s population2. Out of them 811 
                                               
2 Throughout this thesis, the term „malnutrition” is intended to encompass both undernutrition and overnutrition.  
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million people, or 10.8% of the world’s population are undernourished, while 2.38 
billion people are overweight (31.3 percent) and 822 million people are obese (10.8 
percent)3. (FAO et al. 2019) 
Overweight and obesity are no longer a problem affecting only high-income 
countries. Obesity rates in LMICs have been rising substantially over the last three 
decades, as illustrated in figure 1. In upper middle-income countries obesity rates 
have doubled since 1990, and even in low-income and lower-middle-income 
countries, the growth in obesity has accelerated recently.  As a consequence, the 
WHO has been describing obesity as a “global epidemic” (James 2008; World 




                                               
3 Following the approach of the World Health Organization (2014), overweight is defined as a Body Mass Index 
(BMI) larger than 25. Obesity is defined as a BMI larger than 30. The BMI is defined as !"# =
%&'()*	',	-(
(/&'()*	',	0&*&1)3. This implies that the number of obese people cited here is a subset of the number of overweight 
people.  
Following the UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s approach, undernourishment is defined as consuming 
less calories than the FAO-determined country-specific threshold on the minimum caloric requirements for 
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Figure I.1: Obesity prevalence over time 
(% of population, by WB income groups)
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On the other hand, undernutrition remains an important problem, as 
illustrated by figure 2. While upper-middle income countries have e.g. managed to 
substantially reduce stunting among children, progress has been much slower in low-
income and lower-middle-income countries, where on average still more than a third 
of children are stunted. Moreover, while undernourishment across all age groups had 
been declining until 2015 when it reached a minimum of 785.4 million people (10.6 
percent of the world population), it has been increasing both in absolute and relative 
terms since then (FAO 2019). Moreover, it is estimated that 1.5 billion people are 
affected by at least one form of micronutrient deficiency (Development Initiatives 
2018). 
 More and more countries are therefore affected by a double or triple burden 
of malnutrition, with a high prevalence of overweight/obesity, undernourishment 
and/or micronutrient deficiencies at the same time. Development Initiatives (2018) 
shows that out of 141 analysed countries, 88 percent suffered from at least two forms 








1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Figure I.2: Prevalence of stunting among 
children under 5 (by WB income group)
High income Upper middle income
Lower middle income Low income
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note that multiple forms of malnutrition do not only co-exist in the same countries, 
but also within a single household or even at the individual level. As argued by the 
FAO (2018), it is more and more common for households to feature both a stunted 
child and an overweight mother. Development Initiatives (2018) found that 1.9 
percent of all children under 5 are at the same time stunted and overweight. Even if 
both conditions may not always coincide at the same time, several studies have 
confirmed that childhood stunting is a major risk factor for overweight/obesity 
during adolescence and adulthood (Popkin et al. 1996, Hoffmann et al. 2000) 
 International organisations have also pointed out that food insecurity, i.e. 
poor food access, and overnutrition go hand in hand very frequently today. 
Especially households exposed to moderate levels of food insecurity tend to opt for 
diets which are energy-dense, but lack important micronutrients like iron or vitamin 
A. For children this can lead to impaired growth, while for adults it increases the risk 
of overweight and obesity.  Moreover, psychosocial factors may also play a role, 
with food insecurity causing stress and anxiety, which has been associated to an 
overconsumption of energy-dense “comfort foods” (FAO et al. 2018, FAO et al. 
2019) 
 Moreover, even in many LMICs overweight and obesity are increasingly 
affecting low-income populations. Templin et al. (2019) show for example that with 
increasing GDP levels over time, overweight prevalence increases substantially 
among the poor, but remains unchanged among richer parts of the population. If 
LMICs follow the path of today’s high-income countries, it can be expected that in 
the future their low-income populations will also experience the highest obesity 
burden. This poses additional challenges for the targeting of policies to address both 
over- and undernutrition and increases the risk of unintended consequences of 
policies.  
What are the main takeaways from this analysis of trends: First, the numbers 
illustrate that malnutrition is a tremendous challenge, affecting almost half of the 
world’s population. Secondly, LMICs are already disproportionately affected by the 
triple burden of malnutrition and can be expected to carry an even higher burden in 
the future. Third, this implies that research on nutrition-related policies in LMICs are 
of high policy relevance, and important to achieve overarching international goals, 
such as the Sustainable Development Goals 2 (ending hunger and malnutrition) and 
3 (Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages). The following 
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paragraphs discuss the causes and consequences of malnutrition and discuss how 
both phenomena can be addressed by policy.  
2. Causes and consequences of malnutrition 
Overnutrition arises when an individual’s caloric intake is higher than his caloric 
expenditure (Costa-Font, Mas, and Navarro 2013; Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro 2003; 
Lakdawalla and Philipson 2009). Over the last decades, a decrease of manual tasks 
in everyday life and an increase of “sedentary” activities have led to lower caloric 
requirements for many people. Nevertheless, the average daily intake of calories has 
increased in most high and middle income countries (Costa-Font, Mas, and Navarro 
2013). This is often attributed to an increased consumption of processed food and 
meals out, which typically contain higher levels of calories, sugar, and fat, than 
home-cooked meals (Chou, Grossman, and Saffer 2004; Popkin and Gordon-Larsen 
2004; Stoddard et al. 2011) 
Undernutrition occurs when an individual cannot meet her caloric needs, i.e. 
caloric intake is smaller than caloric expenditure (Black et al. 2013; Dasgupta and 
Ray 1986) However, undernutrition can also be caused by a lack of nutritional 
diversity and/or the shortage of certain micronutrients, such as Vitamin A or iron 
(Banerjee and Duflo 2011; Black et al. 2013). Infectious diseases such as malaria 
and diarrhoea can also contribute to malnutrition (see e.g. Bhutta et al., 2013) 
Both undernutrition and overnutrition have important negative implications 
for the health and labour market outcomes of the affected individuals. Undernutrition 
limits the capacity for both physical and intellectual work (Banerjee and Duflo 2011; 
Dasgupta and Ray 1986). For children, it leads to lower educational attainment and 
worse labour market outcomes in adulthood (Case and Paxson 2008; E. Field et al. 
2009; Miguel and Kremer 2004) and is also a major risk factor for child mortality 
(Black et al. 2008). Overweight and obesity are associated with several chronic 
diseases such as high blood pressure, high cholesterol, type II diabetes, cancer, heart 
disease and arthritis (Di Cesare et al. 2016; A. E. Field et al. 2001; Sturm 2002) 
At the macro level, undernutrition leads to a lower level of human capital in 
the economy, and may undermine a country’s perspective for growth and economic 
development (Banerjee and Duflo 2011). Overweight and obesity and the associated 
chronic diseases may put the sustainability of public health systems at risk. Sturm 
(2002) estimates that health care costs for obese people are 36 percent higher, and 
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medication costs 77 percent higher than for people in a normal weight range. Both 
undernutrition and overnutrition should therefore be an important concern to 
societies aiming to maximize their welfare.  
In the broadest sense, one can distinguish between three different factors 
which influence nutritional outcomes. First, there are inherent individual-level (e.g. 
genetic) factors which determine individual tastes, the functioning of an individual’s 
metabolism and thus their propensity to absorb nutrients and accumulate fat, as well 
as an individual’s immune system which determines the risk of contracting 
infectious diseases and related nutritional conditions. Secondly, there are supply-side 
factors, as e.g. the availability and diversity of food on local markets, relative prices 
of different foods (determined inter alia by the available food production 
technologies, transport costs, agricultural policies, see e.g. Popkin et al. 2012), or the 
availability and quality of health care to detect nutrition-related conditions and 
provide treatment to the affected individuals. Lastly, there are also demand-side 
factors which may influence an individual’s nutrition-related choices and outcomes, 
such as an individual’s income, coverage by health insurance, their knowledge about 
and attitudes towards nutrition, or their preferences for exercising. This thesis 
focuses particularly on these demand-side factors and the question to what extent 
public policy can influence individual choices related to nutritional outcomes. 
 
3. Malnutrition as a sub-optimal market outcome – the rationale for policy 
intervention 
In conventional economic theory, nutrition behaviour can be modelled as the 
outcome of rational decisions taken by individuals who maximize the present value 
of their lifetime utility under scarce resources (Cawley 2004). Given competitive 
markets where prices reflect both the internal and external costs of all goods, the 
individual nutrition decisions will necessarily maximize the individual’s welfare and 
at the same time contribute to the maximization of society’s welfare. If these 
assumptions held, the high levels of both undernutrition and obesity would be 
optimal market outcomes and public policies to alter these outcomes would decrease 
overall welfare (Cawley 2004; Mazzochi, Traill, and Shogren 2009) 
However, as argued by Mazzocchi et al. (ibid), there is reason to assume that 
(a) nutritional markets do not always work perfectly and (b) humans do not always 
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make completely rational nutrition decisions. Market prices of processed food might 
for example only reflect the costs of its production, but not external costs caused 
through its impact on obesity and health. On the other hand, humans might hold 
preferences for eating healthy food, but behavioural factors like present-biased 
preferences and instantaneous emotional cues might prevent them from making 
rational decisions. (Liu et al. 2014; Mazzochi, Traill, and Shogren 2009). In such a 
situation, public policy interventions that alter nutritional behaviour can increase a 
society’s overall welfare.  
 
4. Public policy and social determinants of nutrition behaviour - theory 
Public policy can change nutrition behaviour, and ultimately improve nutritional 
outcomes, by modifying the incentive structure which individuals face when making 
their nutrition-related choices (Costa-i-Font et al. 2013). Throughout this thesis an 
incentive is defined as “a thing that motivates or encourages someone to do 
something” (Oxford Dictionaries 2016). Apart from public policy, the literature also 
points to an important role of social determinants of individual nutrition behaviour: 
• Monetary incentives act on an individual’s / household’s budget constraint 
or change the relative prices of different foodstuff: Cash transfers may e.g. 
increase a household’s budget constraint thereby allowing a household to 
purchase more food and/or to diversify its food consumption; taxes and 
subsidies change relative prices of different foodstuff thereby incentivizing 
healthy nutritional choices (Galizzi 2014) 
• In-kind incentives can act in two different ways: First, they can increase 
the availability of healthy and/or unhealthy food, either through direct food 
transfers, or indirectly through the in-kind provision of other goods and 
services which are considered beneficial for nutritional outcomes (e.g. 
agricultural assets, free access to health services). Secondly, they increase 
the beneficiaries’ budget constraint, as expenditure on the transferred good 
can be cut and more resources become available for the purchase of other 
goods.  
• Information and education about healthy nutrition behaviour and its 
benefits can change individual preferences – and ultimately an individual’s 
utility function – with regards to nutrition and exercising. Information 
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policies can be based on consumer-focused information and nutritional 
labelling, mass-media campaigns, but also individual nutritional 
counselling. Nutrition education in schools can also change individual 
nutrition preferences (McAleese and Rankin 2007).  
• Incentives can also be designed with a view to overcome the “bounded 
rationality” of individuals. Such incentives are usually inspired by the 
insights of behavioural science which – unlike conventional economics – 
departs from the assumption that humans always make completely rational 
decisions (Galizzi 2014; Thaler 1994). These incentives encompass 
behaviourally inspired information programmes, as well as behaviourally 
inspired monetary incentives, and nudges.  
• Social determinants of nutrition behaviour encompass social norms, 
including gender norms, the (non-) acceptance of certain behaviours in 
one’s peer group and interpersonal rewards for engaging in a certain 
behaviour. Although social policy can only influence these social 
determinants indirectly, a number of studies have argued that an 
understanding of social processes is crucial in order to design effective 
incentives for nutrition behaviour (Costa-i-Font et al. 2013; Gittelsohn and 
Lee 2013) 
• Regulation can also be considered as an incentive to promote healthy 
nutrition behaviour, e.g. by limiting sugar or fat contents in foods, or by 
mandating the fortification of certain foods in order to ensure an adequate 








Source: Own elaboration based on Galizzi (2014) and Liu et al. (2014). 
 
 
5. Public policy and social determinants of nutrition behaviour– empirical 
evidence 
The following paragraphs aim at providing a synthetic overview on the available 
evidence on the effectiveness of different incentives for healthy nutrition behaviour 
and identify the knowledge gaps that deserve further research. The review assesses 
incentives for undernutrition and overnutrition separately, given that most studies 
have focused on only one of both outcomes. 
 
Undernutrition 
Monetary incentives: There is substantial evidence that cash transfers (CTs) can be 
an effective policy measure for reducing undernutrition. A recent literature review 
on CT programmes by Bastagli et al. (2016) found that 23 out of 31 impact 
evaluations which analysed the impact of CTs on food expenditure, detected positive 
impacts. Out of the 12 evaluations analysing nutritional diversity, 7 found positive 
impacts. Lastly, 5 out of the 13 studies which collected anthropometric information 
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also found positive impacts of the CTs on the prevalence of stunting and/or wasting 
among children4 5.   
Commodity price subsidies are also classified as a monetary incentive for 
better nutrition. While there is evidence that subsidies can effectively increase 
caloric intake and incentivize the consumption of nutritious food (H Alderman and 
del Ninno 1999; Stifel and Alderman 2006; Tuck and Lindert 1996), their main 
drawback is their distributional inefficiency. In opposition to cash transfers or food 
transfers, it is impossible to restrict the benefits of a food subsidy to the food 
insecure population6. International organizations have therefore pointed to the 
inefficiencies related to food subsidies (see e.g. The World Bank, 2010) 
In-kind incentives: In-kind food transfers (FTs) have also been popular policy 
measures to reduce undernutrition and food insecurity. FTs can take different forms, 
such as food distribution, food vouchers / food stamps, school feeding, or food for 
work. FTs are often used in emergency situations when the regular food supply of a 
region is interrupted temporarily. Gilligan and Hoddinott (2007) show that such 
emergency transfers can have a positive long-term impact on the beneficiary 
households’ welfare, in addition to their immediate effect on food insecurity.  
A recent literature review on school feeding programmes in developing 
countries (Harold Alderman and Bundy 2012) points out that these programmes can 
effectively increase the daily caloric intake of beneficiary children. Gentilini (2016) 
reviews 11 studies which directly compare the effectiveness of CTs and FTs. His 
findings suggest that CTs are more effective in promoting food expenditure of a 
household while FTs are more effective in increasing caloric consumption.  
                                               
4 The authors of the review underline that the lack of evidence on anthropometric impacts in 
8 of the 13 studies may be a consequence of short follow-up periods between baseline and 
endline. Anthropometric changes materialize slowly and are often only detectable after 
several years. 
5 Some examples of relevant findings include an increase on overall food consumption in 
Colombia (Attanasio et al. 2004), improved height-for-age scores of beneficiary children in 
South Africa (Aguero, Carter, and Woolard 2006), increased height of beneficiary children 
in Mexico (Gertler 2004), and increased weight-for-height of children in Brazil (Brauw et al. 
2012) 
6 Alderman and del Ninno (1999) show for example that a VAT exemption for milk in 
South Africa lead to a 0.18 percent increase in overall protein consumption, but only a 0.03 
percent increase for the poorest 40% of the population. 
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Free health insurance is another form of in-kind transfer, where the 
beneficiary households receive access to health care free of charge7. Wagstaff and 
Pradhan (2005) show that Vietnam’s poverty-targeted health insurance decreased 
undernutrition among children. The authors argue that the detected impacts compare 
favourably with other social protection programmes, such as cash transfers (ibid).  
Information: There is only limited evidence on the potential of information to 
address undernutrition in LMICs. Most of the available evidence on the effectiveness 
of information campaigns focuses on other dimensions of health. A recent review of 
111 evaluations of mass-media campaigns for child survival in LMICs (Naugle and 
Hornik 2014) points out that the evaluation design of most of the reviewed 
evaluations is too weak to draw conclusions on the interventions’ effectiveness8. 
Another review, focussing on HIV/AIDS-related behaviours (Bertrand et al. 2006) 
found mixed evidence and generally small treatment effects.  
On the other hand, there is evidence that information campaigns which are 
based on interpersonal and/or individualised communication rather than the mass-
media can be more effective in altering health-related behaviours. The provision of 
household-specific water purity test results has successfully incentivised water 
purifying practices among poor households in India and Bangladesh (Jalan and 
Somanathan 2008; Madajewicz et al. 2007). Girls in Kenya receiving information 
about the relative risk of contracting HIV by type of partners were substantially less 
likely to have unsafe cross-generational sex (Dupas 2011b).  
Another promising channel to diffuse health and nutrition information are 
community health workers (Haines et al. 2007). Community health workers (CHWs) 
are ordinary community members who undergo basic training in order to support 
simple medical tasks such as awareness raising, preventive treatments, case 
management of smaller diseases and referrals. A number of studies on CHW yield 
encouraging results, but most of them focus on health rather than nutritional 
                                               
7 There is a substantial amount of literature which considers the provision of free or 
subsidized health insurance as an in-kind transfer (see e.g. Currie & Gahvari, 2007; 
Garfinkel, Rainwater, & Smeeding, 2006; Smeeding, 1977), even though it might also be 
considered as an informational incentive as health insurance facilitates the access to health 
and nutrition information. See chapter xx for a detailed discussion of possible pathways of 
impact of health insurance.  
8 The only field for which the authors found sufficient rigorous evidence is reproductive 
health where 40 out of the 46 reviewed evaluations showed positive impacts. 
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outcomes (see e.g. Brenner et al., 2011; Chang et al., 2011; Chowdhury, Chowdhury, 
Islam, Islam, & Vaughan, 1997; Ramsey et al., 2013). Luby et al. (2018) and Null et 
al. (2018) describe randomised controlled trials evaluating an intervention to reduce 
diarrhoea among children in Bangladesh and Kenya, based on intensive counselling 
about handwashing, sanitation, and/or appropriate child nutrition for mothers, and 
find positive impacts on children’s height.  
Overall, the literature review suggests that the way in which information is 
delivered may be crucial for the effectiveness of nutrition information campaigns. 
However, more research would be needed in order to gain solid evidence on the 
determinants of success and failure of communication campaigns.  
Social determinants: There is a growing body of literature on the importance 
of gender roles and gender norms for nutritional outcomes. A number of studies 
document an association between women’s empowerment and nutritional diversity, 
dietary intake and nutritional outcomes for both women and their children (Imai et 
al. 2014, Malapit & Quisumbing 2015, Malapit et al. 2015, Jones et al. 2020, Kunto 
& Bras 2018, Kunto & Bras 2019, Holland & Ramohan 2019).  
Moreover, there is initial evidence that social learning and peer effects may 
also play a role in determining nutritional outcomes. Hoddinot et al. (2017) who 
show that a behaviour change intervention in Bangladesh aiming to improve child 
nutrition has created spillovers to non-participants. However, this is the only 
available study to date indicating that peer effects may play a role in the 
determination of nutritional outcomes. 
Behavioural incentives: Although it is generally acknowledged that 
undernutrition can have behavioural causes (Black et al. 2013; Dupas 2011a) 9, 
interventions to combat malnutrition have rarely drawn directly on the insights from 
behavioural economics. Whether and how insights from behavioural economics can 




                                               
9 This is particularly true in contexts where undernutrition is fostered by infectious diseases 
and/or the insufficient intake of easily available micronutrients (see the section 
‘Context&Relevance’ for a more detailed discussion on the matter.  
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Monetary incentives: While the impact of cash transfers on undernutrition is well 
investigated, there is only limited and inconclusive evidence on the impact of cash 
transfers on overnutrition. Fernald, Hou and Gertler (2008a and 2008b) show that 
participants of the Mexican Oportunidades programme have a significantly lower 
BMI and prevalence of obesity than among non-participants, but that the 
programme’s cash component leads to higher BMI, higher levels of blood pressure 
and a higher prevalence of overweight and obesity. This finding also goes in line 
with a more recent study by Levasseur (2019), which suggests that the overall 
decrease in obesity related to Oportunidades is caused by the programmes 
conditionalities, not the cash transfers as such. On the contrary, two studies on 
Colombia’s Familias en Acción programme (Attanasio et al. 2005 & Forde et al. 
2012) also found that the programme increased both BMI and the odds of being 
obese.  
‘Fat taxes’ and ‘thin subsidies’ are another form of monetary incentives to 
promote healthy eating behaviour. Colchero et al. (2016) and Batis et al. (2016) 
examine the impact of a recent tax on non-essential food and sugar-sweetened 
beverages in Mexico10. They show that the tax reduced the consumption of sugar-
sweetened beverages by 12% and the consumption of the taxed energy-dense foods 
by 5.1%. The impacts were most pronounced in the lowest socioeconomic groups. 
Chile also introduced a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages, but initial consumption 
effects were small, likely due to the low tax rates which allowed producers to absorb 
it, rather than passing it on to consumers (Caro et al. 2018). Most of the academic 
discussion on thin subsidies is based on simulations based on data from the US and 
yields mixed results (see Cash, Sunding, and Zilberman 2005; Chouinard et al. 2007; 
Epstein et al. 2010). Overall, the available evidence suggests that fat taxes can be 
effective while the evidence on thin subsidies is inconclusive.  
In-kind incentives: This literature review did not find any studies on in-kind 
food transfers to reduce obesity. However, there are a number of studies on the 
impact of free or subsidised health insurance on overnutrition, although all of these 
                                               
10 Sugar-sweetened beverages are taxed with 1 peso per liter (approximately 0.05 USD) and 
non-essential energy-dense foods are taxed with 8% of their purchase price.   
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papers are from high-income countries, most notably the US11. Moreover, the 
available evidence is not conclusive: while earlier studies from the US indicated that 
health insurance may increase both BMI and obesity prevalence through a moral 
hazard effect (Bhattacharya et al. 2009, Rashad & Markovitz 2009), while more 
recent studies based on the Affordable Care Act Expansions indicate that health 
insurance reduces overweight and obesity (Rhubart et al. 2018) or did not have any 
detectable impact on nutrition-related outcomes (Simon et al. 2016). 
Information & Education: According to Downs, Loewenstein, and Wisdom 
(2009) the main policy response to the obesity epidemic has been enhancing access 
to information. However, Galizzi (2014) reviewed studies on nutritional information 
campaigns through mass media and concludes that the evidence is only mixed. 
Informational campaigns, like the ‘five-a-day’ campaign of the UK government have 
successfully increased the consumption of fruits and vegetables, but effect sizes are 
relatively small (Capacci & Mazzochi 2010). Besides, there is evidence that calorie-
labels on restaurant menus can reduce the number of calories consumed, even though 
the estimated treatment effects vary substantially between studies (Cawley et al. 
2018, Roberto et al. 2009), and one study did not detect any impact at all (Ellison et 
al. 2014) 
However, in line with the evidence on health information campaigns from 
LMICs, presented above, there is evidence that obesity-related information can be 
more effective if it is tailored to the recipient. The most frequent form of 
interpersonal obesity counselling occurs through physicians (Anis et al. 2004; 
Bleich, Pickett-Blakely, and Cooper 2011; Galuska 1999; Kushner 1995). Several 
studies from high-income countries found that patients who are diagnosed with 
obesity by a physician are more likely to both attempt and actually achieve a 
reduction in weight (Kant and Miner 2007; Kreuter et al. 1997; Levy and 
Williamson 1988; Loureiro and Nayga 2007).  
Social incentives: There is a growing body of literature suggesting that social 
incentives are important determinants of our eating and exercising behaviour. A 
                                               
11 The study by Wagstaff and Pradhan (2005) cited above which assessed the impact of free 
health insurance on undernutrition in Vietnam did not assess the programme’s impact on 
overweight/obesity. However, in the evaluation sample only 1% of the interviewed 
individuals were obese in their period of interest (1992/1993).  
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number of studies illustrate that obesity and unhealthy eating behaviour are very 
often transmitted through social networks (Christakis and Fowler 2007; Renna, 
Grafova, and Thakur 2008; Trogdon, Nonnemaker, and Pais 2008). On the other 
hand, exercising behaviour has be shown to be “contagious” within groups of friends 
(Ali, Amialchuk, and Heiland 2011; Babcock and Hartman 2010; Carrell, Hoekstra, 
and West 2011) 
Unlike for undernutrition, there is only limited evidence on the effect of 
gender roles on overweight and obesity. Azizi et al. (2005) and Wardle et al. (2004) 
point to gender-based differences in diets. Wells et al. (2012) and Garawi et al. 
(2014) provide evidence for a negative association between women empowerment 
and obesity differentials between men and women in a worldwide sample of 
countries. However, there has not yet been any causal analysis on the relationship 
between women empowerment and overweight/obesity.  
Social and behavioural determinants: Behaviourally inspired information 
policy has also proven effective in improving dietary behaviour and promoting 
healthy eating choices. Obesity scholars agree that the consideration of human 
emotions and visceral processes in the design of information campaigns can increase 
their effectiveness (Liu et al. 2014). Examples include a traffic-light system for 
nutrition labels which provides a visual cue in addition to the neutral nutritional 
information (Galizzi 2014) or the provision of caloric information as physical 
activity equivalent (Bleich et al. 2012).  
Simple changes to the choice architecture which leave the overall freedom of 
choice of individuals unaltered – ‘nudges’ in the terminology of behavioural 
economics – have also proven effective in changing nutrition behaviour (Liu et al. 
2014). Examples of effective nudges include the placement of low-calorie options on 
the first page of a restaurant’s menu (Downs, Loewenstein, and Wisdom 2009) or 
storing sweets in opaque rather than transparent containers (Wansink, Painter, and 
Lee 2006). 
6. Research gaps addressed in this thesis and research hypotheses 
Table 1 summarizes the findings of the literature review and illustrates the 
areas which deserve further research. A ‘+’ or ‘++’ indicates that there is evidence 
that an incentive is effective in affecting nutritional outcomes in the desired direction 
(i.e. reduce undernutrition and overnutrition). A ‘-‘ indicates that there is evidence 
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for an adverse effect on the respective outcome. For both cases, only studies which 
aim at establishing causality are included in the table. A ‘0’ means that studies have 
assessed the impact of the incentive, but that they have not found evidence for its 
effectiveness. A ‘?’ indicates that none, or very few studies have investigated on the 
incentive, and that there is no conclusive evidence on its effectiveness.  
In general, the table illustrates that our knowledge about the effectiveness of 
different behavioural incentives for healthy nutrition behaviour is not complete and 
that the area deserves further research. Evidence is particularly scarce for low- and 
middle-income countries, although these countries are hit hardest by the global 
burden of malnutrition. The proposed PhD thesis shall therefore contribute to the 
following overarching research question: How can public policy effectively 
incentivize healthy nutrition behaviour and improve health and nutrition 
outcomes in low- and middle-income countries? This question is addressed through 
















Cash transfers ++ 
Taxes & Subsidies + 
In-kind incentives 
In-kind transfers / food aid ++ 
Health Insurance + / ?  
Information / 
Education  
Mass-media campaigns + / ? 
Interpersonal communication + 
Community Health Workers + 
Social incentives 
Social learning ? 
Gender / empowerment of women + 




Behaviourally inspired information ? 
Nudges ? 
   
Overnutrition    
Monetary 
incentives 
Cash transfers - / ? 
Taxes & Subsidies + / ? 
In-kind incentives 
In-kind transfers / food aid ? 
Health Insurance + / - / ? 
Information / 
Education  
Nutrition labels / mass-media campaigns + 
Interpersonal communication ++ 
Social incentives 
Social learning ? 
Gender / Empowerment of women ? 
Peer effects ++ 
Behavioural 
incentives 
Behaviourally inspired information ++ 
Nudges ++ 
Source: Own elaboration based on the litterature cited in this introduction 
 
The first and second paper of the thesis assess the impact of two public 
policy interventions on nutrition choices and outcomes. The first study focuses on 
the role of monetary incentives in the context of overnutrition. In particular, it 
evaluates whether a positive income shock due to the social assistance cash transfer 
Bolsa Familia has affected nutritional choices and outcomes of the programme’s 
beneficiaries in Brazil. The literature review has shown that monetary incentives, as 
e.g. through cash transfer programmes, have been crucial in reducing undernutrition 
and that they can boost caloric intake and nutritional diversity in food-insecure 
households. However, their impact on overweight/obesity and the consumption of 
unhealthy food is not very well investigated. Previous studies have suggested that the 
cash component of CCT programmes may increase overweight and obesity, while 
some papers have shown that their aggregate impact (cash and non-cash 
components) leads to a reduction in overweight and obesity. Based on the literature 
on CCTs and undernutrition, which suggests that CCTs lead to an increase in food 
expenditure (see e.g. Bastagli et al. 2016; comprehensive literature review in chapter 
2) as well as a reduction in undernutrition (at least according to some studies, see 
e.g. Gertler 2004, Maluccio & Flores 2005, Macours et al. 2012) and the emerging 
literature pointing to an increase in overweight and obesity in response these 
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programmes (Attanasio et al. 2005, Fernald et al. 2008a, Forde et al. 2012, Leroy et 
al. 2013), the following hypotheses shall be tested: 
H 1.1: The Bolsa Familia conditional cash transfer programme in Brazil has 
lead to an increase in food expenditure 
H 1.2: The programme has led to a reduction in undernutrition  
H 1.3: The programme has led to an increase in overweight and obesity 
among its beneficiaries 
The second study provides evidence on the impact of free health insurance, 
i.e. an in-kind transfer, on nutritional outcomes in a middle-income country. The 
literature review has shown that free health insurance can help to reduce 
undernutrition among low-income households. Moreover, there is mixed evidence on 
the impact of health insurance on overweight and obesity from the USA. The paper 
therefore evaluates the impact of the free Mexican health insurance Seguro Popular 
on food choices and nutrition outcomes. It is one of the first studies investigating on 
the nutritional impact of health insurance in a context of a higher-middle-income 
country with steeply rising obesity rates.  
Based on existing literature on health insurance and nutrition, we developed a 
number of testable hypotheses. There is only one study which has investigated the 
impact of health insurance on undernutrition (Wagstaff and Pradhan 2005) and it did 
find that free health insurance improved weight-for-age and weight-for-height 
among children. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis regarding 
undernutrition:  
H2.1: The Mexican health insurance programme Seguro Popular has 
reduced undernutrition among its beneficiaries 
As mentioned, the existing evidence on the impact of health insurance on overweight 
and obesity is ambiguous. While studies based on older US data suggest that health 
insurance may increase overweight and obesity through a moral hazard effect 
(Bhattarchya et al. 2009, Rashad and Markovitz 2009), studies based on more recent 
data suggest a zero effect or even a reduction in overnutrition (Simon et al. 2016, 
Courbage and Colon 2004, Rhubart 2018). However, departing from the research 
findings that health insurance increases health care usage (see e.g. Finkelstein et al. 
2012, Baicker et al. 2013; detailed literature review in chapter 3), and presuming that 
health care usage leads to better health outcomes (see e.g. Currie and Gruber 1996, 
Pfutze 2015, Robbins et al. 2015, Sommers et al. 2017; detailed literature review in 
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chapter 3) as well as an increase in preventative efforts (Miller et al. 2013), we 
expect that health insurance will lead to a more healthy and less calorie-dense diet 
and reduce overweight and obesity. Therefore we also test the following two 
hypotheses: 
H2.2: Seguro Popular has reduced overweight and obesity among its 
beneficiaries 
H2.3: Seguro Popular coverage leads to a decrease in households’ spending 
on carbohydrates and sugar, and an increase in spending on proteins, 
vegetables and fruit. 
The third and fourth paper of the thesis focus on the social determinants of 
nutrition behaviour and outcomes. Paper 3 examines to what extent gender norms 
can explain the rising disparities in obesity between men and women. The study 
draws on worldwide cross-country data, but focuses particularly on the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region, where the obesity prevalence among women is on 
average 10 percent higher than for men. The literature review has shown that women 
empowerment is associated with lower levels of undernutrition among both women 
and children in low-income countries. This paper assesses to what extent women 
empowerment can predict gender-based differences in overweight and obesity, both 
worldwide and in the MENA region Moreover, and assesses if there is evidence that 
there is a causal relationship between both variables. Given that previous literature 
has found evidence for a positive association between female empowerment and 
nutritional diversity (Malapit & Quisumbing 2015), as well as a negative association 
between empowerment and obesity in a world-wide sample (Wells et al. 2012, 
Garawi et al. 2014), we test the following hypothesis:   
H 3.1: The political and economic participation of women leads to lower 
levels of overweight and obesity among women in the MENA region 
Moreover, given that there is no previous literature on regional heterogeneities, we 
assume a priori that this effect holds in all world regions, including the MENA 
region with its pronounced gender obesitgy gaps. Therefore the second testable 
hypothesis for this paper is:  
H 3.2: The effect of political and economic participation on overweight and 
obesity does not differ between the MENA region and other parts of the 
world. 
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Lastly, the fourth study asks whether social learning or peer effects can 
contribute to a reduction in undernutrition. The literature review has shown that the 
effectiveness of monetary incentives and in-kind incentives on undernutrition is well 
investigated, but that there is only limited evidence on the role of social learning. 
The paper evaluates the impact of a Social and Behaviour Change Communication 
(SBCC) campaign in rural Mozambique on nutrition-related knowledge and 
practices, among both participants of the SBCC intervention, and neighbouring 
households which did not participate. Based on the literature which shows how 
social learning influences knowledge and practices in agriculture and microfinance 
(see e.g. Bandiera and Rasul 2006, Banerjee et al. 2013), as well as the importance 
which theoretical SBCC models attach to peer effects (see e.g. Michie, van Stralen 
and West  2011), the following hypothesis is proposed:  
H 4.1: Social learning has contributed to the adoption of recommended 
nutrition-practices among non-participants of an SBCC campaign, who live in the 
proximity of participating households.  
Moreover, based on the fact that both social learning models and empirical research 
on social learning suggest that updating processes through social learning may not be 
complete (Alatas et al. 2016, Acemoglu et al. 2011, Gale & Kariv 2003), we also test 
the following hypothesis: 
 H 4.2 : Changes in knowledge and practices are more pronounced among 
individuals who were directly exposed to trainings within the SBCC campaign, as 
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2.  The impact of conditional cash transfers on 
overweight and obesity – evidence from Brazil’s 























                                               





Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes have effectively reduced 
undernutrition among children from low-income households around the 
globe. However, only very few studies have examined how these 
programmes affect overweight and obesity. This paper examines the impact 
of the Brazilian Bolsa Familia programme – one of the largest CCT 
programmes worldwide – on overweight, obesity and the composition of 
food expenditure. The identification strategy relies on fixed effects 
regressions to control for time-invariant unobservable confounders, along 
with a wide range of time-varying observable control variables. The 
findings suggest that Bolsa Familia may have increased overweight among 
beneficiary children by 4 percentage points (10% significance). Moreover, 
there is evidence for an income effect, reflected in an increase in total 
household food expenditure by approximately 15 percent (1% significance). 
The paper also documents substitution effects, with a disproportionate 
increase in household expenditure on dairy and sweets. However, the latter 
effects are sensitive to the choice of the outcome variable.  
 
Keywords: Conditional Cash Transfers, Social Protection, Obesity, 











We know very little about the causal relationship between income and overweight 
and obesity. Cross-country analyses show that a country’s obesity prevalence tends 
to grow with its income level (FAO 2020). At the same time, individual data 
suggests that in low-income countries, the burden of obesity predominantly falls on 
high-income households, while in high-income countries obesity is more prevalent in 
low-income households (Templin et al. 2019, Popkin et al. 2020), suggesting non-
linearities in the income-obesity relationship.  
Overweight and obesity are also a growing concern among low-income households 
in upper-middle income countries, as e.g. Brazil or Mexico13. However, most of the 
studies investigating on the causal impact of income on overnutrition have focused 
on high-income countries (Cawley et al. 2010, Cawley & Price 2011, Cesarini 2016 
et al., Finkelstein et al. 2007). This paper provides additional evidence on the 
income-obesity link in a middle income country by examining the impact of Brazil’s 
conditional cash transfer programme Bolsa Familia. The programme’s transfers 
represent a sizable income shock to its poor and vulnerable beneficiaries, amounting 
to 10.7% of their monthly pre-transfer income. Thanks to the programme’s staggered 
rollout over several years, Bolsa Familia particularly lends itself for a causal analysis 
on the relationship between income transfers and obesity.   
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes have the objective of reducing 
poverty and promoting the social inclusion of the poorest and most vulnerable parts 
of the population: They alleviate poverty immediately through a regular and stable 
monetary transfer. Moreover, they incentivise investments into the human capital of 
the beneficiary household’s children through education and health-related 
conditionalities, with the aim of breaking the inter-generational transmission of 
poverty in the medium run (depending on the programme, the receipt of the cash 
transfer might be conditional on the regular school attendance of the beneficiary 
household’s children, regular pre-natal checkups for pregnant women, vaccination of 
children). There has been a substantial amount of research on the impacts of 
                                               
13 Templin et al. (ibid) note that in countries with GDP per capita levels between 
$10,000-$15,000, overweight and obesity are more prevalent in the second-poorest 
quintile than in the top quintile. 
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conditional cash transfer programmes on both adult and child wellbeing. The 
evidence shows that conditional cash transfer programmes are in a position to 
alleviate monetary poverty and increase consumption (Asfaw et al. 2014), improve 
school enrolment and attendance among children (Barham, Macours, Maluccio 
2013; Baird, McIntosh & Özler 2009) and reduce undernutrition in the programme’s 
beneficiary families (Barber & Gertler 2008; Evans et al. 2014). For many of these 
outcome variables, there is evidence that the positive effects can also persist in the 
long run (Gertler, Martinez, Rubio-Codina 2012)14.  
While there is a substantial amount of evidence illustrating that conditional 
cash transfers are effective in reducing undernutrition, we know very little about 
their impact on overweight and obesity. This is likely due to the CCTs’ initial focus 
on reducing extreme poverty and hunger (see e.g. Gertler 2004, Maluccio and Flores 
2005). However, today many LMICs are affected by a “triple burden of 
malnutrition” – undernutrition, overnutrition, and micronutrient deficiencies, which 
can coexist at the country-, household- and individual-level (Pinstrup-Andersen 
2007, Gomez et al. 2013). Figure 1 illustrates that even in the early years of Bolsa 
Familia in 2005, overweight and obesity were just as prevalent among beneficiary 
children than underweight, both amounting to approximately 16 percent. At the same 
time approximately 44 percent of adults from beneficiary households were affected 
by overweight or obesity, while only 4 percent suffered from underweight. It is 
therefore important to ask the question whether conditional cash transfers, are in a 
position to reduce overweight and obesity, or whether they even might have had 









                                               
14 See Bastagli et al. (2016) and Fizbein, Schady et al. (2009) for an extensive 
review of the literature on CCTs. 
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CCTs can affect nutritional outcomes through a number of channels. Cash 
transfers increase the disposable income of a beneficiary household, giving rise to an 
increase in total consumption expenditure and at the same time a change in the 
composition of the household’s consumption bundle (adjusting expenditure shares 
for different goods, depending on their income elasticities of demand). This change 
in the composition of household expenditure could result both in a more energy-
dense diet, e.g. in cases where consumers substitute home-cooked food for processed 
food, or a less energy-dense diet, e.g. when simple carbohydrate sources are 
substituted for more protein-dense foods. The overall effect of cash transfers on 
nutritional outcomes will thus depend on the relative magnitude of the food 
expenditure increase and the changes in the household’s consumption bundle. In 
CCT programmes there may also be effects due to the programme’s conditionalities, 
which often incentivise regular health checkups and regular school attendance.   
 Empirical evidence on the impact of CCT programmes on overnutrition is 
only available two countries – Mexico and Colombia – and the results are 
contradictory. For the Mexican Oportunidades programme, studies have found that 
the programme’s cash component may increase BMI and the risk of being obese 
(Fernald, Hou & Gertler 2008b), while its overall impact is negative thanks to the 
conditionalities (Fernald, Hou & Gertler 2008b, Levasseur 2019). On the other hand, 
studies on Colombia’s Famílias en Acción programme and another CCT programme 
from Mexico indicate that these programmes may increase both BMI and obesity 
among their participants. Additional studies are therefore needed in order to obtain 






















or obesity. Moreover, it is crucial to understand the channels through which CCTs 
can affect nutritional outcomes.  
Bolsa Família (BF) is a promising case study because of its sizeable transfers, 
its implementation in a country with growing obesity rates, and the availability of 
rich and reliable data.  The programme is one of the largest conditional cash transfer 
programmes on earth, covering 13.9 million poor Brazilian families. The programme 
is targeted at the Brazilian population living below the national poverty line (170 
BRL / 55 USD per month per capita). It aims at alleviating poverty immediately 
through cash transfers, while at the same time incentivising investments into the 
human capital of the recipients’ children through education and health-related 
conditionalities (regular school attendance and participation in health 
checkups/vaccination). The monthly transfers per household vary between BRL 39 
and BRL 280 (12-88 USD), depending on the depth of poverty and the demographic 
composition of the household. On average, this amounts to approximately 10.7% of 
the beneficiary households’ monthly income15, constituting a sizeable income shock. 
(Bastagli 2008; Caixa Econômica Federal 2016; Soares 2012; Soares, Perez Ribas, 
and Veras Soares 2011).  
This paper implements a fixed effects estimation strategy based on the 
Avaliação de Impacto do Programa Bolsa Familia (AIBF) dataset in order to assess 
Bolsa Familia’s impact on undernutrition, overnutrition, as well as diet-related 
consumption behaviours. The AIBF dataset was collected in two waves (2005 and 
2009) covering the time period of the programme’s rollout. While the programme 
was made available simultaneously across all Brazilian municipalities, the pace of 
enrolment of eligible households differed both between municipalities and between 
households within the same municipality. The programme’s impact is estimated 
through regressions with household-level fixed effects, which control for any time-
invariant unobservable factors which may have driven enrolment. Moreover, a large 
set of control variables reduces the risk of any bias due to time-varying factors.  
The findings provide suggestive evidence (significant at the 10% level) that 
Bolsa Familia has led to an average increase in overweight among children by 
                                               
15 This estimate is based on the Brazilian household survey Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de 
Domicílios (PNAD), assuming that variable v1273 in the survey correctly identifies Bolsa Família 
benefits.  
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approximately 4 percentage points. This effect is mainly driven by the urban 
Southeastern region of the country. Moreover, the results show that Bolsa Familia 
has increased overall consumption expenditure by approximately 11 percent 
(significant at the 5% level), and in particular food consumption expenditure by 15 
percent (significant at the 1% level). The results on changes to the composition of 
household expenditure are mixed. While the absolute expenditure on dairy and 
sugary products has increased disproportionately, it was not possible to detect any 
statistically significant effect when food shares (in total expenditure) are used as 
outcome variables.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Part 2 gives an overview on the 
relevant literature on the topic and part 3 describes the instutional background of 
Bolsa Familia’s rollout. Part 4 presents the data which is used for the analysis, and 
part 5 discusses the identification strategy. The findings are presented in part 6, 
while part 7 elaborates on the policy implications and concludes. 
2. Literature  
Previous evaluations which have investigated on the nutritional impacts of CCTs 
have mostly focussed on undernutrition among children (underweight, stunting, 
wasting). These studies provide convincing evidence that CCTs can indeed improve 
the nutritional status of malnourished children (Gertler 2004, Attanasio et al. 2005, 
Macours et al. 2012, Maluccio and Flores 2005, Hidrobo et al. 2013, Gitter and 
Caldes 2010, Attanasio et al. 2005, Ruiz-Arranz et al. 2002) 
However, based on theory, one might expect a number of channels through 
which CTs might also affect overweight and obesity. First, the cash transfer will lead 
to an increase in disposable income, which will potentially lead to an increase in 
total expenditure, and potentially also an increase in total food expenditure. The 
beneficiary household will have a higher disposable income and will therefore be 
able to purchase larger quantities of the consumption bundle it had consumed 
previously. One would therefore expect that the household will consume a larger 
amount of calories. A number of studies have documented the positive impact of CT 
programmes on overall consumption expenditure (Angelucci et al. 2012, Haushofer 
& Shapiro 2016), as well as food consumption expenditure (Braido et al. 2012, 
Palermo et al. 2012). Moreover, there is also evidence for a positive correlation 
between income and overweight/obesity on the other hand, both at the country-level 
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(Masood & Reidpath 2017, Grinspun et al. 2020, FAO 2019) and at the individual 
level (Templin et al. 2019, Jolliffe 2010,). 
Secondly, one would also expect that the composition of a household’s 
consumption basket will change in response to the income shock. Beneficiary 
households will substitute inferior goods for superior goods and potentially also 
adjust the expenditure share of each normal good, depending on its income elasticity. 
In this context one would expect that a household diversifies its food consumption, 
substituting cheaper sources of caloric intake (basic carbohydrates) for more 
nutritious food (e.g. proteins, fruit, vegetables) and/or food which is considered more 
tasty (e.g. sweets, fatty foods). Indeed, some studies have found positive impacts of 
CT programmes on dietary diversity (Gitter & Caldes 2010, Hidrobo et al. 2013), 
even though the overall evidence is mixed (Bastagli et al. 2016).  
Moreover, there may also be effects due to an improved access to social 
services (e.g. health, education, sanitation) caused by the cash transfer, which can in 
turn lead to adaptations in a household’s nutrition-related choices and outcomes. 
Moreover, it has been shown that the receipt of CT programmes can also reduce 
stress levels among poor households (Haushofer & Shapiro 2016). As lower stress 
levels are in turn associated with lower risks of overweight and obesity (Torres & 
Nowson 2007), it could be another intermediary between CTs and nutritional 
outcomes. 
For conditional CT programmes, as Bolsa Familia, there may also be effects 
through the associated conditionalities. These can lead to an increased exposure to 
health services due to the requirements for vaccinations and regular medical 
checkups for children (Akresh et al. 2012), potentially contributing to the early 
detection of under- or overnutrition. Moreover, the education-related conditionalities 
can increase school attendance and the educational achievement of children (Akresh 
et al. 2013, Baird et al. 2011). Given the negative association between education and 
obesity risk (Devaux et al. 2011), one might also expect a negative long-term effect 
on obesity. 
Very few papers have investigated on the impacts of CCTs on 
overweight/obesity, food consumption, as well as the composition of food 
expenditure among beneficiary households. Most of these studies are based on 
Mexico’s flagship social assistance programme Prospera (originally denominated 
Progresa and later Oportunidades). Fernald, Hou and Gertler (2008a and 2008b) 
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find that participants of the Mexican Oportunidades programme have a significantly 
lower BMI and prevalence of obesity is also lower than among non-participants, but 
that the programme’s cash component leads to higher BMI, higher levels of blood 
pressure and a higher prevalence of overweight and obesity. This finding is also 
confirmed in a more recent study by Levasseur (2019), which attributes the overall 
BMI-reducing effect to the conditionalities of the programme, rather than the cash 
payments. In this context, it is important to highlight that one of the Prospera-related 
conditionalities is participation in education sessions on health and nutrition, which 
need to be attended by at least one household member aged 15 years or older 
(CONEVAL 2019). This is a major difference between Prospera and many other 
CCTs including Bolsa Familia, where conditionalities do not provide information on 
healthy diets.  
Apart from these studies on Propsera, there are two papers on the impacts of 
other CT programmes on overnutrition. Attanasio et al.’s (2005) evaluation of 
Colombia’s Famílias en Acción programme found a positive impact on overall food 
consumption, and in particular an increase in the consumption of meat, milk, cereals, 
fat and oil. Forde et al. (2012) found a positive impact of Familías en Acción on 
BMI and increased odds of being obese. Lastly, Leroy et al. (2013) corroborate these 
findings in their analysis of the Mexican food aid programme Programa de Apoyo 
Alimentário, which provides cash and/or in-kind transfers to poor rural households. 
They find large impacts on the body weight of women who are already overweight 
or obese (no impact on those who have a BMI<25). 
Overall, the evidence from these studies is mixed. Cash transfers have been 
associated with both a decrease in the prevalence of underweight, an increase in 
overweight/obesity and also an increase in the nutritional diversity of food (more 
animal products, protein sources), while conditionalities have led to a decrease in 
overweight and obesity. The proposed study aims at shedding further light on the 
relationship between cash transfers and nutrition, investigating on both the 
nutritional outcomes, as well as the underlying nutrition decisions of cash transfer 
beneficiaries.  
3. Institutional background 
Bolsa Familia is one of the largest conditional cash transfer programmes worldwide, 
covering 13.9 million low-income families. The programme is targeted at the 
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Brazilian population living below the national poverty line (170 BRL / 55 USD per 
month per capita) and provides monthly cash transfers ranging between BRL 39 and 
BRL 280 (12-88 USD), depending on the depth of poverty and the demographic 
composition of the household. On average, the transfers amount to approximately 
10.7% of the beneficiary households’ monthly income16, constituting a sizeable 
income shock. (Bastagli 2008; Caixa Econômica Federal 2016; Soares 2012; Soares, 
Perez Ribas, and Veras Soares 2011). Bolsa Familia aims at alleviating poverty 
immediately through these cash transfers, while at the same time incentivising 
investments into the human capital of the recipients’ children through education and 
health-related conditionalities (regular school attendance and participation in health 
checkups/vaccination).   
Bolsa Familia was created in 2003 as the flagship social programme of the 
newly elected President Lula da Silva from the country’s centre-left Worker’s Party 
(Partido dos Trabalhadores). In Brazil, cash transfer programmes as well as in-kind 
social transfers existed even before the introduction of Bolsa Familia. However, 
these programmes were fragmented, they had different objectives and targeting 
mechanisms and did not systematically cover the country’s poor and vulnerable 
households. In 2003, four social programmes were merged into the new Bolsa 
Familia programme: the Programa Bolsa Escola (School Grant Programme), 
Programa Bolsa Alimentação (Food Grant), Auxílio Gás (Gas Subsidy Programme) 
and the Programa Nacional de Acesso à Alimentação (National programme for 
access to food). A fifth programme, the Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho 
Infantil (Programme for the eradication of child labour) was only fully incorporated 
in 2005.  
However, as illustrated in figure 2, the number of beneficiaries after merging 
these predecessor programmes amounted to only approximately 4 million families in 
2003 (9 families million in 2005), while 12-14 million households lived below the 
national poverty line. The government’s objective was to enrol all Brazilian citizens 
living below the national poverty line into Bolsa Familia. Low-income families 
which had not been covered by any of Bolsa Familia’s predecessor programmes 
were therefore invited to register for the country’s unified social registry, the 
                                               
16 This estimate is based on the Brazilian household survey Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de 
Domicílios (PNAD), assuming that variable v1273 in the survey correctly identifies Bolsa Família 
benefits.  
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Cadastro Único, which serves as a basis for assessing a household’s eligibility for 
the country’s major social assistance programmes and decide on the timing of 
enrolment17. Inscriptions were administered at the municipality level through two 
modalities: first, households could register on their own initiative at local social 
assistance centres. Secondly, social workers conducted active outreach campaigns 
across the country in order to ensure that populations which live in remote areas, or 
might not know about the government’s initiative, would also be inscribed “on the 
spot”. While the inscription and data collection for the Cadastro Único has always 
been decentralised, the data processing, eligibility verification, and payment 
processing have taken place at the central-government level and are exclusively 
electronic. The centralisation and digitalisation of the eligibility verification process 
also increases the objectivity of the targeting process and effectively prevents any 
personal interference or manipulation by social workers or government officials 
(Mostafa & Sátyro 2014). 
 




                                               
17 The government’s objective was to enrol all households with per capita incomes corresponding to 
less than half of the country’s minimum wage into Cadastro Único. It is important to note that a 
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Bolsa Familia is a means-tested programme. Households are eligible for 
participation if their income is below a certain eligibility threshold. This threshold 
has been defined in accordance with Brazil’s national poverty line and amounted to 
100 BRL per capita per month between 2003 and 2006 (approximately 34 USD at 
the time), 120 BRL between 2006 and 2009, and 140 BRL from 2009 onwards18. 
The Cadástro Unico relies on self-declared income, but the information is cross-
checked with other national databases (e.g. civil registries, tax registries) in order to 
avoid fraudulent applications (Hellmann 2015).  
However, not all households which fulfilled the income-related eligibility 
criteria were instantaneously admitted to Bolsa Familia. Due to budget constraints, 
and in order to ensure an equal and fair distribution of programme benefits across the 
country, the central government established municipality-level quota indicating the 
maximum number of Bolsa Familia beneficiaries per municipality. The quotas were 
calculated based on each municipalities’ poverty rate during the latest census in 
2000, and subsequently updated based on household survey data on changes to 
poverty rates at state level (i.e. updates were identical for all municipalities within a 
state). This implies that during the programme’s rollout between 2003 and 2011, 
there were always families who were eligible for Bolsa Familia’s benefits, but were 
not covered by the programme. Soares (2010) describes them as a “a strange 
category of family: eligible but not beneficiary” (p. 6). These households can be used 
as a comparison group for estimating Bolsa Familia’s impact. 
Indeed, there are a number of reasons why otherwise similar households 
would benefit from Bolsa Familia in one case, but not another. Explanations can be 
found both at the municipality and household level: First, the number of available 
BF benefits in 2003 (= quota - current beneficiaries) depended on the number of 
households covered by BF’s predecessor programmes who had been automatically 
enrolled into Bolsa Familia (Silva Parsons 2015). In municipalities, where the 
predecessor programmes coverage was already close to the municipality-level quota, 
the odds for additional households to be enrolled would be very small. Second, the 
                                               
18 Moreover, families qualify for additional monetary benefits if their incomes are 
also below the extreme poverty line (BRL 50 per capita per month between 2003-
2005, 60 BRL between 2006 and 2009 and 70 BRL from 2009 onwards). 
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updating of the original poverty estimates from the census based on household 
survey data introduced a certain degree of imprecision – in municipalities whose 
poverty rate was growing more quickly than the state average, the quotas would not 
keep up with the number of poor people, resulting in lower chances of admission and 
vice versa (Soares et al. 2010). Third, administrative capacity to enrol households 
into the Cadastro Único may also have differed between municipalities and 
influenced chances of families to benefit (Silva Parsons 2015). Lastly, the individual 
incentives of a municipality’s mayors may also have influenced enrolment. De 
Janvry et al. (2012) show that Bolsa Familia’s predecessor programme Bolsa Escola 
performed much more successfully in municipalities where the mayors were in their 
first term and thus could be re-elected, as compared to municipalities with mayors in 
their second and thus last term in office. 
Moreover, there are a number of factors which influence the order of 
priorization at the household level: First of all, being enrolled in one of Bolsa 
Familia’s predecessor programmes would guarantee enrolment into Bolsa Familia. 
Second, particularly vulnerable categories of households were granted priority, in 
particular indigenous families, families living from waste collection or recycling, 
and families where there was child labour (Hellmann 2015). Third, families with 
lower self-reported incomes would be enrolled as a priority. However, it is important 
to bear in mind that income was self-reported and prone to substantial measurement 
error (Soares et al. 2010). Fourth, households with a higher number of children under 
the age of 17 would be granted priority over households with a lower number of 
children. (Hellmann 2015, De Brauw et al. 2015).  
This discussion illustrates that there was a degree of “randomness” in Bolsa 
Familia’s rollout and that chances of enrolment differed substantially between 
municipalities and households. One possibility in order to exploit this situation for 
estimating BF’s treatment effects would be an IV strategy, using one of the above-
mentioned factors as an instrumental variable. However, due to data constraints and 
given that a multiplicity of factors influenced the individual chances of enrolment, 
this paper draws on fixed effect regressions (see section 5 for details). Fixed effects 
can control for a potential confounding effect of time-invariant unobservable factors 
and are less prone to model misspecification (in particular regarding violations of the 
exclusion restriction), and are therefore considered an appropriate alternative in the 
context of Bolsa Familia.   
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4. Data 
The research questions are analysed based on the Avaliação de Impacto do 
Programa Bolsa Família (AIBF) datasets which were collected in two rounds (2005 
and 2009) in the framework of Bolsa Familia’s impact evaluation. Figure 1 
illustrates that the survey has covered the rollout of the programme very well. 
During the first survey wave in 2005 Bolsa Familia had covered approximately 9 
million households and in 2009, during the second wave, approximately 11 million 
households. However, the programme only achieved full coverage of its target 
population (households with annual incomes below the national poverty line) in 
2012, reaching 13.9 million households. This implies that there is a sufficient 
number of uncovered but eligible households during both survey waves, which can 
serve as a comparison group for this study. 
 During the AIBF survey, a nationally representative sample was interviewed, 
although low-income households were oversampled. Out of the 15,416 households 
interviewed in 2005, 11,372 households were tracked again during the second wave 
in 2009. The sample of analysis is restricted to households which were interviewed 
in both survey waves and which fulfil the formal eligibility criteria, i.e. with incomes 
below 100 Brazilian Reals (BRL) in 2005, and below 170 BRL in 2009. This yields 
a sample of 7,427 households, of which approximately 59 percent benefitted from 
Bolsa Familia in 2009 and 41 percent were eligible but not yet enrolled.  
The relevant outcome variables include the anthropometric measures of all 
household members19, as well as detailed accounts of the households’ spending on 
different food items (e.g. carbohydrate sources by type, protein sources by type, 
vegetables, sweets, processed food, and meals consumed outside of the household). 
Moreover, the survey also collected a rich set of household-level characteristics, 
such as the household’s access to government-provided infrastructure (e.g. water, 
sanitation, electricity) as well as housing quality, which are used as control variables. 
The AIBF dataset also includes data on household income, but it is less consistently 
reported and prone to misreporting, given Bolsa Familia is a means-tested 
programme and the AIBF survey may have been perceived as an government’s data 
                                               
19 In the second AIBF wave, this information was only collected for children under the age of 10 and 
their mothers, implying a smaller sample for these outcomes in the second survey wave.  
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collection. As a consequence the analysis focuses primarily on expenditure, rather 
than income data.  
Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics for the key outcome and control 
variables, for both the treatment and the comparison group in this study. Table 1 
illustrates that even though both the treatment and the comparison group fulfil the 
formal eligibility criteria for Bolsa Familia, there are important demographic and 
socioeconomic differences between both groups. Bolsa Familia households are on 
average larger (4.85 vs. 4.24 household members), they have more children (2.17 vs. 
1.32 in the comparison group), the household heads tend to be younger (41.16 vs. 
46.57 years of age) and work more frequently in the informal sector (56.2 percent vs. 
43.6 percent) than household heads in the comparison group. Moreover, households 
from the treatment group tend to live in villages/neighbourhoods where the public 
infrastructure is less developed, as e.g. manifest in a lower share of paved roads, 
connections to the water grid and access to centralised waste collection. Lastly, per 
capita consumption per week is also much lower for treatment households with 
45.78 BRL (approximately 15 USD at the time of the survey), as compared to 62.54 
BRL (21 USD) in the comparison group. This implies that even after the Bolsa 
Familia cash transfers, the programme participants on average only marginally 
surpassed the World Bank’s absolute poverty rate of $1.90 USD per day. Most of the 
difference in per capita consumption can be explained by gaps in non-food 




Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics by Bolsa Familia participation (household level) 
 Control  Treatment  t-test for equality of means 
(p-values)  Mean SD N  Mean SD N  
Control variables          
Share of HH members aged 0-4 0.0475 0.0000 4693  0.0730 0.0000 6967  0.000 
Share of HH members aged 5-9 0.0633 0.0000 4693  0.1215 0.0000 6967  0.000 
Share of HH members aged 10-14 0.0799 0.0001 4693  0.1439 0.0000 6967  0.000 
Share of HH members over 65 0.0865 0.0002 4693  0.0203 0.0000 6967  0.000 
Number of children 1.3280 0.0023 4693  2.1741 0.0014 6967  0.000 
HH size 4.2482 0.0068 4693  4.8518 0.0024 6967  0.000 
Age HH head 46.5715 0.5015 4538  41.1640 0.1211 6741  0.000 
Female HH head (binary) 0.4772 0.0005 4544  0.5207 0.0002 6760  0.000 
Employed HH head (binary) 0.6171 0.0005 4501  0.6688 0.0002 6718  0.000 
Informal sector (binary) 0.4362 0.0006 4350  0.5621 0.0003 6501  0.000 
Pavement 0.5539 0.0005 4690  0.4380 0.0003 6965  0.000 
Paved road 0.5709 0.0005 4691  0.4346 0.0003 6962  0.000 
Tapped water 0.8773 0.0001 4684  0.7587 0.0002 6952  0.000 
Centralised waste collection 0.8413 0.0002 4677  0.7177 0.0002 6941  0.000 
Improved floor 0.6215 0.0004 4693  0.3972 0.0003 6966  0.000 
Improved roof 0.8202 0.0003 4693  0.8040 0.0002 6966  0.000 
Improved sanitation 0.6425 0.0004 4564  0.4812 0.0003 6795  0.000 
Outcomes          
Total consumption 190.87 107.88 4683  156.35 19.46 6966  0.00 
Total consumption (per capita) 62.54 9.96 4506  45.78 1.43 6727  0.00 
Total food consumption 91.35 18.05 4683  87.18 6.01 6966  0.47 
Total food consumption (per capita) 29.85 2.28 4506  25.28 0.42 6727  0.00 
Total nonfood consumption 99.52 49.80 4684  69.17 6.26 6967  0.00 
Total nonfood consumption (per capita) 32.69 4.14 4507  20.50 0.55 6728  0.00 
Total income 55.61 12.14 3200  79.96 7.08 4484  0.00 
Total income (per capita) 15.47 1.05 3058   21.26 0.45 4317   0.00 
Note: Descriptive statistics based on pooled data from both AIBF waves. The consumption outcomes are reported in Brazilian Reals (1 BRL corresponded to approximately 2-2.5 USD in 2005-2009). 
The reference period for these outcomes is one week. Survey weights based on the first survey wave.  
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics (individual level) 
 Control  Treatment  
t-test for equality of 
means (p-values)  Mean SD N  Mean SD N  
Adults          
Age  39.39 0.22 13474  35.91 0.07 18578  0.00 
Female 0.53 0.00 13710  0.52 0.00 18873  0.98 
Primary education (binary) 0.58 0.00 7433  0.71 0.00 10361  0.00 
Secondary education (binary) 0.36 0.00 7459  0.23 0.00 10351  0.00 
BMI 24.14 0.03 4493  24.33 0.01 7744  0.00 
Overweight 0.38 0.00 4493  0.37 0.00 7744  0.02 
Obesity 0.11 0.00 4493  0.10 0.00 7744  0.43 
Underweight 0.06 0.00 4493  0.06 0.00 7744  0.00 
Children          
Age  9.15 0.03 7906  9.48 0.01 16196  0.00 
Female 0.47 0.00 7902  0.49 0.00 16177  0.98 
Height-for-age (z-score) -0.24 0.00 4728  -0.45 0.00 10040  0.19 
Weight-for-age (z-score) -0.04 0.00 3474  -0.14 0.00 6930  0.00 
Weight-for-height (z-score) 0.03 0.01 2165  0.18 0.00 4114  0.27 
BMI-for-age (z-score) 0.03 0.00 4692  -0.01 0.00 9982  0.00 
Stunting 0.08 0.00 4728  0.10 0.00 10040  0.81 
Wasting 0.06 0.00 2165  0.04 0.00 4114  0.63 
Underweight 0.21 0.00 4292  0.19 0.00 9491  0.00 
Overweight 0.15 0.00 4292  0.14 0.00 9491  0.02 
Obesity 0.04 0.00 4292   0.03 0.00 9491   0.43 
Note: Descriptive statistics based on both waves of the AIBF (pooled). Survey weights based on the first survey wave.  
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In spite of the important socioeconomic and demographic differences, the 
nutritional outcomes between both groups are very similar. The BMI among adults 
in both groups amounts to approximately 24, while the prevalence of overweight 
ranges between 37 and 38, and of obesity between 10 and 11 percent. Children in the 
treatment group have lower height-for-age and weight-for-age z-scores, but higher 
weight-for-height z-scores than in the comparison group. The prevalence of stunting 
is slightly higher in the treatment group (10 vs. 8 percent), but the difference not 
statistically significant. The prevalence of underweight (19 percent), overweight (14 
percent) and obesity (3 percent) is slightly lower among children in the treatment 
group. 
Lastly, figure 1.3 provides an initial overview on the composition of food 
expenditure among households participating in Bolsa Familia. In spite of the low 
overall consumption expenditure, its composition is relatively diverse, with 18.9 
percent dedicated to simple carbohydrates (rice, bread, potatoes, etc.), almost 40 
percent to meat and fish, and 14 percent to fruit and vegetables. Moreover, 8 percent 
of household expenditure is dedicated to sweets and soft drinks, and 1.6 percent are 
spent on processed food. The differences to the comparison group are negligible as 
illustrated in figure A1 and table A2 in the appendix.  
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5. Methods 
In order to estimate the impact of Bolsa Familia on the outcomes of interest, 
regressions with household-level fixed effects are estimated. For the household-level 
outcomes, our regressions take the form 
!"# = 	&	'("# + *	+′"# + -# +	." +	/"#	 
 
where  '("# indicates Bolsa Familia participation of household h at time t, +′"# is a 
vector of observable time-variant control variables, -# is a time dummy for the 
second time period (2009), and /"# is a time-variant household-level idiosyncratic 
shock. The fixed effect is defined as  
 
." = 	. + 	0	1"	 
 
where . is a constant and 1" is a set of time-invariant household level confounders. 
Drawing on regressions with household-level fixed effects implies that our impact 
estimation results rely on the variation in Bolsa Familia participation between 
different households in a given municipality, i.e. they do not take into account 
variation between municipalities. The advantage of this approach is that the 
estimates are not prone to bias due to unobservable time-invariant municipality-level 
characteristics. The disadvantage is that we cannot draw on the potentially random 
variation between municipalities (e.g. due to the municipality-level quotas) which 
was described in section 3. 
 The identifying assumption of our estimates is that selection into treatment is 
exclusively based on time-varying observables included in  +′"#, as well as time-
invariant unobservable characteristics captured by the fixed effect .". In other 
words, selection into treatment is not based on time-varying unobservables. If this 
assumption holds true, & will indeed reflect the causal impact of Bolsa Familia on 
the outcomes of interest.  
In the context of this study, this assumption can be considered as relatively 
realistic. First, the AIBF survey provides rich information on observable time-
varying household characteristics, such as the demographic composition of 
households, employment of the household head, as well as the municipality-level 
infrastructure which a household can access. Secondly, the unobservable factors 
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which could bias the regression results are time-invariant, e.g. ability and 
psychological predispositions of different household members, genetic risk factors 
for overweight and obesity, as well as their preferences and tastes for certain foods. 
Apart from these factors, it is at least not obvious which time varying factors could 
be simultaneously correlated with Bolsa Familia treatment and the outcomes of 
interest.  
Regressions with individual-level outcomes also include household-level, 
rather than individual level fixed effects. This has two main reasons: first, the AIBF 
survey has exactly matched households, but not individuals between rounds. 
Matching different individuals manually, e.g. based on age, would thus entail a large 
degree of uncertainty. Secondly, the undernutrition indicators are most relevant for 
children in the age bracket between 2 and 10 years of age. Many observations from 
the second survey wave would thus need to be excluded from an analysis with 
individual-level fixed effects, as these children are only observed in the second 
survey wave. The individual level regressions thus take the form  
 
!2"# = 	&	'("# + *	+′"# + 	3	4′2# + -# 	+ 	." +	/2"#	 
 
where the subscript i represents the individual, and 4′2# is a vector of time-varying 
individual-level control variables.  
 In a first step, the paper assesses Bolsa Familia’s overall impact on 
nutritional outcomes among both children and adults. The nutritional outcomes 
presented in table 2 are regressed on Bolsa Familia participation based on the fixed 
effects models presented above.  
In a second step, the paper investigates the channels which have contributed to this 
observed effect, in particular on the relative importance of the overall consumption 
increase and changes in the composition of food expenditure. In order to investigate 
the overall consumption effect, total food expenditure as well as expenditure on  
different food items is regressed on Bolsa Familia participation. To investigate 
changes in the composition of food expenditure, I regress the relative share of 
different food items in a household’s consumption basket on Bolsa Familia 
treatment. Although it would be interesting to also test the other channels 
hypothesized in section 2, e.g. the role of conditionalities and education, this is not 
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feasible based on the available data (only short run data on education available) and 
study setting (all households were subject to conditionalities). 
 The standard errors for all regressions with individual-level outcomes are 
clustered at the household-level, given that treatment is also assigned at the 
household level, following the guidance by Abadie et al. (2017). Standard errors for 
household level outcomes are robust to heteroscedasticity but not clustered, given 
that treatment assignment was based on a household-level means test and thus 
independent from municipality or state level characteristics. Lastly, it should be 
noted that the consumption-related outcomes are reported both as household totals, 
and per capita consumption based on an adult equivalent scale specifically developed 
for Brazil based on data from the period of interest (Vaz & Vaz 2007). However, 
other equivalence scales were tested and results are stable with regards to the choice 




Table 3 presents the fixed effect estimates on the impact of Bolsa Familia on 
nutritional outcomes among children (columns 4-6), as well as OLS estimates for 
comparison (columns 1-3). The OLS estimates in column 1 suggest that children 
from Bolsa Familia households tend to have lower weight-for-age, BMI-for-age 
scores, and a lower prevalence of overweight. However, these results lose their 
significance once further household-level controls are included in the regressions. 
The fixed effect estimates in columns 4-6, which unlike the OLS estimates also 
control for time-invariant unobservable factors, provide suggestive evidence that 
Bolsa Familia increased overweight among children by approximately 4 percentage 
points. This finding is robust to the choice of control variables, but only statistically 
significant at the 10% level. The estimated coefficients for all other nutritional 











Table 2.3: Impact of Bolsa Familia on nutritional outcomes among children (<18) 
 OLS estimates  FE estimates   
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  N 
Height-for-age (z-scores) -0.0347 0.0003 0.0059  -0.015 -0.021 -0.001  14,249 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)  (0.062) (0.062) (0.066)   
Weight-for-age (z-scores) -0.071*** -0.0220 -0.0247  -0.026 -0.016 0.005  9,954 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)  (0.057) (0.057) (0.062)   
Weight-for-height (z-scores) -0.0347 -0.0134 -0.0196  0.041 0.045 0.079  6,032 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.04)  (0.111) (0.114) (0.117)   
BMI-for-age (z-scores) -0.069*** -0.0320 -0.0338  -0.015 0.000 0.009  14,167 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)  (0.077) (0.077) (0.082)   
Stunting 0.0012 -0.0034 -0.0044  0.002 0.003 0.003  14,249 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)   
Wasting 0.0026 0.0001 -0.0002  -0.006 0.002 -0.001  6,032 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)   
Underweight 0.0074 0.0046 0.0059  0.016 0.017 0.022  13,288 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)   
Overweight -0.0135** -0.0076 -0.0074  0.036* 0.039* 0.043*  13,288 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)   
Obesity -0.0062 -0.0042 -0.0040  0.001 0.000 -0.001  13,288 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)   
Controls individual x x x  x x x   
Controls demography (HH-level) x x   x x   
Controls socioeconomic situation 
(HH-level)     x       x     
Note: Summary of the regression coefficients on Bolsa Familia treatment for the four nutritional outcomes of interest (obesity, overweight, 
underweight, BMI). All regressions include a time dummy for the second time period. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4 presents OLS and FE estimates on Bolsa Familia’s impact on adults. 
The OLS estimates show that conditional on the standard set of control variables, 
Bolsa Familia participants’ BMI is on average 0.2 index points higher, and their risk 
of being overweight is 2.5 percentage points higher than for non-participants. This 
finding is rather unexpected, given that Bolsa Familia beneficiaries on average have 
lower consumption expenditures than non-beneficiaries, as illustrated in section 3. 
However, once fixed effects are added to the regression models, these coefficients 
lose their statistical significance. Overall, it can be concluded that there is a 
statistically significant correlation between Bolsa Familia treatment and overweight, 
but there is no evidence that this relationship is causal.  
 
Table 2.4: Impact of Bolsa Familia on nutritional outcomes among adults (Fixed effect estimates) 
 OLS estimates  FE estimates 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
BMI 0.232** 0.191* 0.185*  0.210 0.235 0.371 
 (0.0996) (0.102) (0.103)  (0.308) (0.311) (0.328) 
Overweight 0.0246** 0.0246** 0.0249**  -0.0054 -0.0091 -0.0052 
 (0.0107) (0.0109) (0.0110)  (0.0368) (0.0372) (0.0387) 
Obesity 0.00755 0.00623 0.00625  0.0252 0.0255 0.0296 
 (0.00690) (0.00709) (0.00712)  (0.0233) (0.0236) (0.0242) 
Underweight 0.00350 0.00491 0.00528  0.0112 0.00649 0.00388 
 (0.00518) (0.00534) (0.00541)  (0.0165) (0.0167) (0.0173) 
Controls individual x x x  x x x 
Controls demography (HH-level)  x x   x x 
Controls socioeconomic situation 
(HH-level)     x      x 
Number of observations 8,453 8,453 8,309  8,453 8,453 8,309 
Number of households 4,666 4,666 4,586   4,666 4,666 4,586 
Note: Summary of the regression coefficients on Bolsa Familia treatment for the four nutritional outcomes of interest (obesity, 
overweight, underweight, BMI). All regressions include a time dummy for the second time period.. Standard errors are clustered 
at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Heterogeneities 
Given that Brazil is characterised by important geographic disparities, this 
paper also investigates on the heterogeneities in Bolsa Familia’s impact between the 
five large geographic regions of the country: the North, mainly covering the Amazon 
rainforest; the Northeast consisting of coastal areas and a semi-arid hinterland which 
features the highest poverty rates in the country (and by extension the highest share 
of Bolsa Familia beneficiaries); the Centre-West which is characterised by both 
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large-scale and small-scale agriculture; the more urban Southeast including the 
country’s largest cities São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro; as well as the affluent South 
bordering Argentina and Uruguay.  
In order to analyse the heterogeneous treatment effects between these 
regions, the anthropometric outcomes of interest have been regressed on Bolsa 
Familia treatment status, dummy variables for four of Brazil’s geographic regions 
(the Centre-West is used as a reference category), as well as interaction terms 
between each of the regions and Bolsa Familia treatment. Based on these estimates, 
the overall treatment effect for each region can be estimated as the linear 
combination of each region dummy and the corresponding interaction term.  
Table 5 presents the results of these regressions for children. It suggests that 
there may have been regional disparities in treatment effects. For the Northern region 
including the Amazon, the results suggest that Bolsa Familia has reduced obesity 
among children by 8.2 percentage points, as manifest in the significant linear 
combination coefficient in column 9. On the other hand, for the urban Southeast, 
there is evidence that the programme has led to an overall increase in overweight by 
8.7 percentage points (significant at the 5% level) and of obesity by 3.6 percentage 
points (significant at the 10% level).   
As a matter of caution, it should be noted that these coefficients are 
surprisingly large, and should thus be interpreted carefully. One possible explanation 
is that the available sub-samples in each of the 5 regions (especially the sparsely 
populated North) are too small in order to precisely estimate these heterogeneous 






Table 2.5: Heterogeneous treatment effects of Bolsa Familia across Brazilian regions (children<18), fixed effects estimates 













score) Stunting Wasting Underweight Overweight Obesity 
          
Bolsa Familia (BF) -0.120 -0.0487 -0.557* 0.328 0.0297 0.0151 -0.0367 0.177** 0.0230 
 (0.215) (0.206) (0.319) (0.232) (0.0428) (0.139) (0.0907) (0.0725) (0.0250) 
BF * North 0.194 -0.217 0.0888 -0.759** -0.0279 0.0458 0.0963 -0.209** -0.105*** 
 (0.271) (0.272) (0.473) (0.349) (0.0663) (0.151) (0.106) (0.0990) (0.0394) 
Linear combination (BF* North) + BF 0.074 -0.265 -0.468 -0.431* 0.002 0.061 0.060 -0.032 -0.082** 
 (0.163) (0.1748) (0.3457) (0.2511) (0.0506) (0.0536) (0.0551) (0.0664) (0.0308) 
BF* Northeast 0.0658 0.0399 0.728** -0.263 -0.0335 -0.0135 0.0547 -0.152* -0.0254 
 (0.234) (0.223) (0.341) (0.252) (0.0489) (0.141) (0.0958) (0.0794) (0.0309) 
Linear combination (BF* Northeast) + BF -0.054 -0.009 0.172 0.065 -0.004 0.002 0.018 0.025 -0.002 
 (0.0944) (0.0866) (0.1492) (0.1089) (0.0242) (0.0287) (0.0316) (0.0338) (0.0194) 
BF * Southeast 0.118 0.229 0.898** -0.162 -0.0181 -0.0264 0.0345 -0.0903 0.0131 
 (0.252) (0.234) (0.400) (0.283) (0.0546) (0.146) (0.102) (0.0833) (0.0338) 
Linear combination (BF* Southeast) + BF -0.002 0.180 0.341 0.166 0.012 -0.011 -0.002 0.087** 0.036* 
 (0.1321) (0.114) (0.2444) (0.1602) (0.0353) (0.0438) (0.0461) (0.0407) (0.0217) 
BF * South  0.355 0.178 0.767 -0.423 -0.0426 -0.130 0.113 -0.141 0.0114 
 (0.334) (0.283) (0.476) (0.370) (0.0740) (0.159) (0.116) (0.109) (0.0564) 
Linear combination (BF* South) + BF 0.235 0.130 0.210 -0.095 -0.013 -0.115 0.076 0.036 0.034 
 (0.2534) (0.1949) (0.3552) (0.2996) (0.0602) (0.08) (0.0725) (0.0798) (0.0501) 
Individual Controls x x x x x x x x x 
HH-level cotrols (demographic & socioeconomic 
characteristics) 
x x x x x x x x x 
Number of observation 11,734 8,310 4,968 11,653 11,734 4,968 10,989 10,989 10,989 
Number of households 4,624 3,942 2,846 4,598 4,624 2,846 4,543 4,543 4,543 
Note: All regressions include a time dummy for the second time period. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Channels 
As a next step, I have investigated on the channels through which the Bolsa Familia 
cash transfers affect nutritional outcomes, in particular whether there is evidence for 
an increase in total food expenditure and/or a change in the composition of food 
expenditure. Table 6 summarises Bolsa Familia’s impact on overall household 
consumption expenditure, also disaggregated by food consumption and non-food 
consumption. The OLS estimates in columns 1 and 2 suggest a negative and 
significant correlation between Bolsa Familia participation and total consumption 
expenditure, as well as total non-food expenditure. This also confirms the finding 
from the descriptive analysis which indicated that Bolsa Familia participants are less 
well-off than eligible non-participants (our comparison group).  
However, once household-level fixed effects are included, the coefficients on 
Bolsa Familia become positive and significant, suggesting that the programme led to 
important welfare gains for its beneficiaries. Bolsa Familia is estimated to increase 
the average per capita household expenditure by 5.2 BRL per week (1.73 USD at the 
time of the survey, or 11 percent of total consumption expenditure in treated 
households). This finding is significant at the 5% level. The bulk of this increase can 
be attributed to additional food spending, amounting to 3.7 BRL (1.25 USD, or 
approximately 15 percent of total food expenditure) per capita per week. This 
finding is significant at the 1% significance level. Overall, this can be considered as 
evidence for an income effect, i.e. Bolsa Familia leads to an increase in overall food 
expenditure.   
Table 7 provides evidence how this overall increase in food spending has 
been distributed across different food items. In particular, the per capita spending on 
each of 13 food items has been regressed on Bolsa Familia treatment and the usual 
control variables and fixed effects. The results suggest that the average household 
spent a large share of its additional income on meat and fish (1.22 BRL, 
corresponding to 32 percent of the total increase in food spending). This is followed 
by carbohydrates (0.41 BRL, corresponding to 11.1 percent of the increase in food 
spending), sweets (0.39 BRL or 10.5 percent of the increase in food spending), and 
dairy (0.38 BRL, or 10.2 percent of the total increase in food spending). It should be 
noted that, although large, the coefficient on meat is not statistically significant, 
while the latter three findings are all significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the 
expenditure data does not allow any definite conclusions on eventual changes in the 
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intake of calories. This analysis is hampered by the fact that different food items are 
aggregated in the AIBF survey, e.g for sweets.   
Table 8 further investigates on changes in the composition of household’s 
consumption bundles, using the expenditure share of different food items as the 
outcome variable. However, these regressions do not yield any statistically 
significant results. All in all, the analysis provides solid evidence that Bolsa Familia 
has led to an increase in overall consumption expenditure, including increases in 
total consumption and food consumption, but that there is not enough evidence to 
conclude that the composition of the beneficiary households’ consumption bundle 
has changed in response to the programme.  
 
Table 2.6 - Impact of Bolsa Familia on overall household income & consumption 
 OLS  FE 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Total consumption -15.40*** -11.67***  12.17** 15.83** 
 (3.322) (3.634)  (5.471) (6.397) 
Total consumption (per capita) -4.180*** -3.474***  4.079** 5.213** 
 (1.127) (1.241)  (1.765) (2.043) 
Total food consumption -0.951 0.154  8.962*** 10.83*** 
 (1.293) (1.334)  (3.102) (3.411) 
Total food consumption (per capita) -0.232 -0.0941  3.057*** 3.664*** 
 (0.405) (0.423)  (0.982) (1.059) 
Total non-food consumption -14.44*** -11.82***  3.207 4.999 
 (2.857) (3.191)  (3.875) (4.838) 
Total non-food consumption (per capita) -3.948*** -3.379***  1.023 1.549 
 (0.995) (1.112)  (1.279) (1.583) 
Total income 13.21*** 15.13***  38.80*** 25.62** 
 (1.560) (1.653)  (10.86) (10.61) 
Total income (per capita) 3.864*** 4.127***  9.653*** 6.933*** 
 (0.408) (0.429)  (2.467) (2.653) 
Controls demographic composition x x  x x 
Controls socioeconomic situation   x     x 
Number of observations  11,245 10,475    11,245  10,475  
Note:  All regressions include a time dummy for the second time period. Robust standard errors in 













Table 2.7: Impact of Bolsa Familia on per capita food expenditure by food group in BRL  
 OLS  FE 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Carbohydrates 0.158** 0.153**  0.242 0.407*** 
 (0.0638) (0.0672)  (0.152) (0.156) 
Plant-based protein 0.136*** 0.114***  0.0282 0.0375 
 (0.0379) (0.0399)  (0.0462) (0.0501) 
Fruit 0.0568 0.0893*  0.221 0.181 
 (0.0494) (0.0518)  (0.142) (0.123) 
Vegetables 0.0315 0.0526  0.128 0.210 
 (0.0463) (0.0493)  (0.124) (0.136) 
Meat & Fish -0.482* -0.466*  1.010 1.225 
 (0.261) (0.271)  (0.737) (0.813) 
Dairy -0.132 -0.102  0.329** 0.388*** 
 (0.0857) (0.100)  (0.131) (0.150) 
Fat 0.0111 0.00441  0.131** 0.162** 
 (0.0318) (0.0358)  (0.0636) (0.0738) 
Eggs 0.0176 0.0195  0.0542 0.0579 
 (0.0149) (0.0154)  (0.0344) (0.0371) 
Meals out 0.0197 0.00941  0.187** 0.190* 
 (0.0514) (0.0546)  (0.0926) (0.0991) 
Sweets 0.0280 0.0431  0.307*** 0.390*** 
 (0.0401) (0.0419)  (0.0948) (0.101) 
Alcohol -0.0191 -0.00887  0.126* 0.0808** 
 (0.0237) (0.0250)  (0.0706) (0.0385) 
Processed food -0.0293 -0.0156  0.0810 0.0783 
 (0.0213) (0.0225)  (0.0563) (0.0632) 
Coffee 0.0220 0.0173  0.00583 0.0245 
 (0.0151) (0.0155)  (0.0194) (0.0206) 
Temptation goods -0.0252 -0.0152  0.0677 0.0807 
 (0.0319) (0.0320)  (0.0592) (0.0647) 
School snacks -0.0204 -0.00615  0.0684 0.0545 
 (0.0210) (0.0216)  (0.0435) (0.0455) 
Controls demographic composition x x  x x 
Controls socioeconomic situation   x     x 
Number of observations 13,575 12,732   12,276 12,254 












Table 2.8: Impact of Bolsa Familia on the composition of household food expenditure 
(shares of food group in total food expenditure) - FE estimates 
 OLS  FE 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Carbohydrates 0.00417 0.00321  -0.00319 -0.000639 
 (0.00256) (0.00266)  (0.00603) (0.00644) 
Plant-based protein 0.00561*** 0.00412***  -0.00101 -0.00139 
 (0.00107) (0.00111)  (0.00279) (0.00307) 
Fruit 0.00143 0.00259**  0.00542* 0.00482 
 (0.00122) (0.00129)  (0.00313) (0.00330) 
Vegetables 0.00162 0.00271**  0.00203 0.00397 
 (0.00129) (0.00133)  (0.00310) (0.00335) 
Meat & Fish -0.00718 -0.00758  -0.00749 -0.00821 
 (0.00458) (0.00471)  (0.00995) (0.0106) 
Dairy -0.0062*** -0.0051***  -0.00287 -0.00509 
 (0.00183) (0.00191)  (0.00417) (0.00448) 
Fat 0.000115 -0.000378  -0.00074 -0.00147 
 (0.000816) (0.000873)  (0.00189) (0.00194) 
Eggs 0.00113 0.00103  0.000834 0.000545 
 (0.000869) (0.000913)  (0.00206) (0.00210) 
Meals out 0.000990 0.000527  0.00228 0.00228 
 (0.00120) (0.00123)  (0.00282) (0.00301) 
Sweets 0.00267* 0.00284*  0.00428 0.00512 
 (0.00153) (0.00159)  (0.00374) (0.00397) 
Alcohol -0.00130** -0.00136**  0.00182 0.00113 
 (0.000624) (0.000660)  (0.00138) (0.00118) 
Processed food -0.00140* -0.00123  0.000311 1.53e-05 
 (0.000826) (0.000863)  (0.00176) (0.00193) 
Coffee -0.000823 -0.00102*  -0.0029* -0.0031** 
 (0.000595) (0.000614)  (0.00127) (0.00135) 
Temptation goods -0.00127 -0.00118  0.000945 0.00155 
 (0.00105) (0.00111)  (0.00209) (0.00220) 
School snacks -0.000820 -0.000334  -0.00061 -0.000607 
 (0.00111) (0.00115)  (0.00218) (0.00230) 
Controls demographic composition x x  x x 
Controls socioeconomic situation   x     x 
Number of observations 13,575 12,732   12,276 12,254 








Evaluating Bolsa Familia’s impact on the beneficiary households’ consumption 
behaviours required running a relatively large number of regressions with different 
outcomes. To some extent, this is also true for the nutritional outcomes of children, 
for which a larger number of measures apply than for adults (including both z-scores 
and binary outcomes). However, testing many hypotheses increases the risk of “false 
positives” i.e. wrongly rejecting the null hypothesis of zero programme impact. In 
order to quantify this risk, tables 9 and 10 present corrected p-values which take into 
account multiple hypothesis testing. The table presents corrected p-values based on 
the methods proposed by both Bonferroni, Holm and Holland. Based on these 
corrected p-values, only the coefficients on total food consumption, per capita food 




Table 2.9: P-values with correction for multiple hypothesis testing 








 Bonferroni Holm Holland  Bonferroni Holm Holland 
Adults          
BMI 0.400 1.000 1.000 0.802  0.233 0.931 0.931 0.653 
Overweight 0.695 1.000 1.000 0.907  0.743 1.000 1.000 0.934 
Obesity 0.333 1.000 1.000 0.802  0.264 1.000 0.931 0.653 
Underweight 0.958 1.000 1.000 0.958  0.814 1.000 1.000 0.934 
Children          
Height-for-age (z-scores) 0.737 1.000 1.000 1.000  0.984 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Weight-for-age (z-scores) 0.780 1.000 1.000 1.000  0.934 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Weight-for-height (z-
scores) 0.704 1.000 1.000 1.000  0.507 1.000 1.000 0.993 
BMI-for-age (z-scores) 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000  0.916 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Stunting 0.852 1.000 1.000 1.000  0.880 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Wasting 0.932 1.000 1.000 1.000  0.968 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Underweight 0.531 1.000 1.000 0.998  0.413 1.000 1.000 0.986 
Overweight 0.104 0.934 0.934 0.627  0.084 0.755 0.755 0.545 




Table 2.10: P-values with correction for multiple hypothesis testing (consumption-related outcomes) 
 
Specification I (column 3 in table 
x)  




Corrected p-value  p-
value 
Corrected p-value 
 Bonferroni Holm Holland  Bonferroni Holm Holland 
Expenditure by food group         
Carbohydrates 0.16 1.00 1.00 0.82  0.02 0.30 0.28 0.25 
Plant-based protein 0.56 1.00 1.00 0.82  0.47 1.00 1.00 0.74 
Fruit 0.16 1.00 1.00 0.82  0.16 1.00 1.00 0.74 
Vegetables 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.82  0.14 1.00 1.00 0.74 
Meat & Fish 0.21 1.00 1.00 0.82  0.15 1.00 1.00 0.74 
Dairy 0.04 0.61 0.57 0.44  0.02 0.31 0.28 0.25 
Fat 0.08 1.00 1.00 0.66  0.04 0.66 0.53 0.42 
Eggs 0.16 1.00 1.00 0.82  0.14 1.00 1.00 0.74 
Meals out 0.08 1.00 1.00 0.66  0.07 1.00 0.74 0.54 
Sweets 0.01 0.21 0.21 0.19  0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Alcohol 0.12 1.00 1.00 0.75  0.05 0.79 0.58 0.45 
Processed food 0.19 1.00 1.00 0.82  0.23 1.00 1.00 0.74 
Coffee 0.77 1.00 1.00 0.82  0.25 1.00 1.00 0.74 
Temptation goods 0.29 1.00 1.00 0.82  0.23 1.00 1.00 0.74 
School snacks 0.16 1.00 1.00 0.82  0.25 1.00 1.00 0.74 
Share of food group in total expenditure        
Carbohydrates 0.61 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Plant-based protein 0.73 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.66 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Fruit 0.13 1.00 1.00 0.87  0.16 1.00 1.00 0.93 
Vegetables 0.53 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.25 1.00 1.00 0.98 
Meat & Fish 0.51 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.27 1.00 1.00 0.98 
Dairy 0.71 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.46 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Fat 0.29 1.00 1.00 0.99  0.22 1.00 1.00 0.97 
Eggs 0.48 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.45 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Meals out 0.23 1.00 1.00 0.97  0.35 1.00 1.00 0.99 
Sweets 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Alcohol 0.70 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Processed food 0.69 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.59 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Coffee 0.06 0.94 0.94 0.62  0.04 0.58 0.58 0.45 
Temptation goods 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.49 1.00 1.00 1.00 
School snacks 0.79 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Income & consumption          
Total income 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.06  0.03 0.23 0.12 0.11 
Total income (pc) 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.05  0.02 0.16 0.12 0.11 
Total consumption 0.06 0.49 0.22 0.20  0.03 0.21 0.12 0.11 
Total consumption (pc) 0.05 0.43 0.22 0.20  0.02 0.18 0.12 0.11 
Total food consumption 0.02 0.19 0.12 0.11  0.01 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Total food cons (pc) 0.02 0.14 0.10 0.10  0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Total non-food cons 0.44 1.00 0.87 0.68  0.32 1.00 0.64 0.53 
Total non-food (pc) 0.45 1.00 0.87 0.68  0.34 1.00 0.64 0.53 
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However, in the context of this study, it is considered reasonable to consider 
the other significant findings reported above as suggestive evidence for a treatment 
effect. As we know very little about the impact of cash transfers on overweight and 
obesity, it may make sense to start building a picture of the impacts based on 
available data and evidence, even if the small relatively small sample size of this 
study implies that treatment effects are estimated with relatively large standard 
errors, and may therefore not pass multiple hypothesis tests.  
 Another concern relates to the large regional disparities in Brazil and the fact 
that region-specific trends, not accounted for by the linear time trend in the main 
specifications, may explain part of the findings. In order to address this risk, all main 
regression models were re-estimated with a region-specific trend for each of Brazil’s 
five main geographic regions. The results of this robustness check are presented in 
tables A4-A7 and corroborate the findings from the main analysis.  
 
7. Conclusion  
Overall, this paper provides suggestive evidence that Bolsa Familia has led to an 
increase in overweight among children by approximately 4 percentage points. 
However, there was no statistically significant effect on child obesity or on 
anthropometric outcomes among adults. Neither was there a statistically significant 
effect on undernutrition among children.  
The impacts on food consumption suggest that Bolsa Familia leads to higher 
food expenditure, and possibly also less healthy diets. This study documents an 
increase in total food expenditure in response to the Bolsa Familia transfers by 15 
percent. There is also evidence for a disproportionate increase in the absolute per 
capita expenditure on dairy products and sugary products (sweets, soft drinks), even 
though this effect could not be detected in the expenditure shares for each of these 
food items.  
How do these findings relate to other studies? With regards to overnutrition, 
Fernald et al.’s (2008a) and Levasseur (2019) showed that the Oportunidades 
programme’s conditionalites in Mexico have helped to reduce BMI and 
overweight/obesity among the programme’s participants. Although the adverse 
nutritional impacts of Bolsa Familia detected in this study were small and limited to 
child overweight, there is no evidence that the programme contributes to a reduction 
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of overnutrition in Brazil. A possible explanation for this, is that the Mexican 
Oportunidades is already “obesity-sensitive”, while Bolsa Familia is not. The 
Mexican conditionalities include e.g. the regular participation in trainings sessions 
(pláticas) which provide inter alia information on healthy diets. In this context, it is 
also important to point to recent evidence illustrating that cash transfers are more 
effective in reducing undernutrition when combined with training sessions, or social 
and behaviour change communication (SBCC) campaigns (Field & Maffioli 2020). 
Explicitly testing the effectiveness of obesity-related conditionalities, as under 
Oportunidades, should therefore also be considered a priority for further research. 
With regards to undernutrition, the results are in line with the only previous 
impact evaluation on Bolsa Familia which assessed anthropometric outcomes among 
children (De Brauw et al. 2010). Their study detects a statistically significant effect 
on BMI-for-age z-scores among children, but no effect on undernutrition as 
measured by stunting, wasting, height-for-age z-scores, or weight-for-age z-scores. 
Bastagli et al.’s review (2016) shows that even in other countries, cash transfer 
evaluations have rarely detected statistically significant effects on measures of 
undernutrition: only five out of 13 studies found an impact on stunting, one out of 5 
for wasting, and zero out of seven for weight-for-age z-scores. Possible explanations 
for the lack of significant (observed) effects on undernutrition include an insufficient 
follow-up period to observe the slow changes to height and weight, and the fact that 
anthropometric outcomes are particularly susceptible to measurement error 
(especially for younger children). Moreover, the timing of cash transfers may matter 
for reducing undernutrition, with the first 1000 days in the life of a child being 
crucial. Cash transfer evaluations which do not focus exclusively on children who 
were exposed to the treatment in this period, may therefore not be able to capture the 
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Table 2.A1: Composition of household income - by treatment status 
 Control  Treatment  t-test for equality of means 
(p-values)  Mean SD N  Mean SD N  
Total income 55.61 12.14 3200  79.96 7.08 4484  0.00 
Labour income 36.36 4.46 4693  47.26 2.71 6967  0.00 
Social security (contributory) 14.98 2.59 4693  9.18 0.74 6967  0.00 
Intra-family transfers 3.86 0.68 4693  2.57 0.08 6967  0.00 
Bolsa Familia 0.00 0.00 4693  18.42 0.10 6967  0.00 
Total income (per capita) 15.47 1.05 3058  21.26 0.45 4317  0.00 
Labour income (per capita) 10.40 0.41 4515  12.86 0.19 6728  0.06 
Social security (per capita) 4.40 0.24 4515  2.47 0.06 6728  0.00 
Intra-family transfers (per capita) 1.37 0.12 4515  0.80 0.01 6728  0.00 
Bolsa Familia (per capita) 0.00 0.00 4515   5.53 0.01 6728   0.00 
Note: Descriptive statistics based on pooled data from both AIBF waves. The consumption outcomes are reported in Brazilian Reals (1 BRL corresponded to 















Table 2.A2: Composition of household food expenditure - by treatment status 
 Control  Treatment  t-test for equality of means (p-
values)  Mean SD N  Mean SD N  
Carbohydrates 0.167 0.000 2908  0.183 0.000 4319  0.000 
Pulses 0.033 0.000 2908  0.040 0.000 4319  0.000 
Fruit 0.051 0.000 2908  0.043 0.000 4319  0.862 
Vegetables 0.065 0.000 2908  0.060 0.000 4319  0.308 
Dairy 0.083 0.000 2908  0.064 0.000 4319  0.051 
Fat 0.031 0.000 2908  0.033 0.000 4319  0.108 
Sweets & soft drinks 0.075 0.000 2908  0.079 0.000 4319  0.008 
Meat 0.384 0.000 2908  0.395 0.000 4319  0.003 
Alcohol 0.006 0.000 2908  0.004 0.000 4319  0.001 
Processed food 0.017 0.000 2908  0.016 0.000 4319  0.487 
Eggs  0.021 0.000 2908  0.024 0.000 4319  0.020 
Coffee 0.025 0.000 2908  0.022 0.000 4319  0.342 
Meals out 0.019 0.000 2908  0.013 0.000 4319  0.933 
Temptation goods 0.013 0.000 2908  0.013 0.000 4319  0.005 
School snacks 0.012 0.000 2908   0.012 0.000 4319   0.263 



























































Fru it & vegetables
 78 
Table 2.A3: Heterogeneous treatment effects of Bolsa Familia across Brazilian regions (adults) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 BMI Overweight Obesity Underweight 
Bolsa Familia (BF) 1.253 0.203 0.0820 -0.101 
 (1.142) (0.162) (0.0740) (0.105) 
BF * North -0.346 -0.148 -0.0956 0.0928 
 (1.379) (0.203) (0.109) (0.120) 
Linear combination (BF* North) + BF 0.9067 0.0548 -0.0136 -0.0081 
 (0.757) (0.117) (0.08) (0.057) 
BF* Northeast -0.934 -0.244 -0.0303 0.106 
 (1.246) (0.170) (0.0780) (0.108) 
Linear combination (BF* Northeast) + BF 0.3189 -0.0411 0.0517 0.0055 
 (0.486) (0.051) (0.032) (0.024) 
BF * Southeast -1.124 -0.232 -0.0683 0.121 
 (1.274) (0.178) (0.0878) (0.109) 
Linear combination (BF* Southeast) + BF 0.1291 -0.0292 0.0137 0.0202 
 (0.578) (0.076) (0.05) (0.034) 
BF * South  -1.009 -0.0577 -0.113 0.100 
 (1.745) (0.235) (0.0911) (0.107) 
Linear combination (BF* South) + BF 0.2447 0.1453 -0.0312 -0.0007 
 (1.333) (0.171) (0.054) (0.015) 
Individual Controls x x x x 
HH-level cotrols (demographic & socioeconomic 
characteristics) 
x x x x 
Number of observation 6,639 6,639 6,639 6,639 





























Table 2.A4 : Impact of Bolsa Familia on nutritional outcomes 
among adults (Fixed effect estimates) 
 FE estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
BMI 0.184 0.195 0.325 
 (0.309) (0.312) (0.33) 
Overweight -0.008 -0.013 -0.008 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) 
Obesity 0.020 0.020 0.022 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
Underweight 0.011 0.007 0.005 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
Region-specific trend x x x 
Controls individual x x x 
Controls demography (HH-level)  x x 
Controls socioeconomic situation (HH-
level)     x 
Number of observations 8,453 8,453 8,309 
Number of households 4,666 4,666 4,586 
Note: Summary of the regression coefficients on Bolsa Familia treatment for 
the four nutritional outcomes of interest (obesity, overweight, underweight, 
BMI). All regressions include a region-specific time trend for each of the five 
official geographic regions of the country (North, Northeast, Centre-West, 

























Table 2.A5: Impact of Bolsa Familia on nutritional outcomes among children (<18) 
 FE estimates   
 (1) (2) (3)  N 
Height-for-age (z-scores) 0.011409 0.0023325 0.018033  14,249 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.066)   
Weight-for-age (z-scores) -0.01017 -0.002362 0.021168  9,954 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.061)   
Weight-for-height (z-scores) 0.024563 0.0302312 0.071413  6,032 
 (0.112) (0.115) (0.118)   
BMI-for-age (z-scores) -0.02734 -0.012652 0.001713  14,167 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.083)   
Stunting -0.00051 0.0014484 0.000303  14,249 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)   
Wasting -0.00118 0.0061733 0.001173  6,032 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)   
Underweight 0.018539 0.0194754 0.022043  13,288 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)   
Overweight 0.036* 0.040* 0.044*  13,288 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)   
Obesity 0.00083 0.0001835 -0.00106  13,288 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)   
Region-specific trends x x x   
Controls individual x x x   
Controls demography (HH-level)  x x   
Controls socioeconomic situation (HH-
level)     x     
Note: Summary of the regression coefficients on Bolsa Familia treatment for the four nutritional 
outcomes of interest (obesity, overweight, underweight, BMI). All regressions include a region-specific 
time trend for each of the five official geographic regions of the country (North, Northeast, Centre-
West, Southeast and South).  Standard errors are clustered at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** 


















Table 2.A6: Impact of Bolsa Familia on total consumption (fixed 
effect estimates with region-specific trends) 
 FE 
 (1) (2) 
Total consumption 10.598** 14.68** 
 5.205 6.048 
Total consumption (per capita) 3.42* 4.71* 
 (1.607) (1.893) 
Total food consumption 9.42*** 11.145*** 
 (3.143) (3.422) 
Total food consumption (per capita) 3.18*** 3.739*** 
 (0.98) (1.052) 
Total non-food consumption 1.169 3.535 
 (3.425) (4.338) 
Total non-food consumption (per capita) 0.241 0.977 
 (1.048) (1.384) 
Total income 28.459*** 18.18* 
 (10.542) (10.77) 
Total income (per capita) 7.831*** 5.33* 
 (2.687) (2.885) 
Region-specific time trend x x 
Controls demographic composition x x 
Controls socioeconomic situation   x 
Number of observations     
Note:   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include a region-
specific time trend for each of the five official geographic regions of the country 












Table 2.A7: Impact of Bolsa Familia on food expenditure by food 
group in BRL (Fixed Effect estimates with region-specific time 
trends) 
 FE 
 (1) (2) 
Carbohydrates 0.186 0.345** 
 (0.154) (0.157) 
Plant-based protein 0.040 0.049 
 (0.046) (0.05) 
Fruit 0.245* 0.190 
 (0.143) (0.126) 
Vegetables 0.176 0.259** 
 (0.108) (0.119) 
Meat & Fish 1.056 1.258 
 (0.728) (0.799) 
Dairy 0.336** 0.394** 
 (0.154) (0.17) 
Fat 0.142** 0.168** 
 (0.067) (0.076) 
Eggs 0.061* 0.0623* 
 (0.035) (0.037) 
Meals out 0.165* 0.167* 
 (0.087) (0.095) 
Sweets 0.322*** 0.399*** 
 (0.095) (0.102) 
Alcohol 0.149* 0.096** 
 (0.076) (0.039) 
Processed food 0.082 0.078 
 (0.055) (0.061) 
Coffee -0.002 0.019 
 (0.021) (0.02) 
Temptation goods 0.091 0.103 
 (0.062) (0.067) 
School snacks 0.078* 0.065 
 (0.044) (0.046) 
Linear time trend x x 
Controls demographic composition x x 
Controls socioeconomic situation   x 
Number of observations 12,276 12,254 
Note:   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include a region-
specific time trend for each of the five official geographic regions of the 
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The extension of health insurance to previously uncovered populations can 
improve access to health care and health information, reduce individuals’ out-
of-pocket health-care expenditure and reduce precautionary savings. 
However, insurance extensions can also give rise to moral hazard effects and 
act as a disincentive to preventative efforts. In this context, we analyse the 
effect of the Mexican Seguro Popular (SP) on overweight, obesity and food 
consumption. We exploit the arbitrary timing of SP’s rollout across Mexico’s 
municipalities to instrument exposure to SP. We do not find significant 
effects of Seguro Popular on individual’s nutritional outcomes, or food 
consumption choices. 
 
Keywords: obesity, overweight, insurance expansion, Seguro Popular, 
income effects, prevention, health behaviours.  
 









The expansion of health insurance across the world to achieve the goal of universal 
health coverage reduced individuals’ exposure to the financial consequences of ill 
health, including catastrophic risks, and reduced the need for precautionary savings 
to pay for health care out-of-pocket (WHO, 2014). In addition to smoothing the 
consumption and increasing the disposable income of the insured households, 
insurance expansions can increase access to health care (Nyman, 1999), and by 
extension to health information, thereby improving health outcomes. However, it has 
also been argued that insurance can have unintended consequences, such as a 
reduction of preventative actions and the emergence of moral hazard. Previously 
uninsured individuals may reduce their preventive efforts and investment in long-
term health after being covered by insurance, as they will not have to bear the 
(monetary) costs of future health treatments (Acharya et al. 2012).  
This paper assesses the health effects of subsidised insurance expansions 
with a particular focus on nutritional choices and outcomes of the beneficiary 
households. This is a question of considerable policy relevance, given that many 
middle income countries have introduced (Wang et al. 2011), or consider 
introducing, equivalent free health insurance programmes for poor and vulnerable 
citizens who were previously uninsured. At the same time, overweight and obesity 
are becoming a major concern in low and middle income countries (LMICs). 
However, as of today, our understanding on the interplay between health insurance 
and malnutrition in LMICs is incomplete.  This paper aims at closing this knowledge 
gap by exploiting the variation that comes from the introduction of Mexico’s Seguro 
Popular programme on overweight, obesity, as well as undernutrition.   
Today, 2.7 billion people worldwide are malnourished –i.e., approximately 
37 percent of the world’s population—, of which 795 million people are 
undernourished, 1.9 billion people are overweight and 600 million people are obese. 
(FAO, IFAD, and WFP 2015; Melorose et al. 2015; World Health Organization 
2017). Low- and middle-income countries are affected by a ‘double-burden of 
malnutrition’, as persisting undernutrition goes hand in hand with rising levels of 
obesity. Both phenomena have dramatic consequences for the health and wellbeing 
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of the affected individuals and can also pose an obstacle to economic development at 
large.  
Overweight and obesity are associated with several chronic diseases (Di 
Cesare et al. 2016; Field et al. 2001; Sturm 2002), which poses important challenges 
to the sustainability of public health systems. Sturm (2002) estimates that health care 
costs for obese people are 36 percent higher, and medication costs 77 percent higher 
than for people in a normal weight range. Moreover, overweight and obesity can also 
negatively impact labour market outcomes (Cawley 2004,   Johanson et al. 2009). 
Both undernutrition and overnutrition should therefore be an important policy 
concern.  
In recent years, several countries have expanded their health insurance 
systems with a view to cover the most vulnerable parts of the population and 
improve overall public health. The most well-evaluated example is the Affordable 
Care Act (“Obamacare”) in the USA, but there are also a number of low- and 
middle-income countries which have expanded health care to poor and vulnerable 
parts of the population and/or informal sector workers. Prominent examples include 
the Ramed programme in Morocco, Vietnam’s Health Care Fund for the Poor and 
Mexico’s Seguro Popular. Mexico is the OECD country with the highest obesity 
rate, and is projected to be the one exhibiting the highest obesity by 2030.  Given 
that many middle-income countries have also been heavily affected by overweight 
and obesity, an important question for the design of new health insurance programs 
refers to whether health insurance expansions exert nutritional impacts. More 
specifically, does the provision of free health insurance, which is found to increase 
access to health care, exert an effect on obesity and overweight? Or, on the contrary, 
is there a risk that health insurance exacerbates obesity, through income and/or moral 
hazard effects? 
The available evidence on the relationship between health insurance and 
overweight/obesity is scarce and not conclusive. In theory, free health insurance may 
influence nutritional outcomes through several channels, such as an increase in 
disposable income, more frequent diagnosis and treatment of obesity through the 
health care system, as well as moral hazard. While earlier studies based on US data 
have found evidence that health insurance may increase both BMI and obesity 
(Bhattacharya et al. 2009), more recent evaluations based on the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) have not confirmed this finding (Simon et al. 2016, Rhubart 2018). 
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However, there is evidence that the ACA improved preventative health behaviours 
(Sommers et al. 2017). In line with this finding, a study from Colombia shows that 
health insurance expansion can incentivise the use of preventive health services, 
most notably preventive physician visits and child growth monitoring (Miller et al. 
2013). A study from Thailand also suggests an increase in preventive visits, while 
not detecting evidence for an increase in risky behaviours (Ghislandi et al. 2015). 
Given the positive relationship between insurance and health prevention in other 
contexts, this paper assesses whether health insurance can also boost healthy 
nutrition. Unhealthy nutrition is a major risk factor for several severe diseases 
including diabetes, heart disease and some form of cancers (Field et al. 2001). It is 
therefore important to investigate whether health insurance is an adequate policy 
measure to improve health prevention by means of altering nutrition behaviours and 
outcomes.  
This paper provides additional evidence on the nutritional impacts of health 
insurance by analysing how the Mexican health insurance programme Seguro 
Popular has impacted underweight, overweight and obesity, as well as expenditure 
on different food and non-food items. Due to the largely arbitrary timing of Seguro 
Popular’s rollout across Mexico’s municipalities (see below), it provides a quasi-
experimental setting where we can effectively compare two very similar groups of 
insured and uninsured individuals in terms of their nutritional behaviours and 
outcomes. In particular, we use an instrumental variable approach, where we 
instrument individual Seguro Popular membership with the coverage of Seguro 
Popular in one’s municipality. The IV can be seen as a measure for the availability 
of Seguro Popular in one’s municipality, but does not directly influence nutritional 
outcomes at the individual level.  
Our main data source is the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), a 
longitudinal dataset available in three waves, containing not only anthropometric 
measures, but also comprehensive information on the socioeconomic situation and 
health of the respondents. The timing of the surveys matches the expansion of 
Seguro Popular very well, with one pre-treatment wave (2002) and two waves 
covering the expansion of the programme (2005 and 2009). Moreover, we match the 
MxFLS data to several administrative data sources on Seguro Popular coverage at 
the municipality level, as well as other municipality-level characteristics.  
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Our findings do not yield evidence for any positive or negative impact of 
Seguro Popular on overweight, obesity or BMI. However, there is suggestive 
evidence that Seguro Popular decreased the share of carbohydrates in food 
expenditure and increased the share dedicated to meat. This could be interpreted as 
evidence that the programme has  contributed to less energy-dense diets. However, 
the finding loses its significance when correcting for multiple hypothesis testing.  
Moreover, we find important heterogeneities in the programme’s impacts: the 
programme seems to protect the older individuals more effectively against obesity 
than younger individuals. Lastly, for those who were already overweight at baseline, 
Seguro Popular may have increased the risk of staying obese. This last finding would 
be in line with a moral hazard effect.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The second part describes the 
theoretical channels through which health insurance can influence nutritional 
outcomes and reviews the scarce empirical evidence that is available on health 
insurance and nutrition. Sections 3 presents the policy context in Mexico, section 4 
describes the data and section 5 elaborates on our identification strategy. Sections 6-
8 present our results, section 9 discusses the robustness checks that were conducted, 




Pathways of health insurance influence on nutritional outcomes  
Overweight and obesity arise when an individual’s caloric intake exceeds caloric 
expenditure (Cutler et al. 2003; Lakdawalla and Philipson 2009); undernutrition 
occurs when individuals cannot meet their caloric needs (Black et al. 2013; Dasgupta 
and Ray 1986). However, undernutrition can also be caused by a lack of nutritional 
diversity and/or the shortage of certain micronutrients, such as Vitamin A or iron 
(Banerjee and Duflo 2011; Black et al. 2013) or by infectious diseases (e.g. Bhutta et 
al. 2013). Health insurance can influence these outcomes through a number of 
pathways.  
First, if health insurance is provided for free or at a subsidised price, as in the 
case of Seguro Popular, it increases the disposable income of the insured 
individuals. This is because individuals no longer need to (co-)pay for their present-
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day medical expenses, and hence nor hold precautionary savings for large health 
expenditures in the future. Overall one can expect that a higher disposable income 
will translate into an increase of food expenditure will, up to a certain point, lead to 
an increase in caloric intake and influence nutritional outcomes.  
Secondly, one can expect that beneficiary households will adjust the 
composition of food expenditure in response to the increase in disposable income. 
Beneficiary households will substitute inferior goods for superior goods and 
potentially also adjust the expenditure shares on different normal goods, depending 
on their income elasticity of demand.  Individuals may switch from healthier to more 
unhealthy food or vice versa (e.g. from self-produced agriculture products to 
industrially processed food; or from a calorie-rich diet based on simple 
carbohydrates towards a diet based on animal-sourced protein).  
Third, health insurance lowers the costs of using health care and accessing 
health information, so that overnutrition and undernutrition can be diagnosed and 
treated at a lower cost, and comprehensive information can be gathered. However, 
the prevalence of such a health care effect will crucially depend on the extent to 
which the specific health insurance plan does indeed provide preventive care, 
especially obesity-related examinations and treatments, and the effectiveness of 
those treatments in improving outcomes. An increased health care usage may also 
decrease the costs of obtaining preventative actions and nutrition-related information 
and make it easier for individuals to learn about healthy eating. This information 
effect could potentially lead to a lower caloric intake and/or increased caloric 
expenditure through exercising for those at risk of overweight.  
Fourth, health insurance may also affect the time use of the insured 
individuals. The increase in disposable income may induce individuals to reduce 
paid work and increase leisure, which may lead to a decrease in caloric expenditure 
for those engaged in non-sedentary work like farming or construction. On the other 
hand, increased leisure time may also incentivise individuals to prepare healthier 
meals or to exercise more.  
Finally, a number of authors have assessed the possibility whether health 
insurance leads to moral hazard among the insured individuals, as they are no longer 
pay the full costs of potential sickness in the future. In theory, this could increase 
caloric intake and lead to a higher willingness to accept overweight and obesity. On 
the other hand, there may also be behavioural hazard, as suggested by Baicker et al. 
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(2013), i.e. insured individuals may over-use preventive health care: instead of 
choosing the socially optimal consumption level (marginal benefit = marginal cost), 
insured individuals might use preventive care until their individual marginal benefit 
equals zero. Overall this could lead to an earlier detection of underweight, 
overweight and obesity, and a more effective treatment (also fostering the health care 
and information channels mentioned above).  
The overall impact of health insurance on nutritional outcomes will depend 
on the magnitude of the different effects. One can also expect that impacts will differ 
depending on the implementation details of a specific health insurance scheme such 
as co-payments, coverage of obesity-related examinations and treatments, as well as 
the income and nutritional status of the programme’s target population.  Later in the 
paper we will discuss the extent to which our results are reflective on any of these 
effects. 
 
Evidence on the impact of health insurance on nutrition  
The literature on the effects of health insurance on overweight and obesity is 
inconclusive. Two studies drawing on US data from the 1980s and 1990s found 
evidence that health insurance increases overweight and obesity (Bhattarchya et al. 
2009, Rashad and Markovitz 2009). The authors of these studies interpreted their 
findings as a moral hazard effect, spurring additional interest in this hypothesis in 
subsequent studies.  
 However, none of the more recent studies drawing on data from the 2000s or 
other contexts than the US were able to confirm these findings. Simon et al. (2016) 
evaluate the impact of the Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act 
(“Obamacare”)  and do not find any impact of the reform on exercising, BMI or 
obesity, but do find a reduction in smoking among childless adults by 1.9 percentage 
points.  In a similar study setting but without claiming causality, Rhubart (2018) 
finds that inhabitants of US states which did not expand Medicaid during the 
Affordable Care Act reforms are more likely to be overweight and obese, but less 
likely to drink heavily. Focusing on the elderly population in the US, Card et al. 
(2008) do not find any evidence that Medicare coverage affects the prevalence of 
obesity or exercising behaviour among the elderly. Courbage and Colon (2004) use 
UK data in order to assess the impacts of private insurance – purchased in addition to 
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the universal NHS system – and do not find any effects on exercising, smoking or 
attending regular health check-ups.   
We are not aware of any study investigating the effect of health insurance on 
overweight and obesity in a low- or middle-income country context. An evaluation 
of a free health insurance programme in Vietnam (Wagstaff and Pradhan 2005) 
found evidence of a decrease in undernutrition and an increase in BMI among the 
programme’s target population. However, in their period of interest less than 1% of 
the Vietnamese population was classified as overweight or obese, so the increases in 
BMI were mainly interpreted as a success in reducing undernutrition. More 
generally, a study from Colombia showed that health insurance expansions can 
promote preventive health behaviours (Miller et al. 2013), but a study from Thailand 
found no evidence that healthy behaviours or preventative actions were influenced 
by the expansion of insurance coverage (Ghislandi et al. 2015). 
 
Evidence on the impact of health insurance on other outcomes 
There is a large amount of evidence suggesting that free or subsidised health 
insurance leads to an increase in the disposable income of the insured, and facilitates 
consumption smoothing over the life cycle (Baicker et al. 2013, Hu et al. 2016, 
Mazumder et al. 2016, King et al. 2009, Saenz de Miera 2017, Sommers et al. 2017, 
Wagstaff & Pradhan 2005). In particular, using randomised encouragement King et 
al. (2009) found that SP led to a 23% reduction in catastrophic health expenditures. 
Galárraga et al. (2010) confirmed this finding using an instrumental variables 
approach and nationally representative data.  
Moreover, several papers document that health insurance increases the 
utilization of both inpatient and outpatient health care (Finkelstein et al. 2012, 
Baicker et al. 2013, Ghosh et al. 2017, Bleich et al. 2007, Sosa-Rubi et al. 2009, 
Sommers et al. 2017, Jowett et al. 2004, Wagstaff and Pradhan 2005, Wagstaff et al. 
2009). While Rivera-Hernández et al. (2019) found no effects of SP on the use of 
preventive services such as screening for diabetes, hypertension, breast cancer and 
cervical cancer among individuals 50 to 75 years, using a specialised survey on 
aging Parker et al. (2019) found significant effects of the programme on utilization 
and diagnostic tests. In addition, Sosa-Rubi et al. (2009) showed that SP increased 
access to obstetrical services. 
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However, there is only mixed evidence on whether health insurance indeed 
improves health outcomes. Several studies have shown that health insurance leads to 
improvements in self-reported health (Sommers et al. 2012, Cercone et al. 2010, 
Teruel et al. 2012), while others have not found any impact on self-assessed health 
(King et al. 2009, Barros 2008). The provision of health insurance does seem to 
reduce infant mortality (Currie and Gruber 1996, Pfutze 2015, Saenz de Miera 2017, 
Conti and Ginga 2016, Celhay et al. 2019), increase birthweight (Camacho and 
Conover 2013), improve mental health outcomes (Baicker et al. 2013), improve 
cancer prevention and treatment (Robbins et al. 2015, Loehrer et al. 2016), and 
improve preventive health care with regards to glucose and cholesterol testing 
(Sommers et al. 2017). On the other hand, studies analysing health insurance’s 
impact on hypertension and high cholesterol have mostly not found any statistically 
significant impacts (Baicker et al. 2013, King et al. 2009, Brook et al. 1983, Barros 
2008). Supply-side constraints and low capacity of the medical staff may help 
explain why higher health care usage does not necessarily translate into better health 
outcomes (e.g. Lagarde and Palmer 2011, De Allegri et al. 2012, Dzakpasu et al. 
2014).  
 
3. Institutional background  
Mexico has a very high prevalence of obesity (25.3 percent of the population at the 
end of our study period in 2009, as compared to 10.9 worldwide) and overweight 
(61.2 percent of the population in 2009 as compared to 35.2 percent worldwide22), 
placing Mexico among the 25 countries most affected by obesity worldwide and the 
most affected country in Latin America. Moreover, Mexico experienced a quite 
substantial increase in obesity by 3.5 percentage points during the study period (as 
compared to 1.8 percentage points worldwide) allowing us to study the impact of 
health insurance in a context of rising obesity rates (World Health Organization 
2017).  
Before the introduction of Seguro Popular in the early 2000s, health 
insurance in Mexico was provided to formal sector employees alone through the 
country’s social security systems which is based on payroll taxes. Only a very small 
                                               
22 Including those who are obese. 
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share of the population (less than 3%) held private insurance. Informal workers, 
small-scale family farmers and the unemployed had to pay their health care 
expenditure out of pocket. Seguro Popular precisely aimed at covering these hitherto 
uninsured parts of the Mexican population and established access to health care as a 
universal right. In this way Seguro Popular expanded health insurance to groups of 
the population that could not afford insurance before. Indeed, the only eligibility 
criterion for enrolling in Seguro Popular was not to be covered by a contributory / 
payroll-based health insurance or private insurance. Seguro Popular compares to 
other worldwide experiences in the United States (e.g. the ACA and Medicaid 
expansions), China, Vietnam and Morocco, where health insurance has also recently 
been expanded to cover the poorest and most vulnerable groups of the population. 
A pilot of Seguro Popular started in 2002 and the implementation of the 
actual programme began in 2004, but was only gradually rolled out through the 
country due to financial constraints. Individuals were only able to enrol in the 
programme once the programme was offered in their municipality. This in turn 
required that the state’s government had signed an agreement with the central 
government on the programme’s implementation. The central government 
established that more marginalised, rural and indigenous areas ought to be prioritised 
in the rollout, but no objective criteria and/or indicators had been established to 
guide the rollout. Previous studies found that municipalities with a higher population 
size tended to implement the programme earlier. Moreover, the sympathy of a 
municipality government with the central government may also have played a role, 
as Seguro Popular was seen as a prestige project of the central government. Besides 
these factors, previous studies investigating on the issue could not detect any other 
observable municipality-level factors that were correlated with the rollout (Azuara 
and Marinescu 2013, Bosch and Campos 2014, King et al. 2009, Pfutze 2015).  
Seguro Popular affiliates have access to a wide range of free health services as 
defined in Mexico’s Universal Catalogue of Health Services (UCHS)23, covering 
approximately 95% of Mexico’s disease burden (King et al. 2007). The diagnosis 
and, to some extent also the treatment of obesity and obesity-related diseases are 
                                               
23 In Spanish Catálogo Universal de Servicios de Salud (CAUSES).   
 94 
included in the UCHS. However, during the longest part of our study period, this is 
limited to children and adults over the age of 40 : 
• In the 2004 version of the UCHS, the diagnosis of obesity is included within 
the triannual check-ups for men and women over the age of 40. Dietary and 
exercise-related counselling is included as a treatment of diabetes II and 
hypertension.  
• Since 2006, the UCHS also included the diagnosis of both undernutrition and 
obesity for children and adolescents, along with a comprehensive list of 
treatments for those who are diagnosed (e.g. 3-5 monthly nutrition 
counselling appointments with a GP) 
• From 2008 onwards, preventive health services are included for adults aged 
20-59. This includes measures to prevent and detect a number of chronic 
diseases, including obesity. However, unlike for children, no specific obesity-
related treatments are listed. The UCHS only mentions educational measures 
to improve self-care for individual health.  
 
4. Data 
Our main data source is the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), a longitudinal 
dataset with survey waves in 2002, 2005/06 and 2009-12 (Rubalcava and Teruel 
2006, 2008, 2013). It includes information on insurance status, anthropometric 
measures of children and adults taken by specifically trained enumerators, 
consumption expenditure on different food items, as well as a wide range of 
socioeconomic characteristics. The timing of the survey waves matches the roll-out 
of Seguro Popular very well, as the first wave took place before the official start of 
the programme, the second wave at the early stages of the rollout when 
approximately 20% of the target group were covered, and the third wave in 2009-12, 
when the programme already reached between 55% and 90% of the target 
population.   
The MxFLS data was matched to administrative records of Mexico’s 
National Commission for Social Protection in Health (Comisión Nacional de 
Protección Social en Salud, CNPSS) with trimestral information on the number of 
Seguro Popular beneficiaries in each of the Mexican municipalities. Moreover, we 
draw on information from the National Statistics and Geography Institute (Instituto 
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Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, INEGI) for municipality-level information on 
the overall population size, and on data from CONAPO (Consejo Nacional de 
Poblacion), CONEVAL (Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política Social) and 
the Mexican Ministry of Health to measure the overall socioeconomic development 
of the municipality and the available health infrastructure. The CNPSS data together 
with the INEGI data also allow us to compute the share of a municipality’s 
population covered by Seguro Popular in a certain year.  
 This allows us to construct a rich set of control variables for our regressions, 
both at the individual level (sex, age, years of schooling, civil status, employment 
status, BMI at baseline, chronic disease at baseline), household level (participation in 
the Oportunidades cash transfer programme, consumption expenditure at baseline, 
household size and demographic composition of the household at baseline, as well as 
information on the household head analogous to the individual-level controls), and 
municipality level (urban vs. rural, population size, poverty rate, illiteracy rate, 
percentage of the population earning less than two minimum wages, percentage of 
women, and the proportion of households without access to piped water, without 
electricity connection and without access to sanitation). Summary statistics on all 
control variables are presented in table 1.  
 Our sample of analysis consists of all individuals who were surveyed in all 
three MxFLS waves, who were uninsured and at least 18 years old at baseline, not 
pregnant at the time of the survey and for whom the full set of control variables as 
well as the anthropometric outcome variables are available. We identified 28,117 
individuals for whom data is available in all three waves, corresponding to 84,351 
observations, and 9875 households in 275 municipalities. Out of them, only 9,063 
are uninsured at baseline, 8088 are also at least 18 years of age at baseline, and for 
5,848 individuals we also have information on Seguro Popular insurance status and 
the anthropometric outcomes. After excluding pregnant women and observations for 
whom we do not have the full set of control variables, we end up with 3,732 
individuals, corresponding to 5,445 observations, in 2,283 households and 138 
municipalities.  
Restricting the sample to individuals who were uninsured at baseline 
decreases the sample size by almost 70%. However, it should be noted that Seguro 
Popular was only intended to cover the previously uninsured parts of the population. 
Individuals who previously held contributory public insurance were not eligible for 
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participating in Seguro Popular. Private insurance was infrequent and accessible only 
to high-income households which did not have plausible incentives to renounce to 
the more comprehensive benefit package offered by the private providers24. As a 
consequence, we do not consider it reasonable to include previously insured 
households in the impact estimation. Their probability of being treated by Seguro 
Popular is very close to zero, making them not suitable as a comparison group. This 
also implies that the estimated treatment effects refer to Seguro Popular’s target 
population, not to the Mexican population at large. 
 Table 1 illustrates that our sample of analysis differs in important aspects 
from the overall MxFLS sample, which is representative for the Mexican population. 
As expected, the individuals in our sample are poorer than the average population, 
have attained lower levels of schooling, and live more frequently in rural areas. 
However, the nutritional outcomes are remarkably similar in both groups, with an 
average BMI of 28, an overweight prevalence of 71%, and an obesity prevalence of 
31%. In this context, it is important to acknowledge that the findings of this study 
only apply to the target population of Seguro Popular, i.e. uninsured low-income 














                                               
24 The 2010 INEGI Conteo survey indicates that only 3.3% of the Mexican population had private 
insurance. Those with private insurance could have switched to SP but this is very unlikely since 
private insurance gives access to private hospitals and clinics that generally provide better health care. 
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics  
 MXFLS sample  Sample of analysis   
t-
test 
Outcome variables (selection) Mean SD N  Mean SD N  
(p-
val.) 
BMI 27.94 5.37 24540  27.92 5.21 5445  0.76 
Overweight 0.70 0.46 24540  0.70 0.46 5445  0.76 
Obesity 0.31 0.46 24540  0.31 0.46 5445  0.86 
Underweight 0.01 0.12 24125  0.01 0.12 5445  0.57 
Exercise (binary) 0.13 0.34 26842  0.10 0.30 5445  0.00 
Smoking (binary) 0.10 0.30 26834  0.09 0.28 5444  0.00 
Smoking (cigarettes per week) 4.25 21.13 26825  4.18 21.57 5444  0.78 
Hours worked (week) 43.10 19.08 14247  41.77 21.17 2819  0.00 
Controls variables (individual 
level)          
Female  0.55 0.50 33478  0.59 0.49 5445  0.00 
Married  0.50 0.50 33774  0.62 0.49 5445  0.00 
Age 45.29 16.32 25547  45.89 14.76 5445  0.00 
Age^2 2317 1630 25547  2324 1494 5445  0.73 
BMI at baseline 27.40 5.19 28065  27.34 5.08 5445  0.34 
Years of schooling 6.81 4.66 26892  5.32 3.94 5445  0.00 
Chronic disease at baseline (binary) 0.18 0.38 26425  0.16 0.36 5445  0.00 
Employed  0.40 0.49 33774  0.48 0.50 5445  0.00 
Controls variables (household 
level)          
Urban 0.78 0.42 33774  0.68 0.47 5445  0.00 
Oportunidades 0.13 0.34 29256  0.24 0.43 5445  0.00 
Consumption expenditure at 
baseline 5382 21487 27793  4182 10413 5445  0.00 
HH size at baseline 4.65 2.17 33774  4.90 2.28 5445  0.00 
Years of schooling (head) 5.99 4.63 26346  4.74 3.83 5445  0.00 
Female HH head 0.21 0.41 26632  0.20 0.40 5445  0.00 
HH head married 0.69 0.46 26792  0.69 0.46 5445  0.41 
Age HH head 52.72 14.79 23433  51.93 14.18 5445  0.00 
Age^2 HH head 2998 1618 23433  2898 1558 5445  0.00 
HH head employed 0.66 0.47 26792  0.71 0.45 5445  0.00 
Average HH BMI at baseline 27.46 3.97 28322  27.15 3.82 5445  0.00 
Control variables (municipality level)         




4 5445  0.00 
Proportion of women 0.51 0.01 32430  0.51 0.01 5445  0.00 
Percentage illiterate 8.32 7.27 32430  10.81 7.66 5445  0.00 
Percentage low-income 45.03 18.43 32430  52.12 17.60 5445  0.00 
Percentage poor 19.87 14.05 32430  25.16 14.68 5445  0.00 
proportion w/o electricity 0.02 0.02 32430  0.03 0.02 5445  0.00 
Proportion w/o piped water 0.09 0.10 32430  0.12 0.12 5445  0.00 
Propotion w/o sanitation 0.14 0.17 32430   0.19 0.19 5445   0.00 
Note: The MxFLS sample contains all individuals for whom data for all three MxFLS waves is available. However, summary 
statistics only refer to waves 2 and 3, to make it comparable to the sample of analysis. The last column provides the p-values 
associated to t-tests testing for the equality of the means in both samples (H0: means are equal). 
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5. Identification strategy 
In order to assess the impact of Seguro Popular on nutritional outcomes we are 
interested in estimating the following model: 
 
!"# = 	& + 	(	)*"# + 	+	,"# + 	-	./01# + 	2"#        (1) 
 
where !"# is a nutritional outcome (e.g. BMI, overweight, obesity) of individual i at 
time t. )*"# is the individual’s affiliation to Seguro Popular at time t and  X is a 
vector of individual, household-level and municipality-level control variables. 
3/01# is a linear time trend, and 2"# the individual-specific error term.  
 The main challenge in this specification is that the treatment status )*"# may 
be correlated with the error term 2"#, even after controlling for X, potentially leading 
to a biased estimate of (. In our case, selection bias may occur both at the individual 
and the municipality level. First, individuals who are obese, or at a higher risk of 
obesity, might have a higher (or lower) propensity to enrol in Seguro Popular than 
the average population. Moreover, some other unobservable individual 
characteristics may be correlated with treatment status (e.g. intelligence, having a 
genetical predisposition for overweight/obesity, being health-conscious, etc.). 
Secondly, municipalities with a high (low) obesity prevalence may have been 
prioritised in the rollout of Seguro Popular, leading to selection bias at the 
municipality level.  
 We are adopting two strategies in order to address these threats. First, we 
instrument individual affiliation to SP at time t with the share of individuals in 
municipality m who are covered by SP at time t-1 (“SP coverage”). This IV 
approach aims at eliminating any selection bias at the individual-level based on 
unobservables, once Seguro Popular is introduced in a municipality. It is important 
to note that our instrument is lagged by one time period with respect to our treatment 
variable. This is to avoid that the instrument is jointly determined with the treatment, 
and instead precedes the treatment decisions. In particular, 








We argue that this instrumental variable is both relevant (it has a statistically 
significant impact on the probability of being treated) and valid (it has no direct 
impact on obesity, and only affects obesity through the treatment).  
The first stage estimates presented in table 2 illustrate that the instrument is 
indeed relevant (i.e. B>0(45#, )*"5#) ≠ 0), as confirmed by the weak identification 
and underidentification tests (Kleibergen Paap LM and Kleibergen Paap Wald 
statistics). This is true for both the individual-level regressions, and the household-
level regressions where the sample size is much smaller. Moreover, the first stage 
remains relevant even after the inclusion of municipality-level fixed effects. The 
regression results suggest that being female and being a beneficiary of the 
Oportunidades cash transfer programme is positively associated with Seguro Popular 
treatment. BMI at baseline, or having a chronic disease at baseline is not 
significantly correlated with Seguro Popular participation. The reduced form 
estimates do not suggest any statistically significant impact of the instrument on any 
of our outcome variables (see table 3). 
However, even after including state-level fixed effects, there is still a positive 
correlation between Seguro Popular coverage and the number of doctors per 1000 
inhabitants at time t, as well as the share of Oportunidades cash transfer recipients in 
the municipality. Both were to be expected: the correlation with Oportunidades can 
be explained by the fact that both programmes target low-income households. The 
association with the availability of doctors can be explained by the simultaneous 
expansion of health infrastructure which accompanied the Seguro Popular rollout. 
Nevertheless, both factors are also a concern to our identification strategy. Both, the 
income effect related to Oportunidades and the health care effect related to the 
increased availability of doctors may have a direct impact on our nutritional 
outcomes of interest. We therefore control for Oportunidades in all regressions, and 
include regressions controlling for the health infrastructure as a robustness check 
(the latter may also be considered as a “bad control” (Angrist and Pischke 2008), as 
it may be caused by Seguro Popular in the first place. For this reason we have not 
included it in the main specifications). 
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Table 3.2 - First stage estimates - SP coverage in municipality and individual SP affliliation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
 SP afflilation (individual-level, t)  SP afflilation (household-level, t) 
SP coverage (municipality-level, t-1) 0.763*** 0.773*** 0.777*** 1.052***  0.810*** 0.794*** 1.066*** 
 (0.108) (0.105) (0.103) (0.165)  (0.115) (0.116) (0.190) 
Female 0.0300** 0.0272** 0.0252** 0.0257**     
 (0.0120) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0119)     
Age  0.00108 -0.00119 -0.00136 -0.00265     
 (0.00241) (0.00274) (0.00274) (0.00252)     
Age^2 -1.02e-05 2.17e-05 2.27e-05 3.30e-05     
 (2.39e-05) (2.77e-05) (2.77e-05) (2.56e-05)     
Years of schooling -0.00364** -0.00138 -0.00152 -0.00234     
 (0.00184) (0.00200) (0.00192) (0.00179)     
BMI (at baseline) -0.000550 1.75e-05 -0.000248 -0.000778     
 (0.00109) (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00104)     
Oportunidades beneficiary  0.121*** 0.121*** 0.116***  0.146*** 0.145*** 0.134*** 
  (0.0192) (0.0180) (0.0178)  (0.0221) (0.0212) (0.0221) 






x x x 
 




  x x 





Municipality-level Fixed Effects       x 
 
    x 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen Paap rK LM Statistic) 25.38 26.79 23.96 18.36  25.65 22.06 17.14 
P-value associated to rK LM Statistic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Weak identification test (Kleibergen Paap Wald rK F-Statistic) 50.03 54.64 57.27 40.62  49.63 46.88 31.35 
Observations 5445 5445 5445 5445   2757 2757 2757 
Note: All regressions include a linear time trend. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Critical value for rejecting the null of weak identification is 16.38 based 
on Stock & Yogo (2005). 
Individual-level controls: sex, age, years of schooling, civil status, employment status, BMI at baseline, chronic disease at baseline  
Household-level controls: participation in the Oportunidades cash transfer programme, consumption expenditure at baseline, household size and demographic composition of the household at baseline, as well 
as information on the household head analogous to the individual-level controls. 
Municipality-level controls: urban vs. rural, population size, poverty rate, illiteracy rate, percentage of the population earning less than two minimum wages, percentage of women, and the proportion of 







Table 3.3: Reduced form estimates: Seguro Popular coverage (t-1) and nutritional outcomes 
 OLS estimates  
OLS estimates with state-level 
fixed effects 
Outcomes        
Obesity -0.0133 -0.0157 -0.0159  0.0236 0.0123 0.0517 
 (0.0475) (0.0467) (0.0501)  (0.0424) (0.0428) (0.0456) 
Overweight 0.0552 0.0689 0.0897*  -0.0167 -0.0133 0.0340 
 (0.0440) (0.0454) (0.0489)  (0.0496) (0.0518) (0.0550) 
Underweight 0.00773 0.00923 0.00819  0.00866 0.00496 -0.00697 
 (0.0132) (0.0133) (0.0128)  (0.0146) (0.0154) (0.0137) 
BMI -0.0465 -0.0305 0.0773  -0.0336 -0.161 0.349 
 -0.465 -0.473 -0.543  -0.445 -0.447 -0.492 
        
Individual-level controls x x x  x x x 
Household-level controls x x   x x 
Municipality-level controls 
  x    x 
Linear time trend x x x  x x x 
State-level fixed effects 
    x x x 
Number of observations 5578 5578 5578   5578 5578 5578 
Note: Table summarises the regression coefficients on the coverage of Seguro Popular (at t-1) in regressions 
of the 4 main nutritional outcomes (obesity, overweight, underweight, and BMI). Standard errors are clustered 
at the municipality-level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 
















Table 3.4: Correlation of SP coverage and municipality-level characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent variables (separate regressions were 
run for each ind. var.) Coverage of Seguro Popular at time t-1 
Share obese at baseline -0.200 -0.0365 -0.260  
(0.166) (0.198) (0.189)  
Share with chronic disease at baseline -0.169 0.0583 -0.226  
(0.185) (0.164) (0.176)  
Share self-reporting good health at baseline -0.331*** -0.185* -0.0851  
(0.0588) (0.0960) (0.107)  
Doctors per 1000 at baseline -0.00793 -0.00220 0.0116  
(0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0116)  
Doctors per 1000 at t 0.0226 0.0311 0.0471** -0.000138  
(0.0275) (0.0236) (0.0229) (0.0761) 
Clinics per 1000 at baseline 0.305*** 0.139 0.166  
(0.0706) (0.120) (0.104)  
Clinics per 1000 at t 0.282*** 0.150 0.158 0.423  
(0.0785) (0.113) (0.0971) (0.715) 
Oportunidades at baseline 0.191*** 0.120** 0.158***   
(0.0415) (0.0591) (0.0489)  
Oportunidades at t 0.186*** 0.0749 0.145** -0.0387 
 (0.0521) (0.0819) (0.0668) (0.162) 
     
Municipality-level controls  x x x 
State fixed effects   x  
Municipality fixed effects       x 
     
Number of observations 236 236 236 236 
Note: Regression results obtained from separate OLS regressions for each of the listed independent 
variables. Clustered standard errors in parantheses. Analysis is carried out t the municipality-level with 
observations for 2005 and 2009, as in the main regressions. Municipality level controls are the same as in 
column 3 of table 3 and based on administrative data / census data. Share overweight at baseline, share 
obese at baseline, share with chronic disease, and self-reported good health have been constructed based on 
the MxFLS survey. They are therefore not representative at the municipality level, but are representative for 










Additionally, we present regressions with both municipality-level fixed 
effects and a wide range of time-varying municipality-level control variables. While 
the municipality-level fixed effects control for any time-invariant characteristics, the 
municipality-level controls allow us to account for a wide range of time-varying 
observable characteristics. This strategy aims at eliminating any selection bias at the 
municipality level. With fixed effects and municipality level controls, the structural 
model becomes   
 
!"# = 	& + 	(	)*"# + 	+	,"# + 	-	./01# +	23# +	43 + 	5"#        (1) 
 
where 23#  is a vector of municipality-level control variables and 43 is a 
municipality-level fixed effects. This model is eventually estimated by two-stages 
least square regressions. In regressions where )*"#	is interacted with other variables 
of interest 6"#  to investigate on heterogeneous treatment effects, the interaction term 
is instrumented by (7"3,#9:* 6"#). Standard errors for all regressions are clustered at 
the municipality level in order to account for the clustered treatment assignment.  
 We prefer this approach over a difference-in-difference (DiD) estimation 
comparing treated to untreated municipalities. Indeed, by 2009 (our last available 
survey wave), Seguro Popular was already available in all municipalities covered by 
the MxFLS survey, leaving us without any control group in a classical DiD setting. 
Using coverage as an instrument allows to measure varying degrees of availability of 
Seguro Popular in a municipality, and to exploit the variation in exposure to Seguro 
both within and between municipalities. A similar IV approach has also been taken 
by Saenz de Miera (2017) and Pfutze (2015) in previous impact assessments of 
Seguro Popular, and by Liu and Zhao (2014) in an study on China’s Urban Resident 










Seguro Popular’s impact on nutritional outcomes  
Table 5 reports our baseline estimates of the effect of Seguro Popular on BMI, 
obesity, overweight and underweight. We report both OLS estimates (columns 1-3), 
2SLS estimates with state-level fixed effects (columns 4-6) and 2SLS estimates with 
municipality-level fixed effects (columns 7-9). Overall, the regression results do not 
yield evidence for any impact of Seguro Popular on obesity, overweight, 
underweight or BMI among adults. The coefficients on all outcomes are very close 
to zero and not statistically significant. This finding is robust to the inclusion of 
different controls, and irrespective of the use of state-level or municipality-level 
fixed effects. 
Table 6 presents the estimates for the impact of Seguro Popular on children’s 
nutritional outcomes. In addition to the outcomes reported for adults, it also reports 
Seguro Popular’s impact on child malnutrition (low weight-for-age) and stunting 
(low height-for-age). Overall, the results are very similar than for adults. However, 
there is suggestive evidence that Seguro Popular may have reduced stunting and 
increased overweight. These results should be interpreted with caution as they are 
not robust to the inclusion of municipality-level fixed effects, and only significant at 
the 10% level. Overall the results indicate that on average, there is no effect of 
Seguro Popular on nutritional outcomes.
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2SLS estimates with state FEs  
 
2 SLS estimates with municipality 
FEs  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
            
Obesity -0.0110 -0.00908 -0.00770  0.0301 0.0147 0.0652  0.00909 0.00433 -0.0512 
 (0.0116) (0.0119) (0.0114)  (0.0555) (0.0546) (0.0599)  (0.0743) (0.0721) (0.0707) 
Overweight 0.00999 0.00924 0.00862  -0.0258 -0.0204 0.0418  -0.0296 -0.0345 -0.000615 
 (0.0133) (0.0138) (0.0134)  (0.0645) (0.0664) (0.0705)  (0.0852) (0.0831) (0.0668) 
Underweight -0.00133 -0.000555 -0.000332  0.0127 0.00689 -0.00881  -0.00888 -0.00920 -0.0262 
 (0.00385) (0.00368) (0.00366)  (0.0193) (0.0200) (0.0175)  (0.0245) (0.0237) (0.0210) 
BMI -0.0306 -0.0134 0.00284  -0.0469 -0.206 0.454  0.0802 0.0222 -0.131 
 (0.0979) (0.0996) (0.0983)  (0.574) (0.573) (0.628)  (0.638) (0.612) (0.460) 
Individual-level controls x x x  x x x  x x x 
Household-level controls  x x   x x   x x 
Municipality-level controls   x    x    x 
State-level fixed effects x x x  x x x  
   
Municipality-level fixed effects     
   
 x x x 
Number of observations 5,445 5,445 5,445   5,445 5,445 5,445   5,445 5,445 5,445 
Note: Summary of the regression coefficients on Seguro Popular treatment (individual level) for the four nutritional outcomes of interest (obesity, overweight, 
underweight, BMI). All regressions include a linear time trend. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Individual-level controls: sex, age, years of schooling, civil status, employment status, BMI at baseline, chronic disease at baseline  
Household-level controls: participation in the Oportunidades cash transfer programme, consumption expenditure at baseline, household size and demographic 
composition of the household at baseline, as well as information on the household head analogous to the individual-level controls. 
Municipality-level controls: urban vs. rural, population size, poverty rate, illiteracy rate, percentage of the population earning less than two minimum wages, 
percentage of women, and the proportion of households without access to piped water, without electricity connection and without access to sanitation. 
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2SLS estimates with state FEs  
 
2 SLS estimates with 
municipality FEs  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
            
Obesity -0.00977 -0.00305 -0.00548  0.0352 0.0482 0.0561  -0.00913 -0.00544 0.0346 
 (0.0109) (0.00969) (0.0102)  (0.0399) (0.0380) (0.0375)  (0.0338) (0.0313) (0.0357) 
Overweight -0.0318 -0.0220 -0.0241  0.0392 0.0784 0.108*  0.0638 0.0738 0.0556 
 (0.0230) (0.0205) (0.0211)  (0.0747) (0.0678) (0.0583)  (0.0846) (0.0808) (0.0838) 
BMI -0.305 -0.234 -0.233  -0.0255 0.173 0.419  0.303 0.413 -0.0245 
 (0.186) (0.165) (0.168)  (0.544) (0.476) (0.453)  (0.642) (0.574) (0.889) 
Malnutrition (weight-for-age) 0.00791 0.01000 0.00769  0.0484 0.0522 0.0943  0.123 0.121 0.103 
 (0.0165) (0.0166) (0.0184)  (0.0555) (0.0552) (0.0706)  (0.0849) (0.0915) (0.0699) 
Stunting (height-for-age) 0.00742 0.00110 0.00534  -0.0370 -0.114* -0.0877  -0.0200 -0.0153 0.0166 
 (0.0175) (0.0160) (0.0167)  (0.0627) (0.0624) (0.0673)  (0.0668) (0.0671) (0.0771) 
Individual-level controls x x x  x x x  x x x 
Household-level controls  x x   x x   x x 
Municipality-level controls   x    x    x 
State-level fixed effects x x x  x x x  
   
Municipality-level fixed effects     
   
 x x x 
Number of observations 4,531 4,531 4,531   4,531 4,531 4,531   4,531 4,531 4,531 
Note: Summary of the regression coefficients on Seguro Popular treatment (individual level) for the four nutritional outcomes of interest (obesity, overweight, 
underweight, BMI). All regressions include a linear time trend. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Heterogeneous treatment effects 
However, the average effects might mask important heterogeneous effects, 
especially across individuals’ age, income and education as well as the existence of a 
well-developed health infrastructure that allows taking advantage of the lifting of 
financial barriers to health care. 
First, access to insurance might not exert the same effect across individuals’ 
age. Older individuals might be more likely to take advantage of better health care 
access and standard check-ups on obesity-related conditions like diabetes or heart 
disease may only be routinely carried out for individuals over a certain age 
threshold. Table 7 analyses the extent to which the impacts of Seguro Popular on 
obesity differs between sub-groups of the population. Consistently, we find evidence 
of negative and significant interaction terms of Seguro Popular across older age 
groups, i.e. Seguro Popular is more effective in protecting these age cohorts against 
overweight and obesity. This is also in line with the Seguro Popular programme 
guidelines on eligibility for different treatments. In our period of interest, regular 
check-ups on an individual’s health and chronic diseases were only foreseen for 
individuals over the age of 40.  
We also interact Seguro Popular coverage with gender, years of schooling, 
and rural vs. urban residence. There is suggestive evidence (significant at the 10% 
level) that Seguro Popular may increase the BMI of women, relatively to men, by an 
additional 0.6 index points. Moreover, we find a significant and positive interaction 
effect of Seguro Popular affiliation and years of schooling, for both obesity and 
BMI. This implies that more educated individuals may be subject to a higher risk of 
becoming obese in response to Seguro Popular than less educated individuals. Such a 
pattern would not be in line with a health information effect of Seguro Popular as 
more educated individuals tend to communicate more effectively with doctors 
(Willems et al. 2005). Possible explanations for this counter-intuitive finding include 
a moral hazard effect, where more educated individuals are more aware of the 
benefits of insurance and adapt their behaviours accordingly, or a self-selection into 
treatment of more educated individuals with a higher obesity risk, which is not well 
controlled by our identification strategy.  
Lastly, we find evidence that individuals who are covered by Seguro Popular 
and were overweight at baseline may be at a higher risk to become obese than 
individuals who were overweight at baseline but not covered by Seguro Popular. 
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This positive interaction term could be interpreted as evidence of a moral hazard 
effect. Although this effect is significant at the 1% significance level, it should be 
interpreted with caution, as no similar effect is detected once BMI is used as an 








Table 3.7 - Heterogeneous treatment effects of Seguro Popular - IV estimates with state-level fixed effects  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 
Outcome variable: Obesity 
 
Outcome variable: BMI 
Seguro Popular 0.0250 0.324*** 0.713** 0.191** 0.0414 0.0985 0.0448174 
 
0.0572 4.039*** 7.222** 1.633** 0.930 1.452* -0.122 
 
(0.0696) (0.0980) (0.305) (0.0767) (0.0700) (0.0713) 0.06887999 
 
(0.669) (1.154) (2.917) (0.794) (0.847) (0.879) (1.014) 
Seguro Popular * Female 0.0702 
       
0.663* 
      
(0.0523) 
       
(0.354) 
      
Seguro Popular * Age 
 
-0.00539*** -0.0216* 
      
-0.0751*** -0.207* 
    
  
(0.00136) (0.0118) 
      
(0.0169) (0.113) 
    
Seguro Popular * Age^2 
  
0.000158 
       
0.00129 
    
  
(0.000114) 
       
(0.00112) 
    
Seguro Popular * Years of schooling 
   
0.0167** 
       
0.139** 
   
   
(0.00683) 
       
(0.0557) 
   
Seguro Popular * Overweight at 
baseline 
    
0.143*** 
       
0.571 
  
    
(0.0494) 
       
(0.530) 
  
Seguro Popular * Obese at baseline 
     
0.0545 
       
0.276 
 
     
(0.0537) 
       
(0.631) 
 
Seguro Popular * Urban 
      
-0.0344 
       
-0.485 
 
            (0.0503) 
 
            (0.415) 
                
Linear combination of coefficients 
(Main effect of SP + Interaction term) 
0.095 0.077 0.089 0.092 0.1843** 0.153** 0.045 
 
0.720 0.594 0.694 0.661 1.501* 1.729* 0.629 
Standard error 0.063 0.061 0.063 0.063 0.077 0.073 0.069 
 
0.643 0.640 0.649 0.646 0.775 0.925 (0.635) 
Observations 5445 5445 5445 5445 5445 5445 5445   5445 5445 5445 5445 5445 5445 5445 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality-level. All regressions include the full set of control variables which are also included in column 3 of table 5, a linear time trend, as well as the main effects corresponding 
to the respective interaction terms presented in each column.  
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Seguro Popular’s impact on food consumption, life style and health care usage 
Lastly, we assess whether Seguro Popular has affected any nutrition-related 
behaviours, including food consumption patterns, exercising behaviours and health 
care usage. Table 8 presents regression results on the impact of Seguro Popular on 
the composition of a household’s food expenditure, measured by the share of 
different food groups in a household’s total food expenditure. After including 
municipality-level fixed effects, we find a statistically significant reduction in the 
share of carbohydrates in total food expenditure by 6.3 percentage points, which is 
accompanied by an increase in meat expenditure by 7.7 percentage points. This 
could be interpreted as an attempt to reduce the consumption of energy-dense food / 
increase the consumption of protein sources in response to the Seguro Popular 
treatment. However, this finding is not robust to corrections for multiple hypothesis 
testing (see table 3.10).  
Lastly, we examine whether Seguro Popular might have changed people’s 
lifestyles across any relevant dimension. The results of this analysis are presented in 
table 9. In the regressions with state-level fixed effects, we find statistically 
significant evidence for a reduction in smoking on the intensive margin by 
approximately 11 cigarettes per week. There is also suggestive evidence for the 
reduction in smoking along the extensive margin by approximately 10 percentage 
points. However, these coefficients lose their significance once municipality-level 
fixed effects are included. Moreover, we find suggestive evidence for an increase in 
exercising along the extensive margin by approximately 13 percentage points.  
It should be noted that we do not find any evidence for an impact on health-
related absences from work, self-reported health, or health care usage. However, for 
health care usage, this may be explained by the comparatively short recall periods in 













Table 3.8: Impact of Seguro Popular on composition of household food expenditure (shares of food 
group in total food expenditure) - 2SLS estimates 
 State FEs   Municipality FEs  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Carbohydrates .032 -.005 -.005  -.014 -0.077** -0.063** 
 (0.033) (0.039) (0.038)  (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) 
Meat  -.046 -.004 -.003  .015 0.098** 0.077** 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)  (0.041) (0.043) (0.042) 
Dairy -.016 .013 .013  -.006 -.012 -.017 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)  (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) 
Plant-based protein .006 -.016 -.016  -.016 -0.032* -0.026* 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Fruit -.006 -.006 -.006  .014 .019 .02 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) 
Vegetables .034 0.040* 0.040*  0.0380281 0.0254159 0.031348 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)  (0.039) (0.047) (0.047) 
Sugary Products .005 .003 .003  -.008 -.004 -.004 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Fat 0.024* .01 .01  .009 -0.021* -.017 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Meals out -.014 -.015 -.015  .023 .027 .013 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.021)  (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) 
Processed food -.001 -.001 -.001  .001 .001 .001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Household-level controls x x x  x x x 
Municipality-level controls  x x   x x 
Household consumption (per 
capita, adult equivalents)     x      x         
Number of observations 2757 2757 2757  2757 2757 2757 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. All regressions include a linear time trend. 






Table 3.9: Impact of Seguro Popular on lifestyle and time use           
 State FEs   Municipality FEs   N 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Lifestyle and time use          
Exercise  .056 .065 .063  0.149* 0.138* 0.134*  5545 
 (0.069) (0.071) (0.070)  (0.085) (0.082) (0.075)   
Exercise hours .108 .104 .105  .193 .186 .169  5029 
 (0.196) (0.202) (0.201)  (0.227) (0.223) (0.187)   
Smoking (binary) -0.10* -0.099* -0.099*  .036 .032 .034  5545 
 (0.053) (0.057) (0.057)  (0.053) (0.052) (0.052)   
Number of cigarettes (per week) -10.79** -10.75** -10.75**  -7.456 -7.475 -6.752  5545 
 (4.445) (4.541) (4.538)  (5.269) (5.289) (4.571)   
Self-assessed health -.0537 -.0507 -.053  .145 .134 .151  5545 
 (0.149) (0.149) (0.148)  (0.175) (0.172) (0.180)   
Health-related absence from work 
.002 .007 .007  -.035 -.034 -.031  5545 
(0.050) (0.049) (0.049)  (0.079) (0.078) (0.077)   
Health care usage (binary) in last 4 weeks 
.039 .034 .032  .023 .014 .014  5545 
(0.058) (0.060) (0.060)  (0.082) (0.082) (0.076)   
Hours worked (per week) 1.318 .913 .888  3.694 3.22 2.806  3132 
 (4.285) (4.422) (4.442)  (4.597) (4.463) (4.352)              
Individual-level controls x x x  x x x   
Household-level controls  x x   x x   
Municipality-level controls   x    x   
Linear time trend x x x   x x x               
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7.  Robustness checks 
A number of robustness checks have been carried out in order to detect any possible 
weaknesses in our identification strategy that might have biased the results. The first 
set of checks were related to the choice of the instrumental variable. We then employ 
three alternative instruments, in order to rule out any spurious findings caused by the 
specific calculation of our main instrument: 
i. Share of individuals covered by Seguro Popular at time t-1 as a share of those 
who were covered in 2011, when the rollout had been completed. 
ii. Share of individuals covered by Seguro Popular at time t-1 as a share of those 
eligible for Seguro Popular treatment in 2000, before the inception of the 
programme. 
iii. Share of individuals covered by Seguro Popular at time t as a share of the 
municipality’s total population at time t. 
The results of these robustness checks are presented in table A1 in the appendix and 
confirm the findings presented in the main part. If anything, the regressions with 
alternative instrument 2 could be interpreted as evidence that Seguro Popular 
increased obesity. However, this result is only significant for some of the regression 
specifications, and several regression coefficients under this instrument become 
implausibly large.  
Secondly, we checked the sensitivity of the results with regards to the 
definition of the sample of analysis. As described above, in the main regressions 
presented in section 6 we are using a balanced sample, so that coefficients across 
specifications with different control variables are comparable. Table A2 also 
presents regressions results for an unbalanced sample, a balanced sub-sample of 
individuals who were overweight at baseline, and a balanced sub-sample of 
individuals over the age of 40. These results also confirm the main findings 
presented in table 5, suggesting that there is no significant impact of Seguro Popular 
on nutritional outcomes. Given the significant interactions between Seguro Popular 
and age, as well as Seguro Popular and overweight at baseline, one might have 
expected significant results in the respective sub-samples. One explanation for the 
lack of significance could be the lower statistical power in the sub-samples, which 
have only 50-60% of the original observations.    
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Our third concern is related to the fact that both the treatment and our 
outcome variables are binary in the case of underweight, overweight and obesity. It 
has been argued that the failure of 2SLS regressions to consider the binary nature of 
these variables may lead to inconsistent estimates (e.g. Dong and Lewbel 2015). We 
therefore also implement a two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) approach as 
described in Terza et al. (2008) in order to take into account the binary nature of both 
treatment and outcome variables. These results are presented in table A3.   
Fourth, we check whether our results are affected by the expansion of health 
infrastructure, and run additional regressions where we control for the number of 
doctors per 1000 inhabitants and clinics per 1000 inhabitants (both measured at the 
municipality level). The corresponding results are presented in table A4. However, 
even after controlling for a municipality’s health infrastructure, we do not find any 
evidence that Seguro Popular has impacted nutritional outcomes. 
Lastly, we investigate whether our significant results on household food 
expenditure (decrease in carbohydrate expenditure, increase in meat expenditure) 
can be explained by multiple hypothesis testing. Indeed, we ran regressions on 10 
different food consumption outcomes, using 6 different regression specifications. 
This makes our estimates vulnerable to “false positives”. Table 3.10 presents 
corrected p-values for the relevant specifications in table 3.8. After correcting for 
multiple hypothesis testing, none of the previously significant findings on 
carbohydrates, meat or plant-based protein, is significant at the 5% or 10% 
significance level. As a consequence, we cannot rule out the possibility that our 
findings on food consumption are purely to be explained by multiple hypothesis 












Table 3.10: P-values with correction for multiple hypothesis testing (food consumption) 
 Specification I (column 5 in table 3.8)  Specification II (column 6 in table 3.8) 
 p-
value 
Corrected p-value  p-
value 
Corrected p-value 
 Bonferroni Holm Holland  Bonferroni Holm Holland 
Carbohydrates 0.017 0.208 0.208 0.189  0.044 0.531 0.531 0.419 
Meat  0.025 0.295 0.270 0.239  0.070 0.844 0.774 0.552 
Dairy 0.622 1.000 1.000 0.896  0.487 1.000 1.000 0.931 
Plant-based protein 0.054 0.646 0.539 0.425  0.103 1.000 1.000 0.662 
Fruit 0.314 1.000 1.000 0.896  0.270 1.000 1.000 0.854 
Vegetables 0.424 1.000 1.000 0.896  0.241 1.000 1.000 0.854 
Sugary Products 0.660 1.000 1.000 0.896  0.675 1.000 1.000 0.941 
Fat 0.101 1.000 0.911 0.617  0.177 1.000 1.000 0.789 
Meals Out 0.323 1.000 1.000 0.896  0.611 1.000 1.000 0.941 
Processed food 0.476 1.000 1.000 0.896   0.691 1.000 1.000 0.941 
          
 
 
8.  Conclusion 
We have assessed the impact of health insurance on nutritional outcomes and 
choices in a context of growing rates of overweight and obesity. Our results suggest 
that the expansion of health insurance to low-income households in Mexico did not 
exert an average effect on underweight, overweight, and obesity (most of the 
estimated coefficients point to a reduction in weight attributable to Seguro Popular). 
However, we do find evidence of heterogenous effects in the programme’s impact, 
suggesting that Seguro Popular protected older individuals more effectively against 
obesity than younger individuals. Moreover, we find evidence that the programme 
may have increased obesity among those who were already overweight before the 
introduction of Seguro Popular, which would be in line with a moral hazard effect. 
However, the latter effect is sensitive to the choice of the outcome variable and not 
confirmed in the robustness checks. 
Our estimates provide suggestive evidence that households covered by 
Seguro Popular have on average decreased the share of household expenditure on 
carbohydrates, but increased the share of household expenditure on meat. This 
result is consistent with a health information effect, where households decrease their 
consumption of energy-dense carbohydrates, as well as a change in the beneficiary 
households’ consumption bundle in response to the income shock due to Seguro 
Popular. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that this is a spurious finding 
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and only emerged due to multiple hypothesis testing. More research would be 
needed in order to confirm this finding.  
It is important to bear in mind that obesity-related treatments were not 
covered during the first years of Seguro Popular, which are covered by our data. The 
programme’s nutritional performance may have improved after 2009, when more 
and more obesity-related treatments were included into the catalogue of free health 
services, and obesity-related examinations were integrated into the regular check-ups 
offered to the insured. Moreover, it should be underlined that the findings of this 
paper are only applicable to Seguro Popular’s target population, i.e. low-income, 
informal sector households which previously did not have any access to health 
insurance. 
Overall, our paper underlines the finding that health insurance does not 
automatically improve nutrition-related diseases such as overweight and obesity. 
Moreover, based on the study we cannot discard the concern that free health 
insurance may even exacerbate obesity, e.g. through an increase in disposable 
income or moral hazard. Including obesity-related treatments and check-ups into 
health insurance plans should therefore be considered a policy priority in order to 
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Table 3.A1: Impact estimates of Seguro Popular based on alternative instruments (robustness check) 
               
 
IV: Coverage in municipality (t-1) as 
percentage of target population (individuals 
covered after complete rollout in 2011)  
IV: Coverage in municipality (t-1) as a 
percentage of eligible individuals as per 
census conducted in 2000  
IV: Coverage in municipality in the 
present year (t), as percentage of total 
population in municipality (t) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
               
Obesity 0.0717 0.0685 0.0897 0.108  0.790 0.486 0.476 0.490**  0.0250 0.00640 0.0510 0.0452 
 (0.156) (0.143) (0.223) (0.230)  (1.220) (0.566) (0.339) (0.248)  (0.0566) (0.0558) (0.0611) (0.0698) 
Overweight -0.00319 0.0157 0.0612 0.0586  0.142 0.148 0.183 0.124  0.0182 0.0231 0.0870 0.0845 
 (0.169) (0.161) (0.216) (0.194)  (0.314) (0.255) (0.165) (0.125)  (0.0613) (0.0643) (0.0620) (0.0704) 
Underweight -0.00156 -0.00070 -0.00046 7.23e-05  -0.00156 -0.00070 -0.00046 7.23e-05  0.00322 -0.0033 -0.0197 -0.042* 
 (0.00381) (0.00367) (0.00365) (0.00372)  (0.00381) (0.00367) (0.00365) (0.00372)  (0.0209) (0.0215) (0.0195) (0.0240) 
BMI -0.154 -0.0731 0.419 0.774  5.515 2.583 2.914** 3.039***  0.370 0.170 0.893 1.037 
 (2.153) (2.046) (2.940) (2.849)  (7.353) (2.439) (1.287) (1.128)  (0.635) (0.643) (0.701) (0.803) 
Individual-level controls x x x x  x x x x  x x x x 
Household-level controls  x x x   x x x   x x x 
Municipality-level controls   x x    x x    x x 
Health infrastructure in 
municipality    x     x     x 
State-level fixed effects x x x x  x x x x  x x x x 
Number of observations 5,445 5,445 5,445 5,199   5,445 5,445 5,445 5,199   5,445 5,445 5,445 5,199 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality-level. All regressions include a linear time trend. The controls in the first three columns are as in table 5 of the paper (main results). The controls for 
the health infrastructure are nurses per 1000 inhabitants and doctors per 1000 inhabitants (the inclusion of hospitals per 1000 inhabitants and nurses per 1000 inhabitants does not change the main 







Table 3.A2: Robustness checks related to the sample of analysis (2SLS estimates)  
 Unbalanced sample  
Sub-sample of individuals who were 
overweight at baseline  
Subsample of individuals over the age 
45 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Obesity -0.0311 0.0158 0.0592 0.0414  0.146 0.147 0.153 0.146  0.0672 0.0475 0.160 0.122 
 (0.0502) (0.0549) (0.0598) (0.0684)  (0.0916) (0.0926) (0.103) (0.122)  (0.0882) (0.0865) (0.0997) (0.105) 
Overweight -0.0448 -0.0212 0.0447 0.0718  -0.00765 -0.0132 -0.0164 -0.0154  0.0354 0.0184 0.0528 0.00161 
 (0.0607) (0.0665) (0.0706) (0.0758)  (0.0232) (0.0242) (0.0232) (0.0237)  (0.0532) (0.0545) (0.0575) (0.0616) 
Underweight 0.0112 0.00568 -0.0158 -0.0326  -0.00034 0.00171 0.00247 0.00254  0.000303 0.00124 0.00609 0.00261 
 (0.0210) (0.0202) (0.0193) (0.0227)  (0.00429) (0.00434) (0.00431) (0.00446)  (0.0103) (0.0118) (0.0112) (0.0127) 
BMI -0.618 -0.213 0.368 0.467  0.523 0.450 0.873 1.323  0.688 0.307 1.111 0.618 
 (0.568) (0.594) (0.647) (0.687)  (0.970) (1.002) (1.094) (1.220)  (0.685) (0.702) (0.848) (0.837) 
Individual-level controls x x x x  x x x x  x x x x 
Household-level controls  x x x   x x x   x x x 
Municipality-level controls   x x    x x    x x 
Health infrastructure in 
municipality    x     x     x 
State-level fixed effects x x x x  x x x x  x x x x 
Number of observations 8,267 5,831 5,831 5,569   3,543 3,543 3,543 3,407   2,818 2,818 2,818 2,719 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality-level. See table A2 for a detailed list of included control variables. All regressions include a linear time trend. *** p<0.01, ** 







Table 3.A3: Probit regression results on Seguro Popular and overweight/obesity using 2-stage-
residual-inclusion 
     
 2 SRI regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Obesity -0.404 -0.274 -0.409 -0.417 
Bootstrapped Standard Error (0.268) (0.273) (0.370) (0.329) 
Average marginal effect -0.129 -0.087 -0.129 -0.131 
Overweight -0.172 -0.0639 0.111 0.110 
Bootstrapped Standard Error (0.237) (0.273) (0.298) (0.312) 
Average marginal effect -0.0550 -0.0203 0.0353 0.0348 
 
    
1st stage residual x x x x 
Individual-level controls x x x x 
Household-level controls  x x x 
Municipality-level controls   x x 
Health infrastructure in municipality    x 
     
Linear time trend x x x x 
Municipality-level fixed effects x x x x 
Number of observations 5545 5545 5545 5545 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality-level. Standard errors are bootstrapped based on 500 
replications. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean. The first stage residuals are included in all 
regressions following the approach suggested by Terza (2008) For a detailed list of the included control 

























Table 3.A4: Regression coefficients after controlling for health infrastructure in 
municipality 
 OLS  





Obesity -0.0118 0.0514 -0.105 
 (0.0119) (0.0682) (0.0758) 
Overweight 0.00391 0.0578 0.0596 
 (0.0134) (0.0764) (0.0766) 
Underweight 0.000244 -0.0216 -0.0154 
 (0.00373) (0.0207) (0.0222) 
BMI -0.0192 0.562 -0.0483 
 (0.0996) (0.674) (0.484) 
Individual-level controls x x x 
Household-level controls x x x 
Municipality-level controls x x x 
Doctors per 1000 & Clinics per 
1000 in municipality 
x x x 
    
Observations 5445 5445 5445 
Note: Summary of the regression coefficients on Seguro Popular treatment (individual level) for the four nutritional 
outcomes of interest (obesity, overweight, underweight, BMI). All regressions include a linear time trend. Standard 




















4. The Weight of Patriarchy? - Gender Obesity Gaps in 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
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The worldwide obesity epidemic has impacted women more heavily than men. 
These gender-based differences are particularly pronounced in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region where gender obesity gaps on average exceed 
10 percentage points. This paper examines one of the explanations, namely the 
role of female empowerment on gender gaps in obesity. We study the effect of 
female labor market participation and the share of female members of 
parliament on gender obesity gaps over a time span of 41 years (1975–2016) in 
a sample of 190 countries. We document that after controlling for a number 
relevant controls, gender obesity gaps are associated with these proxies of 
female empowerment in the MENA region but not worldwide. Our results show 
that a one percentage point increase in female labor market participation 
(female MPs in national parliament) predicts a 0.2 (0.09) percentage point 
decrease in gender gaps in obesity in the MENA region. 
 
 
Keywords: Female overweight, Obesity, Female empowerment, Female labor 







The burden of obesity worldwide falls overwhelmingly on women (Kanter and 
Caballero, 2012). However, in no other world region are the gender-based differences as 
pronounced as in the Middle East. Women in the Middle East are on average 10.3 
percentage points more likely to be obese than men, compared to approximately 4 
percentage points worldwide. There are a number of potential explanations for these 
comparatively large gender gaps in obesity, including gender-based differences in 
physical labour, body-type preferences, alongside cultural norms regarding the 
priorization of family members when calories are scarce. This paper investigates on the 
role of women empowerment, i.e. the decline of “patriarchic” norms, on gender obesity 
gaps. Women empowerment is the ability of women to access the constituents of 
development (Duflo, 2012), which include more prominently earning opportunities by 
participating in the labour market, political participation and equal rights and non-
discrimination, including in the household. Empowerment can influence autonomy and 
agency, self-confidence and self-efficacy, which impact on health decision making, and 
as we show in this paper on overweight.  
Gender-based differences in overweight and obesity are an important concern to 
policy makers interested in improving gender equality and public health in general. 
Overweight and obesity substantially increase the risk of several chronic diseases such 
as high blood pressure, high cholesterol, type II diabetes, cancer, heart disease and 
arthritis (Di Cesare et al. 2016, A.E. Field et al. 2001, Sturm 2002). A higher prevalence 
of obesity among women today will therefore almost inevitably lead to a higher 
prevalence of heart disease, diabetes and other obesity-related comorbidities in the 
future, along with adverse impacts on labour market outcomes, mortality, and general 
wellbeing.  
Nonetheless, evidence on the gender-specific determinants of overweight and 
obesity is scarce. Power and Schulkin (2008) discuss biological differences in the fat 
metabolism between men and women which can partly explain gender obesity gaps. 
Kanter and Caballero (2008) cite lower levels of physical activity among women due to 
contextual factors as a reason for gender-based differences in overweight. Azizi et al. 
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(2005) also refer to the importance of gender differences in diets, documenting a higher 
sugar and snack intake among women. Other explanations might be related to 
sociocultural factors and different body-type preferences. For the MENA region, a 
number of studies have documented preferences for plump body shapes and/or 
overweight among women but not among men (Rguibi and Belahse, 2006, Naigaga et 
al. 2018, Musaiger et al. 2004). This might result from excess weight being perceived as 
a positive trait linked to maternity, prosperity and good health (Ichinohe et al., 2005; 
Mokhtar et al., 2001).  
So far there is only very limited evidence on the relationship between women 
empowerment and nutritional outcomes and most of the related literature focuses on 
undernutrition. Malapit and Quisumbing (2015), show a positive association between 
women’s financial empowerment and nutritional diversity, but not with BMI in Ghana. 
Malapit et al. (2013) find that women empowerment in agricultural households can 
increase both the nutritional diversity and BMI of women in Nepal (the baseline BMI of 
the sampled women was relatively low, suggesting that the finding reflects a decrease in 
undernutrition). Moreover, there is evidence that children of more empowered women 
are less likely to be undernourished (ibid, Cunningham et al., 2014). Regarding 
overnutrition, Mabry et al. (2010) argue that restrictions to the freedom of movement of 
women incentivizes more sedentary behaviour as it prevents women from egaging in  
both active and passive exercise.  
The two papers which are most closely related to our study are Wells et al. 
(2012) and Garawi et al. (2014), which provide evidence for a negative association 
between women empowerment and obesity differentials between men and women in a 
worldwide sample of countries. However, below we document that most of such 
association is driven by Middle Eastern countries alone. Furthermore, they do not 
investigate on the mechanisms behind these associations, nor do they provide any 
evidence on the direction of causality, which we both aim to address in this paper.  
 The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we document the rise of gender 
obesity gaps in the Middle East, as compared to other world regions. Secondly, we 
investigate to what extent the worldwide association between measures of women 
empowerment and obesity gaps documented in other papers, is driven by developments 
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in the MENA region25. Third, we provide an initial assessment on the direction of 
causality between women empowerment and gender obesity gaps by estimating fixed 
effects regressions.  
We use historical data on overweight and obesity over a time period of 41 years 
in 190 countries, 17 of which are in the MENA region, which allows us to describe 
trends in male and female obesity in the Middle East and benchmark them against other 
countries. We document that while average worldwide gender differences in obesity 
have remained stable since 1975, female obesity in the Middle East has increased at a 
much faster pace than male obesity, leading to a substantial gender obesity gap.  
Second, we study to what extent gender obesity gaps correlate with different 
proxies of women empowerment, both worldwide and in the MENA region. In our study 
we mainly draw on two proxies for women empowerment, namely female labour market 
participation and the share of female members of parliament (MPs). These proxies are 
chosen as they are consistently available for a large number of countries and over a long 
time span, yet we show that our results also hold for composite measures of female 
empowerment, as e.g. the UN’s Gender Development Index (GDI).  Our results show 
that the worldwide association between these variables and gender obesity gaps is 
entirely driven by the MENA region. Within the MENA region, the association is robust 
to the inclusion of a number of controls including socio-economic status, education, 
demographic controls alongside time fixed effects. The effect is suggestive that 
increasing female agency (in several domains such as employment, politics and the 
household) affects health decision making, and more specifically the within country 
gender gaps in obesity.  
Third, given the potential of omitted variables and/or reverse causality 
confounding the effect, we draw on causal inference methods to gain additional 
evidence on the direction of causality. In particular, we implement fixed effect 
regressions to control for potential omitted variables. These estimates indicate that 
                                               
25 MENA region (Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and 
Gaza, and Yemen). 
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causality runs from female labour force participation and the share of female MPs to 
gender obesity gaps. Indeed a one percent increase in female labour force participation 
(share of female MPs) decreases gender obesity gaps by 0.2 (0.09) percentage points in 
the MENA region. The effects are mainly explained by rising obesity rates among men 
once the female employment rate increases.  
Section 2 of this paper summarizes the previous literature relevant to our 
analysis of gender obesity gaps, as well as gender-specific factors which may influence 
such gaps. In sections 3 and 4 we discuss our data sources and methods. Next, section 5 
presents three stylized facts on gender-based differences on overweight and obesity in 
the MENA region, and describes a phenomenon which we determine the region’s 
“gender obesity gap”. Then, sections 6 investigates a number of possible explanations of 
these patterns and also presents a number of robustness checks. A final section 
concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature 
Overweight and obesity arise when an individual’s caloric intake is higher than 
their caloric expenditure (Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro 2003; Lakdawalla and Philipson 
2009). The underlying factors for such an imbalance can be structural or the results of 
individuals choices and lifestyles. Over recent years, changing lifestyles have intensified 
these caloric imbalances. On the one hand, the share of individuals engaging in physical 
labor has been declining and more people pursue sedentary activities for living. On the 
other hand, the daily intake of calories has increased in most high and middle income 
countries (Costa-Font and Mas 2016).  
 There are a number of explanations for the increased consumption of 
calories. Technological progress in both agriculture and industrial food processing has 
led to a decrease in the relative prices of food. Cutler et al. (2003) show that this led to 
an increase in the consumption of calories, particularly through more frequent meals and 
snacking. Another explanation is related to the improved labour market perspectives for 
women. This led to an increase in the opportunity cost for cooking and hence an 
increase in the consumption of industrially processed food, as well as restaurant meals 
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including fast food. As the latter options often have a higher caloric density than home 
cooked food, this has also contributed to rising obesity levels (Chou, Grossman and 
Saffer 2004).  
 However, it is not immediately clear why any of these factors should 
affect women differently than men. Evidence from biology and the medical sciences 
suggests that the body mass of women on average contains a higher proportion of fat 
than the body mass of men (Power and Schulkin 2008). These biological factors can 
explain why women are more affected by obesity on average, but not why these gender 
gaps differ between world regions.  
A literature review on gender-specific explanations of obesity by Kanter and 
Caballero (2012) point to the possibility of gender-specific changes to physical activity 
patterns over recent years. In some world regions, manual tasks that were traditionally 
carried out by women may have been automatized more quickly, leading to a decrease 
of physical activity among women. Other explanations relate to culture and body type 
preferences in different societies. In some cultures, female weight is associated with 
high social status, maternity and nurturing, leading to a preference for high body weight. 
Moreover, cultural or religious norms may restrict the possibility for females to exercise 
in public (ibid.).  
On a more general level, there is evidence that female empowerment is 
conducive to wider political participation, employment and education, and health 
(Mahlotra et al, 2002, World Bank, 2011, Hindin, 2000). In theory, it is therefore well 
conceivable that empowerment also affects nutritional outcomes. More empowered 
women may e.g. be less affected by a social pressure to comply with certain body type 
preferences. Moreover, there may be indirect effects through employment (higher 
incomes among more empowered women) and education which can increase 
“nutritional literacy”.  
This is also confirmed by empirical evidence. Jones et al (2020) differentiate 
three domains of women's empowerment namely asset ownership, intrinsic agency 
(power within household), and instrumental agency (power to influence in household 
decision-making) and show that the latter two contribute women’s nutritional status in 
East Africa. Other studies examining women empowerment status (draw on measures of 
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decisions making, violence attitudes and experience) find evidence of an association 
with women’s nutritional status (Yaya 2020). Consistently, Kunto and Bras (2018, 
2019) as well as Imai et al. (2014) provide a life course explanation showing that the 
empowerment of mothers also improves the nutritional status of their adolescent 
children, in particular for girls. Patel et al. (2006) show that limited empowerment is the 
main predictor of poor health among Indian women. Moreover, a growing body of 
evidence from psychology suggests that an individual’s empowerment, by improving 
individual’s agency and self-efficiency, eases the process of searching for solutions to 
health specific conditions such as diabetes which relate to individuals overweight and 
obesity (Wong et al, 2016; Nishita et al, 2013). A study examining individuals with type 
II diabetes found evidence of a reduction of stress, systolic blood pressure and Body 
Mass Index (BMI) following empowerment interventions (Tucker et al, 2014). 
However, this intervention targeted both, men and women.  
A recent paper by Atkin, Sihra and Shayo (2019) also underlines the importance 
of cultural and religious factors in shaping food consumption preferences. They show 
that changes in the status of a religious or ethnic group in a society have implications for 
both the degree to which members identify with this group, and the consumption of 
identity goods and adherence to consumption taboos (e.g. Hindus not consuming beef). 
Moreover, they find that conflict may increase the identification with one’s own group 
and lead to a higher consumption of identity goods (e.g. Hindus consuming pork).  
This paper contributes to the literature in the following way. First, we describe 
what we refer to as a “gender obesity gap” in the Middle East, namely a rising disparity 
in obesity rates between men and women. This pattern has not yet received any attention 
in the development and health literature so far. Therefore, we first provide a cross-
country analysis of gender-based differences in obesity in the MENA region and 
worldwide to document such a phenomenon.  Secondly, we contribute to the increasing 
literature on gender health gaps, and the macro-institutional determinants of health, 
especially empowerment theories which suggest that expanding individual agency exerts 
an effect on individual’s health. Third, we investigate on a number of explanations for 
the gender obesity gap, particularly drawing on literature on women empowerment. In 
particular, we assess to what extent the economic and political participation of women 
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(measured by female labour market participation and the share of female MPs in 
national parliaments) can explain gender obesity gaps. Finally, we investigate on the 
channels through which empowerment influences gender obesity gaps, and particularly 
the underlying changes to male and female obesity rates.   
 
3. Data  
We use country-level panel data on BMI, overweight and obesity from the World Health 
Organisation’s (WHO) Global Health Observatory. This dataset contains complete 
information on nutritional outcomes by sex for 190 countries worldwide, out of them 17 
countries in the Middle East, over a time span of 41 years (1975-2016).  
 This data has been merged with two different proxies for female empowerment 
that were obtained from the World Bank Open Data database: the percentage of women 
in a country’s labour force as a measure of female labour market participation, and the 
share of female MPs in national parliaments as a measure of women’s political 
participation. These variables are used as the primary proxies of female empowerment 
in our analysis, given that they have been consistently recorded for a large number of 
countries (176) and over a long time period (1990-2016). This large number of more 
than 4,000 observations gives us the necessary statistical power to investigate on the 
heterogeneities between MENA and other world regions, and to add a larger number of 
control variables.  
While we acknowledge that these indicators do not reflect all dimensions of 
female empowerment, they are able to capture at least economic and political 
participation. As a robustness check, we use the more comprehensive UNDP’s Gender 
Development Index as a proxy of female empowerment. In the time period between 
1990 and 2010, this index is only available in 5 year-intervals, leading a smaller sample 
size and therefore less precise estimates of the regression coefficients (see below).  
 Moreover, we draw on the World Bank Open Data database for constructing 
control variables on the socioeconomic situation of all countries, as well as the 
demographic composition of their populations. The World Bank data has more gaps and 
for some countries a number of variables are not available at all. We use linear 
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interpolation in order to fill data gaps between two available data points for the control 
variables. 
 Overall this provides us with 4,423 observations from 181 countries for which 
we have data on nutritional outcomes, GDP per capita and the country’s demographic 
composition (dummy variables for the share of different age-groups in the total 
population) , female labour market participation and the share of female MPs in national 
parliaments. For 3,183 observations we also have additional control variables such as 
unemployment, the size of the services sector, and the country’s total fertility rate. 
Descriptive statistics are provided in table 4.A1 in the appendix.  
 
4. Methods 
 We run fixed effects regressions in order to assess the associations between 
obesity and overweight and two proxies of female empowerment, namely a.) female 
labour market participation, and b.) the share of female MPs in national parliaments. It 
is important to acknowledge that we can only identify the impact of these proxy 
variables, and not of female empowerment as such. Female empowerment is a multi-
dimensional construct which cannot be expressed in a single number. Therefore we opt 
for investigating on the impact of proxy variables, which capture different dimensions of 
female empowerment.  
In all regression models, we interact the main independent variable, e.g. female 
employment, with a MENA region dummy variable. This allows us to disentangle the 
worldwide association between the independent variable and gender-obesity differences, 
from the region-specific association in the Middle East. The regression models take the 
form 
 
!"# = 	& +	()*"# +	(+	,-./" +	(0	(*"#	2	,-./") + 	4	5"# +	6" +	7"# 
 
where !"# is a nutritional outcome for country i at time t (either the gender obesity gap, 
or female or male obesity), *"# is our independent variable (i.e. a proxy of female labour 
market participation, or of women empowerment), ,-./" is a binary variable 
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indicating whether the country is part of the MENA region (this dummy is dropped in 
all fixed effect models due to de-meaning), 5"#  is a vector of control variables, 6" is a 
country-specific fixed effect, and 7"# is a serially uncorrelated random error term.  Our 
main parameters of interest are () and (0. () measures the association between a proxy 
for female empowerment and gender-obesity differences worldwide, while (0 measures 
the same association for the MENA region in particular. Moreover, all regressions 
include a linear and quadratic time trend in order to capture any long-run developments, 
which are independent of the world region, but may be correlated with the treatment 
variables.  
Table 4.A1 in the appendix illustrates that the independent variables feature 
sufficient variation over time which is crucial for our fixed-effects estimation. In the 
MENA region female labour force participation increased by 5.7 percentage points 
between 1990 and 2015 (a 27 percent increase compared to the baseline mean) and the 
share of female MPs increased by 9 percentage points (a 280 percent increase). In the 
rest of the world, labour force participation increased by 2.21 percentage points (4.4 
percent increase compared to baseline) over the study period and the share of female 
MPs by 10.7 percentage points (a 102 percent increase). 
 It is important to acknowledge that this approach has a number of limitations. 
First, fixed effect models allow us to control for time-invariant unobservable factors, but 
not for unobservables which can change over time. Second, as the main interest of this 
paper are gender obesity gaps in the MENA region, we do not interact our treatment 
variables with other regional dummies. We therefore compare the MENA region to the 
rest of the world, without taking into account possible heterogeneities between other 
regions. 
 
5. Stylised facts  
Descriptive evidence reveals that there is indeed a negative correlation between our 
measures of female empowerment and gender obesity gaps. More specifically, Figure 1 
shows evidence suggestive that higher levels of female male labour market participation 
negatively correlate with gender obesity gaps. Similarly, Figure 2 shows a negative 
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correlation between the share of female MPs in national parliament and gender 
differences in obesity.  
Figure 4.1: Gender obesity gaps and female labour force participation 
 
Note: This figure displays the correlation between country specific differences in obesity across genders 
and the proportion of women in the labour force. The figure is own elaboration based on WHO data 1975-
2015. Bin scatter plot (n=100).  
	
Figure 4.2: Gender obesity gaps and share of female MPs in national parliaments 
 
Note: This figure displays the correlation between country specific differences in obesity across genders 
and the proportion of female members of parliament (MP) in national parliments. The figure is own 
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Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the development of gender-based inequalities in different 
world regions26. Three main conclusions can be drawn from these graphs. First, the 
worldwide prevalence of obesity among women is on average 4 percentage points 
higher than the prevalence of obesity among men. This difference has remained constant 
over a long time period, in spite of substantial overall increases in overweight/obesity. 
The results are consistent with some structural factors driving the association. 
 Second, the constant world average masks important regional differences in the 
development of gender-based obesity differences. There are two world regions where 
obesity among women has grown much faster than obesity among men: sub-Sahara 
Africa and the MENA region. In the remainder of this paper we describe this pattern as 
the growing “gender obesity gap”. In the MENA region, gender-based differences in 
obesity had already surpassed the world average at the beginning of our data series in 
1975 (6.4 percentage points). Since then, the gender obesity gap has grown rapidly over 
the 1980s and 1990s, reaching 9.6 percentage points in the year 2000. This growth also 
continued between the year 2000 and 2016, although at a slower pace reaching 10.3 
percentage points in 2016. In sub-Sahara Africa, gender obesity gaps were still below 
the world average in 1975, but since then have been growing even more rapidly than in 
the MENA region, reaching 9.6 percentage points in 2016.  
On the other hand, gender-based differences in obesity in Europe have steadily 
decreased over our period of interest, from 6.4 percentage points in 1975 to 2.6 
percentage points in Europe. Lastly, in the Americas, Southeast Asia, and the Western 







                                               
26 We are using the WHO classification of world regions for all graphs presented in this section. For 
details, see: https://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/definition_regions/en/  
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Figure 4.3: Gender obesity gaps for selected world regions over time (% point 
differences between women-men) 
 
Note: This figure displays the differences in obesity across genders across different world regions. The 
figure is own elaboration based on WHO data 1975-2015. Bin scatter plot (n=100).  
 
Third, it is important to note that even male obesity in the MENA region grew more 
rapidly than the world average over the study period. This implies that the growing 
gender obesity gaps cannot be explained by constant or decreasing male obesity rates, 
but by an extraordinarily rapid increase in female obesity. This is also confirmed by 
Figure 3 which summarizes female obesity trends by WHO world region. It shows that 
today the Middle East is the region with the second highest female obesity rate 
worldwide, only surpassed by the Americas.  Figure 4 reports the overall change in 
obesity prevalence in different world regions between 1975 and 2016. Although obesity 
in the American region was still higher than the MENA region in 2016, we document 
that the MENA regions exhibits the largest change in obesity (92% change compared to 
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Figure 4.4: Growth in male vs. female obesity across world regions (1975-2016, in percentage 
points)   
	
Note: This figure displays the obesity rates across genders across different world regions in 1975 and 
2016. The figure is own elaboration based on WHO data 1975-2015. Bin scatter plot (n=100).  
 
6. Explaining the gender obesity gap 
6.1 Fixed Effects estimates 
Table 1 presents Fixed Effects (FE) estimates which report how the two proxies of 
female empowerment (female labor market and the share of female MPs in the national 
parliaments) predict gender obesity gaps across countries. The left panel of the table 
(columns 1-3) suggests that female employment worldwide does not have an impact on 
gender-based obesity differences, after including country-level fixed effects and 
controlling for a number of country characteristics. In contrast, we find that, it does 
reduce the gender obesity gap in the MENA region. The estimates show that a 1 
percentage point increase in female employment in the MENA region is associated with 
an average decrease of 0.22 to 0.29 percentage points in the gender obesity gap. While 
this effect size is quite large, it would still be very difficult to eliminate the gender 
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increase in the female labor force participation rate by 40 percentage points would 
eliminate the gender obesity gap, an increase by 25 percentage points in the labor force 
participation rate of women could bring the gender obesity gap down to the worldwide 
average of 4 percentage points (the cross-country average of female labor market 
participation in the MENA region amounts to 27 percent in 2016). This suggests that 
other factors which are unrelated to female employment or empowerment have also 
contributed to the existing gender obesity gap.  
The right panel of the table (columns 4-6) illustrates that female representation in 
parliament is associated with a higher gender obesity gap worldwide, but with a lower 
gender obesity gap in the MENA region. The coefficients for the MENA region range 
between 0.085 and 0.0986, implying that a one percentage point increase in the share of 
female MPs predicts a 0.09 percentage point decrease in the gender obesity gap. We 
interpret this as a rather small coefficient, in particular compared to the coefficients on 
female employment. The numbers suggest that, all else equal, an increase in the share of 
female MPs by 65-67 percentage points would be needed in order to reduce the MENA 
regions’s gender obesity gap to the world average.  
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Table 4.1: Gender obesity gaps and female empowerment (Fixed effects estimates)  
(1) (2) (3) 
  
(4) (5) (6)  
Gender obesity gap 
  
Gender obesity gap          
Female labour force 
participation 
-0.0109 0.0282 0.0223 
 
Percentage of female 
MPs in national 
parliaments 
0.0256*** 0.0239*** 0.00383 
(0.0204) (0.0190) (0.0227) 
 
(0.00924) (0.00877) (0.00862) 
Female labour force 
participation x MENA 
-0.297*** -0.282*** -0.243** 
 
Percentage of female 
MPs  x MENA 
-0.0939** -0.0980** -0.0871** 
(0.0698) (0.0696) (0.1000) 
 
(0.0398) (0.0415) (0.0420) 




GDP per capita 
 
-9.95e-05* -0.000154***   
(4.86e-05) (4.40e-05) 
   
(5.34e-05) (4.70e-05) 




(GDP per capita)^2 0 5.33e-10   
(3.50e-10) (3.42e-10) 
   
(4.15e-10) (3.61e-10) 





Size of services sector 
(% of GDP) 
  
-0.0135   
(0.0111) 








-0.0667***    
(0.0196) 
    
(0.0197) 




Total Fertility Rate 
 
-1.692***    
(0.357) 
    
(0.338) 
Linear and quadratic trend x x x 
 
Linear and quadratic 
trend 
x x x 
Controls for demographic 
composition 





x x x 
         
Observations 4,747 4,482 3,326 
  
4,747 4,482 3,326 
Number of countries 176 172 161 
  
176 172 161 
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors (country-level) in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * 
significance at the 1% level 
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However, it is important to note that both the political representation of women and 
female employment, two proxies of female empowerment do predict lower gender 
obesity gaps consistently with the predictions of empowerment theory. These results are 
consistent with studies that suggest an association between measures of gender 
inequality and obesity.  
 
6.2 Channels 
As a next step, we present evidence on the potential channels which affect the gender 
obesity gap, in particular whether the associations between female employment, female 
MPs and the gender obesity gap are driven by changes in male or to female obesity. 
Table 2 illustrates that the negative association between female employment and the 
gender obesity gap, is mainly to be explained by rising obesity rates among men once 
the female employment rate increases. Female obesity in turn is by and large unaffected 
by female employment.  
 A stronger representation of women in national parliaments is associated with 
both higher obesity rates among men and women. However, the growth in male obesity 
rates in response to female representation is stronger than for women, explaining the 
overall negative association between gender obesity gaps and female MPs in the MENA 
region. We show that both measures of empowerment have different effects on gender 
gaps in the Middle East than elsewhere. In the Middle East it seems that female 
employment increases male obesity and has no effect on obesity among women 
(negative but insignificant coefficient). Similarly, a larger share of female MPs increases 

















Table 4.2 - Channels: Are the findings driven by changes to female obesity, male obesity, or both? 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Independent variable: female labour force participation Female obesity  Male obesity 
Female labour force participation 0.0525** 0.0678** 0.0518**  0.0634** 0.0396 0.0295 
(0.0259) (0.0273) (0.0241)  (0.0276) (0.0266) (0.0238) 
Female labour force part. x MENA -0.115** -0.0566 -0.0737  0.182* 0.226** 0.170 
(0.0528) (0.0674) (0.0773)   (0.100) (0.102) (0.113)  
       
Independent variable: percentage of female MPs in national parliaments Female obesity  Male obesity 
Percentage of female MPs  -0.0131 -0.0130 -0.00576  -0.0387*** -0.0369*** -0.00959 
(0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0113)  (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0109) 
Percentage of female MPs  x MENA 0.0836*** 0.0791** 0.0736*  0.177*** 0.177*** 0.161*** 
(0.0304) (0.0321) (0.0398)   (0.0297) (0.0292) (0.0319) 
Note: The table presents the coefficients from three different fixed effects regression specifications,  using female and male obesity as outcomes instead of gender gaps. 
Control variables across specifications are analogous to tables 1 and 2. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. 
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6.3 Heterogeneity: Arab Spring 
One potential variation in the effect of empowerment comes from shocks that increase 
the instability of the MENA region countries.  The Arab Spring stands as a shock which 
influenced by social norms along the lines of traditional values amidst the temporary 
election of the Muslim brotherhood 2012-2013 (Gallup, 2019) which we argue it exerted 
an impact of health behaviours, and overweight. Weight gain can respond to 
psychological pain and psychological and emotional traumas insofar as food is one of 
the easiest means for humans to escape traumas.  Consistently, table 3 presents the 
results of regressions with triple interaction terms of our independent variables with both 
a MENA dummy and a post-Arab-Spring dummy. These results illustrate that after the 
Arab Spring the negative association between female labour market participation and 
gender obesity differences have become even stronger. On the other hand, the 
association between female representation in national parliaments and the gender 





Table 4.3 - Heterogeneity: Changes after the Arab Spring (fixed effects estimates) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  
(4) (5) (6) 
 
Gender obesity gap 
  
Gender obesity gap 
Female labour force participation -0.0126 0.0276 0.0212 
 
Percentage of female MPs in 
national parliaments 
0.0255*** 0.0238*** 0.00378 
(0.0203) (0.0188) (0.0225) 
 
(0.00927) (0.00879) (0.00865) 
Female labour force participation x 
MENA 
-0.233*** -0.235*** -0.201** 
 
Percentage of female MPs in 
national parliaments  x MENA 
-0.0940** -0.0990** -0.0911** 
(0.0705) (0.0768) (0.100) 
 
(0.0372) (0.0434) (0.0442) 
Female labour force part. x MENA x 
post-Arab spring 
-0.0101 -0.0954* -0.0451 
 
Percentage of female MPs   x 
MENA x post-Arab spring 
0.000708 0.00247 0.0196 
(0.0634) (0.0558) (0.0636) 
 
(0.0162) (0.0175) (0.0166) 
Post Arab spring (dummy) -0.0381*** -0.0253** -0.0312* 
 
Post Arab spring (dummy) -0.0468 -0.0865* -0.0965* 
 
(0.0133) (0.0125) (0.0161) 
  
(0.0485) (0.0473) (0.0579) 
Note: The results in this table are bassed on separate regressions with either female labour force participation or percentage of female MPs as independent variables. 









Table 4.4: Gender obesity gaps and the Gender Development Index (robustness check) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 RE estimates  FE estimates         
Gender Development Index (GDI) 5.052 4.367 7.140* 4.400 3.472 4.735 
(3.852) (3.205) (3.984) 
 
(3.559) (2.567) (4.248) 
GDI * MENA -14.52** -8.042 -5.623 
 
-14.7** -9.21* -7.17 
(6.812) (5.530) (6.535) 
 
(6.840) (5.376) (7.208) 
MENA 17.17*** 14.74*** 12.92** 
 
- - -  
(6.070) (4.990) (5.634) 
 
   
















Size of services sector (% of GDP) 
  
-0.0201 
   
-0.0273**   
(0.0123) 





   
-0.0515**    
(0.0204) 
   
(0.0210) 
Total Fertility Rate 
  
-1.548*** 
   
-1.625***    
(0.318) 
   
(0.428) 
Linear and quadratic trend x x x 
 
x x x 
Controls for demographic composition x x x 
 
x x x         
Observations 1,498 1,472 1,190 
 
1,498 1,472 1,190 
Number of countries 159 157 148   159 157 148 
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors (country-level) in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** significance at the 
5% level, and * significance at the 1% level 
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 6.4 Composite female empowerment index as independent variable 
 The proxies for female empowerment presented above mainly reflect 
economic and political empowerment but may neglect other dimensions. We 
therefore investigate whether our results are consistent if a composite woman 
empowerment index is used as a proxy. As discussed above, the main drawback of 
these composite measures is that they are not available for as many countries and/or 
time periods as our primary measures. Table 3.4 presents both fixed and random 
effect regressions, where empowerment is measured by the UNDP’s Gender 
Development Index (GDI). This index is available in five-year intervals during our 
period of interest (1990-2016). The results of these regressions largely confirm our 
initial results, namely a negative correlation between the proxies for women 
empowerment and gender obesity gaps. It should be acknowledged that in the 
specification with the full set of control variables, this association loses its statistical 
significance. However, we interpret this as a consequence of the lower statistical 
power in these models with less than a third of the original sample size, rather than 
as an inconsistency with the original results.  
7. Conclusion 
This paper studies the effect of female labour market participation and the 
representation of women in national parliaments on gender obesity gaps, with a 
special focus on the MENA region. Drawing on fixed effect estimates, we document 
a robust negative effect of these variables on gender obesity gaps in the MENA 
region. This suggests that improving women's economic and political participation 
can also reduce gender-based inequities in nutritional outcomes. 
It is important to note that the worldwide association between women 
empowerment and gender obesity differences is entirely driven by the MENA 
region. Once the MENA region is partialled out, the worldwide association between 
empowerment and obesity disappears. These results are robust to the inclusion of 
fixed effects, as well as controls for time-varying country characteristics. In 
particular, we document that a one percentage point increase in female labour market 
participation in the MENA region reduces gender gaps in obesity by 0.2 percentage 
points. Similarly, an increase in the share of female MPs by one percentage point in 
the region reduces gender gaps by 0.09pp. 
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While our results indicate that female labour market participation and 
representation in parliaments can reduce gender obesity gaps, it is important to note 
that this reduction can mainly be explained by an increase in obesity among men, 
rather than a decrease in obesity among women. This finding is largely unexpected 
and merits further investigation.   
Based on our initial findings around gender obesity gaps, we outline a 
number of extensions. First, it would be important to establish whether the cross-
country relationships which we have documented in this paper, also hold at the 
individual or household level. Secondly, based on our results, it would be important 
to test whether empowerment also influences gender gaps in other measures of 
health, such as diabetes, hypertension and other diseases which correlate with 
obesity.  Similarly, it seems important to document to what extent political and 
economic empowerment result in differences in stress, and more specifically mental 
conditions.  Third, additional evidence on causality based on microdata will also be 
essential for a better understanding of gender obesity gaps.    
Our results can be interpreted as revealing that progress in the empowerment 
of women (proxied by labour market participation and the share of female MPs) can 
reduce gender-based health inequities in obesity. At the same time, it is important to 
note that the main driver of this effect has not been a decrease in obesity among 
women, but rather an increase among men. Overall, our findings illustrate that 
gender equality may give rise to returns beyond observable measures, such as 
income or employment, but also to less tangible measures such as health and 
nutrition.   
 149 
References 
Abuyassin, B., & Laher, I. (2016). Diabetes epidemic sweeping the Arab world. World journal of 
diabetes, 7(8), 165. 
Atkin, D., Colson-Sihra, E., & Shayo, M. (2019). How Do We Choose Our Identity? A Revealed 
Preference Approach Using Food Consumption (No. w25693). National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Azizi F, Azadbakht L, Mirmiran P(2005). Trends in overweight, obesity and central fat accumulation 
among Tehranian adults between 1998–1999 and 2001–2002: Tehran lipid and glucose 
study. Ann Nutr Metab. 2005;49:3–8 
Bursztyn, L., Egorov, G., & Fiorin, S. (2017). From extreme to mainstream: How socinorms 
unravel (No. w23415). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Chou, S. Y., Grossman, M., & Saffer, H. (2004). An economic analysis of adult obesity: results from 
the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System. Journal of health economics, 23(3), 565-587. 
Costa-Font, J., Fabbri, D., & Gil, J. (2010). Decomposing cross-country differences in levels of 
obesity and overweight: does the social environment matter?. Social Science & Medicine, 70(8), 
1185-1193. 
Costa-Font, J., & Mas, N. (2016). ‘Globesity’? The effects of globalization on obesity and caloric 
intake. Food Policy, 64, 121-132. 
Cutler, David M, Edward L Glaeser, and Jesse M Shapiro. 2003. “Why Have Americans Become 
More Obese?” Source: The Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(3): 93–118. 
Di Cesare, Mariachiara et al. (2016). “Trends in Adult Body-Mass Index in 200 Countries from 1975 
to 2014: A Pooled Analysis of 1698 Population-Based Measurement Studies with 19.2 Million 
Participants.” The Lancet 387(10026): 1377–96. 
Dimova, R., Elder, S., & Stephan, K. (2016). Labour market transitions of young women and men in 
the Middle East and North Africa. Geneva: ILO. 
Duflo, E. (2012). Women empowerment and economic development. Journal of Economic 
literature, 50(4), 1051-79. 
Field, A E et al. 2001. “Impact of Overweight on the Risk of Developing Common Chronic Diseases 
during a 10-Year Period.” Archives of Internal Medicine 161(13): 1581–86. 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11434789. 
Gallup (2019). Gallup World Poll. https://www.gallup.com/analytics/232838/world-poll.aspx 
Garawi, F., Devries, K., Thorogood, N. et al. Global differences between women and men in the 
prevalence of obesity: is there an association with gender inequality?. Eur J Clin 
Nutr 68, 1101–1106 (2014) 
Greve, J. (2008). Obesity and labor market outcomes in Denmark. Economics & Human 
Biology, 6(3), 350-362. 
ILO (2016). Women in business and management: gaining momentum in the Middle East and North 
Africa: regional report. 
Johansson, E., Böckerman, P., Kiiskinen, U., & Heliövaara, M. (2009). Obesity and labour market 
success in Finland: The difference between having a high BMI and being fat. Economics & 
Human Biology, 7(1), 36-45 
Jones, Rebecca E., Regine Haardörfer, Usha Ramakrishnan, Kathryn M. Yount, Stephanie S. 
Miedema, Timmie D. Roach, and Amy Webb Girard. "Intrinsic and instrumental agency 
associated with nutritional status of East African women." Social Science & Medicine (2020): 
112803. 
Kanter, R., & Caballero, B. (2012). Global gender disparities in obesity: a review. Advances in 
nutrition, 3(4), 491-498. 
Kabeer, N. (1999). Resources, agency, achievements: Reflections on the measurement of women's 
empowerment. Development and change, 30(3), 435-464. 
Kunto, Y. S., & Bras, H. (2018). Women’s empowerment and gender inequality in adolescent 
nutritional status: evidence from the indonesian family life survey. Journal of Biosocial 
Science, 50(5), 640-665. 
 150 
Kunto, Y. S., & Bras, H. (2019). Ethnic Group Differences in Dietary Diversity of School-Aged 
Children in Indonesia: The Roles of Gender and Household SES. Food and nutrition 
bulletin, 40(2), 182-201. 
Ichinohe M, Mita R, Saito K, Shinkawa H, Nakaji S, Coombs M, Carney A, Wright B, Fuller 
ELTohoku J Exp Med. 2005 Sep; 207(1):21-32. 
Imai, K. S., Annim, S. K., Kulkarni, V. S., & Gaiha, R. (2014). Women’s empowerment and 
prevalence of stunted and underweight children in rural India. World Development, 62, 88-105. 
Lakdawalla, Darius, and Tomas Philipson. 2009. “The Growth of Obesity and Technological 
Change.” Economics and Human Biology 7(3): 283–93. 
Malhotra, A., Schuler, S. R., & Boender, C. (2002). Measuring women’s empowerment as a variable 
in international development. In background paper prepared for the World Bank Workshop on 
Poverty and Gender: New Perspectives (Vol. 28). 
Mabry RM, Reeves MM, Eakin EG, Owen N (2010). Evidence of physical activity participation 
among men and women in the countries of the Gulf cooperation council: a review. Obes 
Rev 2010; 11: 457–464. 
Mokhtar N, Elati J, Chabir R, Bour A, Elkari K, Schlossman NP, Caballero B, Aguenaou H 
(2001). Diet culture and obesity in northern Africa. J Nutr. 2001;131:887S–892S. 
Musaiger, A. O., Shahbeek, N. E., & Al-Mannai, M. (2004). The role of social factors and weight 
status in ideal body-shape preferences as perceived by Arab women. Journal of biosocial 
science, 36(6), 699-707. 
Naigaga, D. A., Jahanlu, D., Claudius, H. M., Gjerlaug, A. K., Barikmo, I., & Henjum, S. (2018). 
Body size perceptions and preferences favor overweight in adult Saharawi refugees. Nutrition 
journal, 17(1), 17. 
Hindin, M. J. (2000). Women’s power and anthropometric status in Zimbabwe. Social Science & 
Medicine, 51(10), 1517-1528. 
Nishita C., Cardazone G., Uehara D. L., Tom T (2013). Empowered diabetes management life 
coaching and pharmacist counseling for employed adults with diabetes. Health Education and 
Behavior.  40(5):581–591 
Patel, V., Kirkwood, B. R., Pednekar, S., Pereira, B., Barros, P., Fernandes, J., ... & Mabey, D. 
(2006). Gender disadvantage and reproductive health risk factors for common mental disorders 
in women: a community survey in India. Archives of general psychiatry, 63(4), 404-413. 
Power, M. L., & Schulkin, J. (2008). Sex differences in fat storage, fat metabolism, and the health 
risks from obesity: possible evolutionary origins. British Journal of Nutrition, 99(5), 931-940. 
Rocca, C. H., Rathod, S., Falle, T., Pande, R. P., & Krishnan, S. (2009). Challenging assumptions 
about women's empowerment: social and economic resources and domestic violence among 
young married women in urban South India. International journal of epidemiology, 38(2), 577-
585. 
Renzaho, A. M. (2004). Fat, rich and beautiful: changing socio-cultural paradigms associated with 
obesity risk, nutritional status and refugee children from sub-Saharan Africa. Health & 
place, 10(1), 105-113. 
Rguibi M, Belahsen R. Body size preferences and socio-cultural influences on attitudes towards 
obesity among Moroccan Sahraoui women. Body Image 2006;3:395–400. 
Staiger, D. and J.H. Stock (1997). Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments. 
Econometrica 65(3), 557-586. 
Tucker, C. M., Lopez, M. T., Campbell, K., Marsiske, M., Daly, K., Nghiem, K., ... & Patel, A. 
(2014). The effects of a culturally sensitive, empowerment-focused, community-based health 
promotion program on health outcomes of adults with type 2 diabetes. Journal of health care 
for the poor and underserved, 25(1), 292. 
Yang, H. H., & Wu, C. I. (2015, September). Evolution of Social Networks and Body Mass Index for 
Adolescence. In International Conference on Multidisciplinary Social Networks Research (pp. 
106-115). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.  
Yaya, Sanni, Emmanuel Kolawole Odusina, Olalekan A. Uthman, and Ghose Bishwajit. "What does 
 151 
women's empowerment have to do with malnutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from 
demographic and health surveys from 30 countries." Global Health Research and Policy 5, no. 
1 (2020): 1-11 
World Bank (2011) World Development Report 2012. Gender equality and development. Washington 
D.C. http://go.worldbank.org/CQCTMSFI40 
Wells JCK, Marphatia AA, Cole TJ, McCoy D . Associations of economic and gender inequality with 
global obesity prevalence: understanding the female excess. Soc Sci Med. 2012; 75: 482–490. 
Wong, C. K. H., Wong, W. C. W., Wan, Y. F., Chan, A. K. C., Chan, F. W. K., & Lam, C. L. K. 
(2016). Effect of a structured diabetes education programme in primary care on hospitalizations 
and emergency department visits among people with type 2 diabetes mellitus: results from the 
Patient Empowerment Program. Diabetic Medicine, 33(10), 1427-1436. 
Zhang, X., Zhao, X., & Harris, A. (2009). Chronic diseases and labour force participation in 








































Southeast Asia Western Pacific Africa Europe Middle East Americas Global





Table 4.A1: Descriptive statistics for treatment and control variables in the MENA region and the rest of the world (ROW) 
 
MENA 1990 MENA 2015 Change 
1990-2015 
MENA 





 Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Female labour force 
participation (in percent) 21.20 6.46 26.89 15.51 5.69 50.64 1.04 52.86 0.78 2.21 
Share of female MPs in 
national parliaments 3.29 1.28 12.78 6.85 9.49 10.55 0.40 21.35 0.53 10.79 
GDP per capita 14,264 28,543,579 33,426 72,024,318 19,162 6,723 298,795 18,165 1,559,662 11,442 
Size of services sector (in 
percent) 42.48 14.25 53.16 7.69 10.69 45.72 0.96 56.53 0.66 10.81 
Unemployment rate 10.37 5.00 7.83 2.60 -2.54 7.35 0.29 8.44 0.28 1.08 
Poverty rate 5.78 1.64 0.63 0.11 -5.14 27.53 10.00 8.50 2.21 -19.04 
GINI index 39.13 2.51 34.70 5.84 -4.43 42.29 2.44 37.44 0.67 -4.84 














Table 4.A2: Gender obesity gaps and female employment (Random effects estimates)  
(1) (2) (3) 
  
(4) (5) (6)  
Gender obesity gap 
  
Gender obesity gap          
Female labour force participation -0.0153 0.0205 0.0160 
 
Percentage of female 
MPs in national 
parliaments 
0.0256*** 0.0240*** 0.00398 
(0.0192) (0.0182) (0.0210) 
 
(0.00922) (0.00877) (0.00860) 
Female labour force participation x 
MENA 
-0.29*** -0.271*** -0.217** 
 
Percentage of female 
MPs  x MENA 
-0.0930** -0.0986** -0.0855** 
(0.0677) (0.0686) (0.0970) 
 
(0.0396) (0.0416) (0.0418) 
MENA 10.97*** 14.48*** 14.12*** 
 
MENA 5.005*** 7.544*** 8.297***  
(2.305) (2.785) (3.441) 
  
(0.880) (1.200) (1.155) 












   
(5.15e-05) (4.45e-05) 




(GDP per capita)2 
 
-0 4.70e-10   
(3.37e-10) (3.31e-10) 
   
(4.02e-10) (3.53e-10) 




Size of services sector 
(% of GDP) 
  
-0.0106   
(0.0111) 








-0.0618***    
(0.0196) 
    
(0.0197) 




Total fertility rate 
  
-1.689***    
(0.295) 
    
(0.283) 
Linear and quadratic trend x x x 
  
x x x 
Controls for demographic composition x x x 
  
x x x          
Observations 4,747 4,482 3,326 
  
4,747 4,482 3,326 
Number of countries 176 172 161     176 172 161 
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors (country-level) in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * 
















5. Does social learning contribute to the adoption of 
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Abstract: What determines the adoption of preventive health behaviours? 
Social learning has been a key driver for behaviour change and technology 
adoption in the fields of agriculture and finance in developing countries. 
This paper investigates whether social learning also influences adoption 
decisions regarding cheap and cost-effective health prevention technologies. 
In particular, the study assesses the impact of a social and behaviour change 
intervention in Mozambique’s Manica province on a.) young mothers who 
participated in the intervention, b.) mothers from neighbouring households 
which did not participate in the intervention but were exposed to social 
network effects, and c.) a control group of mothers from neighbouring 
villages which were not covered by the programme. The data for the study 
was collected through a dedicated survey in January-March 2017, covering 
a representative sample of 1,680 mothers from the three groups. The 
empirical analysis draws on an inverse-probability-weighting approach to 
measure the intervention’s impact on health knowledge and the uptake of 
key health technologies. The results confirm that in treated villages, social 
learning has contributed to the uptake of preventive health technologies, 
such as latrine usage, handwashing with soap, and exclusive breastfeeding 
up to the age of 6 months. However, treatment effects are consistently lower 
in the social learning group as compared to the directly exposed group, 
suggesting that updating processes are not complete. The results suggest 
that social learning effects should be taken into account in both the design 
and the cost-benefit assessments of behaviour change interventions.  
Keywords: social learning, malnutrition, network externalities, health 





Social learning is a crucial determinant for the adoption of new technologies in 
agriculture (see e.g. Bandiera and Rasul 2006, Conley and Udry 2010), and 
microfinance (Banerjee et al. 2013). However, apart from the landmark paper by 
Miguel&Kremer (2003) on deworming,  there is few evidence whether social 
learning also determines the uptake of simple and live-saving health technologies. A 
number of authors have pointed out that preventive health technologies like 
mosquito bed nets, Oral Rehydration Solution (ORS), or exclusive breastfeeding for 
infants younger than 6 months are underused in many contexts (Banerjee & Duflo 
2012, Casabonne & Kenny 2012). In the context of this study in rural Mozambique, 
only 33 percent of children under 5 sleep under an insecticide-treated bed net and 
only 50 percent of children who experience diarrhoea are treated with ORS 
according to the latest DHS survey (2011). This study investigates whether intra-
communal social learning can improve health and-nutrition related behaviours 
among mothers of young children, particularly with regards to malaria prevention, 
WASH, child feeding and maternal health.  
   
 Often malnutrition, infectious diseases and related cases of death could be 
avoided by using these cheap (often free) and widely available health technologies. 
In Mozambique, the under-5 mortality rates amounts to 72 per 1,000 life births and 
43 percent of the children under 5 are affected by chronic undernutrition (UNICEF 
2019). Undernutrition, caused by low caloric intake, lack of dietary diversity, and/or 
infectious diseases in turn causes approximately 45 percent of all child deaths in sub-
Sahara Africa (WHO 2019).  
The reasons for the seemingly paradoxical low adoption rates of cheap health 
technologies in these contexts have not been fully understood yet. Possible 
explanations include an incomplete knowledge about the costs and benefits of these 
technologies, signalling effects where low prices suggest a low effectiveness to 
consumers, traditional beliefs that are not underpinned by scientific evidence, as well 
as psychological factors, such as time-inconsistent preferences and present bias 
(Banerjee and Duflo 2012). Neoclassical economics may only provide a partial 
understanding of the related explanations and behavioural insights may need to be 
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taken into account. This paper will specifically focus on social learning processes 
and how they can improve the adoption of cheap health technologies by improving 
knowledge and creating social incentives for technology adoption. 
 Although there is a growing body of literature on Social and Behaviour 
Change Communication (SBCC) campaigns in the fields of health and nutrition, 
most of these studies have focused on the overall impact of these programmes and 
not disentangled the respective importance of changes to the individual knowledge 
and the subsequent peer effects at the community-level. The latter effects are the 
main focus of this paper. SBCC interventions usually use either mass-media 
broadcasting or community-based strategies in order to disseminate information 
about the benefits of one or several health technologies and/or behaviours. 
Evaluations of community-based interventions have shown their potential in e.g. 
promoting exclusive breastfeeding, improving handwashing practices and reducing 
diarrhoea (see e.g. Luby et al. 2018, Menon et al. 2016). The evidence on mass-
media interventions for child health has been less conclusive and several studies 
were unable to detect any impact of the evaluated campaigns (Naugle & Hornik 
2014, Head et al. 2015) 
This article expands on the existing literature by investigating whether there 
is any evidence for social learning / spillover effects to take place in the context of 
an SBCC intervention. Social learning models underline that individual agents may 
have incentives to learn from their neighbours in situations with uncertain payoffs 
about different courses of action (e.g. using a mosquito net or not). One would 
therefore expect that a SBCC intervention does not only positively affect households 
which were directly exposed to such an intervention, but that there are also spillover 
effects on untreated households in municipalities where the treatment is offered.   
However, in spite of the theoretical predictions of social learning models and 
the encouraging empirical evidence from the fields of agriculture and microfincance, 
there may be additional obstacles for social learning to materialise in health and 
nutrition. First of all, the health and nutrition practices of one’s network members are 
not as easily observable as e.g. crop adoption decisions in the field of agriculture. 
Social learning for health and nutrition therefore may involve higher communication 
costs. Secondly, health and nutrition practises may be considered more personal and 
private, making people more reluctant to openly share their views and opinions with 
their neighbours. Third, unlike in the case of a new agricultural crop, people may 
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presume that they ought to know about good health and nutrition practices for their 
children. Seeking information would therefore imply revealing one’s own ignorance 
about a certain topic. Avoiding stigma and shame may therefore be another barrier 
towards information seeking (see Chandrasekhar et al. 2017). Hence, it is important 
to gather empirical evidence on the presence of social learning effects in the fields of 
health and nutrition. Quantifying social learning effects can also help to improve 
cost-effectiveness estimates on BCI interventions.  
As this paper draws on concepts from both economics and public health, it is 
important to define some key terms from both fields and put them in relation to each 
other. The term “social learning” is widely used in the economics literature and can 
be defined as learning “through observation of other people’s behaviours” (Bandura 
1971: p.2) or more generally “aggregating information from others” (Chandrasekhar 
et al. 2015: p.1). It is therefore a more narrow concept than “spillover effects” which 
also encompass effects which are unrelated to cognitive processes, e.g. a lower risk 
of contracting an infectious disease due to a lower disease prevalence among other 
community members. The term should neither be confounded with “Social and 
Behaviour Change Communication” (SBCC), which is a public health concept 
referring to the “strategic use of communication approaches to promote changes in 
knowledge, attitudes, norms, beliefs and behaviors” (USAID 2021). SBCC 
campaigns usually target different barriers to social change, among them individual 
factors (knowledge, skills), but also community-level factors (e.g. peer influence). 
Investigating on social learning within an SBCC intervention therefore may help to 
disentangle the relative importance of different channels through which these 
programmes achieve their impact.   
This study focuses on social learning effects in the context of a SBCC campaign 
implemented by the United Nations World Food Programme in rural areas of 
Mozambique’s Manica province in 2017/2018. The SBCC project aimed at 
improving the health and nutrition of children during the first 1000 days of their life 
(from conception up to their second birthday) by strengthening knowledge and 
improving practices about key health and nutrition topics. The four priority areas of 
the intervention were:  
• Malaria (prevention & treatment) 
• Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) 
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• Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) 
• Maternal care and nutrition 
The intervention drew on 90 community-level health committees (HCs) which 
were trained by WFP programme staff and equipped with training material on the 
four above-mentioned topics. Afterwards the HCs were expected to organize training 
sessions for pregnant women, mothers with children aged 0-2, as well as their 
husbands. The health committees were instructed to approach comunidades (i.e. 
small rural settlements, literal translation “communities”, usually consisting of 20-
100 households) in their geographical proximity and invite all women who are either 
pregnant or had a child aged 0-2 to participate in the trainings. Details on the 
timeline of the intervention and its contents can be found in tables A1 and A2 in the 
appendix.  
The assignment of treatment was not randomised, but based on logistical 
considerations (limitation of the intervention to 5 out of 9 districts in Manica 
province, so that 5 district capitals could be used as hubs for the intervention), as 
well as previously existing contacts to local health authorities of the WFP and its 
local partners (governmental and non-governmental institutions operating in Manica 
province).  
 Given the lack of randomisation, this study uses two strategies to estimate the 
intervention’s impact. First, the sampling design drew on census data so that 
comparison areas with very similar characteristics than the (non-randomly selected) 
treatment areas could be included in the survey. Secondly, propensity-score-based 
methods are used to balance treated and comparison households in their observable 
characteristics. The particular method chosen is inverse probability weighting with 
regression adjustment, which unlike most other propensity score techniques allows 
for the comparison of more than two groups at the same time: (1.) Treated 
households, 2.) Untreated households living in treated areas, 3.) Untreated 
households living in untreated areas). It is important to acknowledge that the 
households in group 2 do live in municipalities where the trainings were offered, but 
for some reason did not participate in the trainings themselves. They are thus non-
compliers. Qualitative evidence from the field suggests that in most cases this is due 
to absence from the village, on the day(s) on which the trainings were conducted 
(e.g. due to agricultural work). In some cases, these households may also have 
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actively opted against participating in the trainings. Our control strategy allows us to 
adjust for observable differences between treated households and “spillover 
households”, but cannot account for any potential unobservable differences.  
 Three main results can be drawn based on this analysis. First the health 
committees were effective in improving health/nutrition-related knowledge and 
practices among the women who participated in their trainings. Second, women who 
did not participate in these trainings, but who live in treated areas, also improved 
knowledge and practices about key indicators – this can be interpreted as evidence of 
social learning effects. Third, treatment effects are consistently larger for the group 
of women which were directly exposed to the intervention than for the indirectly 
exposed group. This suggests that not all women in the indirectly exposed group 
benefit from social learning and/or that there is information loss.  
 The paper is structured as follows: section 2 reviews both the theoretical and 
empirical literature related to social learning and behaviour change interventions, 
with a particular focus on developing countries. Section 3 describes the data which is 
used as a basis for this paper, as well as the sampling strategy and data collection 
process for the household survey that has been conducted as a basis for this study. 
Section 4 presents the research methodology, section 5 discusses the results and 
section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Literature  
2.1. Modelling Social Learning 
Interventions which aim at inducing social learning and behaviour change need to 
accomplish two crucial steps (Banerjee et al. 2019): 
1. Information dissemination: they need to deliver the relevant information (e.g. 
the benefits of using a mosquito bednet) to their target audience 
2. Information aggregation: they also need to ensure that the target audience 
actually updates their beliefs and behaviours based on the new information (e.g. to 
internalise the benefits of mosquito nets and use them more frequently)  
 Information dissemination depends on the costs and expected benefits of 
seeking information for an individual (ibid.). An individual will seek information 
(e.g. attend a meeting organised by health committees) if she expects that the benefit 
of seeking information is higher than the related monetary and non-monetary costs, 
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including opportunity costs. Interventions like the SBCC project in Mozambique can 
be expected to increase the supply of information, thereby lowering its costs and 
ultimately increase the number of people who seek information. Moreover, recent 
evidence suggests that information campaigns can also lead to demand side 
responses. Banerjee et al. (2018) show for example that depending on their design, 
information campaigns can decrease barriers related to information seeking, in 
particular the stigma and shame an individual suffers by revealing his ignorance 
about a certain issue. If certain individuals in a community are known to have 
received a piece of information which was not accessible to others, e.g. health 
committee members, this can reduce the stigma and shame of approaching these 
individuals.  
Information aggregation processes are most commonly modelled through 
Bayesian or DeGroot learning models (Banerjee et al. 2019). These models provide a 
theoretical basis to understand why individuals do or do not change their behaviours 
based on new information. Bayesian learning models assume that individuals form 
beliefs about the right choice of behaviour in each time period t (i.e. the behaviour 
yielding the highest life-cycle payoffs) based on a personal prior and a number of 
neighbourhood signals received from other agents. In its simplest form, the Bayesian 
updating model can be written as 




where an individual i’s guess about the correct behaviour in period t, "#$, is a 
function of the indvidual’s prior beliefs, (#,$*+, and a weighted average of 
neighbourhood signals from the previous period /#,$*+,.. Neighbourhood signals are 
independent and identically distributed in Bayesian learning models, and individuals 
apply weights &#$.  to all signals, reflecting the precision/noisiness they attribute to 
each of them (see e.g. Alatas et al. 2016). Bayesian agents will be aware if they 
receive one and the same signal from several sources and will not double-count 
signals. Under these assumptions, it has been shown that social learning will occur 
asymptotically, leading to a situation where all agents converge in their beliefs 
towards the correct decision (Acemoglu et al. 2011, Gale & Kariv 2003).   
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Another approach to modelling social learning processes are DeGroot 
learning models. In these models, agents base their decision about the optimal 
behaviour on a simple average of the opinions of all other agents in their network, 
and their own opinion. This implies that agents may double-count the same signal if 
received from different neighbours. Moreover, individuals only receive a private 
signal once, at time t=0 (see Chandrasekhar, Larreguy & Xandri 2018). Even in 
these models behaviours will asymptotically converge towards the correct decision, 
yet convergence is much slower than in Bayesian learning models. Under certain 
conditions, agents may even be trapped in wrong beliefs for an infinite number of 
time periods (Chandrasekhar et al. 2015). Indeed, empirical evidence has shown that 
De Groote models describe real-world social learning processes more adequately 
than the Bayesian learning models which presuppose much more sophisticated 
updating processes (ibid. ; Chandrasekhar et al. 2018).  
Banerjee et al. (2019) have developed a generalised version of this model 
which may be particularly useful for this study. In their Generalised DeGroot Model, 
(GDG) a number of agents may be completely uninformed at the beginning, i.e. not 
have received any priors. In this case, agents will only average across the beliefs of 
all informed neighbours in order to reach an own conclusion about the state of the 
world. As long as no one in the agent’s network is informed, the agent would hold an 











where the set of informed neighbours of individual i at time t is denoted as 6#$.  
What are the predictions of these models with regards to the SBCC 
intervention in Mozambique? Under Bayesian learning, the information 
disseminated by health committees would influence the subsequent updating 
processes in the social networks exposed to the intervention. If health committee 
members are considered a well-informed and credible source (i.e. the “noisiness” of 
the transmitted signals is deemed low by recipients), the target audience would 
attribute a high weight to the new information and the intervention would help the 
treated communities to converge to the correct behaviours more quickly. Under the 
GDG model, the success of the intervention would depend on the network structure. 
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As the updating in the GDG model only involves a simple averaging of others’ 
opinions, the relative success of the intervention would be dependent on the number 
of exposed individuals, as opposed to those individuals who hold contrary beliefs. 
The social networks would only converge towards the correct belief if the correctly 
informed individuals outnumber the incorrectly informed individuals when t grows 
towards infinity.  
 
2.2. Related Literature 
This study contributes to two strains of empirical literature: 1.) the literature around 
social learning about new technologies and 2.) the literature about the effectiveness 
of community-level Social and Behaviour Change Communication interventions in 
the fields of health and nutrition. 
 
2.2.1 Social learning and technology adoption 
Much of the empirical literature on social learning is related to the introduction of 
new technologies in the fields of agriculture and finance. Bandiera and Rasul (2006) 
have shown that social networks are a crucial determinant of the diffusion of a 
hitherto unknown crop (sunflowers) in central Mozambique. Moreover, they show 
that more informed farmers are less sensitive to the adoption decisions of others than 
less informed farmers. Conley and Udry (2010) show that individual decisions about 
fertiliser usage among farmers using a new crop (pineapple) in Ghana are driven by 
the observed strategies of others in a farmer’s network as well as the respective 
payoffs which others receive from a particular strategy. Banerjee et al. (2013) show 
that social networks have also played a crucial role in the diffusion of microfinance 
in India. They find that both microfinance participants and non-participants have 
informed others about the availability of microfinance, with participants being more 
likely to inform others.   
Chandrasekhar, Golub and Yang (2017) provide more detailed insights on 
who in a social network is likely to engage in social learning and can benefit from it 
through a lab experiment in the field in India. They show that the shame and stigma 
caused by revealing one’s own ignorance about a topic may be an important barrier 
towards seeking information, especially for low-skill individuals. This implies that 
those individuals who would be most in need of information may not seek it, leading 
to what the authors call a “signaling poverty trap”. Creating a more private learning 
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environment may therefore be one solution to ensure that low-skill individuals can 
benefit from social learning.  
There are only very few studies on social learning for health and nutrition 
that were conducted in developing countries. Miguel and Kremer (2003) analyse 
how information about deworming drugs through one’s social network affects 
individual uptake. They reach the unexpected conclusion that the larger the number 
of adopters in one’s network, the smaller the individual probability to take up the 
drug. The authors interpret this as an indication for actual social learning, rather than 
simple imitation, as individuals learn that the private benefits of deworming are not 
high enough to justify a shift from traditional behaviours and beliefs (in the study 
setting in Kenya worms were considered important for digestion).  
 
2.2.2. Social and Behaviour Change Communication for health and nutrition 
Secondly, there is a growing body of literature on community-based behaviour 
change interventions, often referred to as Social and Behaviour Change 
Communication (SBCC) programmes, which are also implemented with the aim of 
improving health and nutrition practices. In many cases, these programmes do not 
only work towards changes at the individual level, but aim at inducing peer effects or 
changes in community-level norms or attitudes.  
 This is reflected in a number of theoretical SBCC models, which often serve 
as a basis for the design of SBCC interventions. The behaviour change wheel 
(Michie, van Stralen and West  2011) proposes that individual behaviour change 
requires three conditions: capability (an individual’s skills), opportunity (the context 
of an individual’s action), and motivation (brain processes that trigger a certain 
behaviour). These three factors at the heart of the behaviour change wheel are 
commonly referred to as the COM-B system.   
It is important to acknowledge that “opportunity” in the COM-B model is 
defined by an individual’s social environment and their interaction with other 
community members. Altering the social environment may thus be an important 
strategy in order to change individual behaviour. This is why an SBCC intervention 
may, consciously or unconsciously, also induce social learning. Some studies have 
also made an explicit link between social learning and SBCC interventions (Briscoe 
& Aboud 2012). This theoretical argument is also reflected in handbooks/toolkits for 
SBCC practitioners and can thus be expected to inform the design of such 
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programmes in practice (see e.g. USAID 2021, Health Communication Capacity 
Collaborative 2021). In line with the theoretical models, an empirical review on the 
most common methods for SBCC interventions identifies “social support” as a 
commonly employed strategy (Briscoe & Aboud 2012).  
However, although behaviour change models like COM-B do underline the 
importance of social learning in behaviour change processes, most impact 
evaluations of SBCC programmes and other behaviour change inteventions, have not 
attempted to “partial out” the effect of social learning, but rather assessed their 
aggregate effects. 
Menon et al. (2020) summarise the evidence from different randomised 
controlled trials evaluating the SBCC programmes within the “Alive and Thrive” 
initiative, which specifically focuses on improving nutritional outcomes among 
infants and young children.  They find that the SBCC initiatives led to an 
improvement in complementary feeding in all studied countries (Bangladesh, 
Vietnam, and Ethiopia), and in breastfeeding in Bangladesh and Vietnam. The 
programme entailed interpersonal counselling, mass media and community 
mobilization. Results from RCTs reported in Menon et al. (2016) show that the 
programme increased self-reported exclusive breastfeeding rates in the 24 hours 
before the interview by 36.2 percentage points in Bangladesh, and 27.9 percentage 
points in Vietnam. In Ethiopia, an evaluation of the same intervention (Kim et al. 
2019), suggested improvements in children’s dietary diversity and a reduction in 
stunting, but no significant changes regarding breastfeeding.  
 Luby et al. (2018) and Null et al. (2018) describe randomised controlled trials 
evaluating an intervention to reduce diarrhoea among children through intensive 
counselling about handwashing, sanitation, and/or appropriate child nutrition to 
mothers by community promoters (individuals with secondary education who live in 
walking distance to the intervention areas). In Bangladesh, this intervention was 
effective in reducing the diarrhoea prevalence among children by 1.7 to 2.3 
percentage points, depending on the treatment arm, as compared to a baseline 
prevalence of 5.7 percent (Luby et al. 2018).  Moreover, the intervention also leads 
to improvements in height. Length-for-age z-scores increased by 0.13-0.25 points for 
two of the treatments (nutrition counselling & combined WASH+nutrition 
counselling), compared to a baseline value of -1.79.  The very same intervention was 
also implemented in Kenya, where it did not lead to any reductions in diarrhoea 
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prevalence, but also improved length-for-age z-scores by 0.13 to 0.16 points, as 
compared to a baseline value of -1.54 (Null et al. 2018). This result illustrates that 
the effectiveness of a certain intervention can vary substantially depending on its 
implementation context. Luby et al. (2005) studied an initiative to promote 
handwashing in Pakistan. The intervention included the distribution of free soap and 
weekly visits by fieldworkers to encourage handwashing. The authors find a 50% 
reduction in the prevalence of pneumonia and a 53% reduction in diarrhoea (from 
approximately 4.06 to 1.93 episodes of diarrhoea per 100 person-weeks). However, 
when households were revisited two years after the end of the intervention, soap 
purchases and diarrhoea prevalence in the treatment group were not significantly 
different from the control group anymore (Luby et al. 2009).  
In general, Menon et al. (2020) point out that similar interventions may differ 
in their impact, depending on the context of implementation, with the reach of an 
intervention and the chosen platforms of delivery being major determinants of a 
programme’s effectiveness. However, previous studies on the pathways to impact of 
SBCC evaluations have used qualitative methods (Avula et al. 2013, Henry 2015), 
and if using quantitative methods, have not attempted to quantify the importance of 
social network effects (Kim et al. 2018). Quantifying social network effects in the 
context of SBCC interventions is mainly important for two reasons: First, it is 
important to know if SBCC interventions also reach non-compliers (i.e. those who 
live in treated areas, but for some reason are not directly exposed to the 
intervention), and to what extent the intervention is effective for them. Secondly, 
gaining an understanding of the importance of direct exposure vs. indirect exposure 
to SBCC interventions may be important to inform programme design in the future, 
e.g. to decide whether SBCC programmes should more actively attempt to induce 
social effects.  
Probably, the study which is most closely related to this paper is Hoddinot et 
al. (2017) who show that a behaviour change intervention in Bangladesh aiming to 
improve child nutrition has created spillovers to non-participants. They find that 
non-participants who are neighbours of participants increased their knowledge on a 
standard set of IYCF questions by 0.17 standard deviations, were 13.8 percentage 
points more likely to meet the WHO’s guidelines for minimum dietary diversity, and 
children aged 0-6 months were 7.1 percentage points less likely to ever have 
consumed water-based liquids. However, in the Hoddinot et al. study, non-
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participants simultaneously received a food or cash transfer, which may alter the 
impacts as compared to a pure social learning intervention.  
 
 
2.3. Contribution of this study  
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this literature review. First of all, there 
is substantial evidence for the existence of intra-communal social learning processes 
in developing countries. Most of this evidence comes from the fields of agriculture 
and finance. Secondly, although there is a large literature on behaviour change 
interventions in relation to health and nutrition, this literature review has only found 
one study providing evidence on the spillover /social learning effects of such 
interventions to non-participants in Bangladesh (Hoddinot et al. 2017). Third, the 
available literature suggests that health behaviour change interventions so far have 
had lower treatment effects in Africa than in Asia or Latin America. It is therefore 
important to further explore under which circumstances behaviour change 
interventions can be successful in Africa and to what extent they can trigger social 
learning processes.  
This paper makes two main contributions to the existing literature. First, it 
explores to what extent there are intra-communal social learning processes in the 
fields of health and nutrition in the context of a health behaviour change campaign. 
Given that most of the existing evidence on social learning from developing 
countries is from the fields of agriculture and finance, it is important to test whether 
the existing knowledge also applies to health and nutrition. The question is also very 
policy-relevant, as the existence of spillovers would substantially increase the cost-
efficiency of community-based health interventions, making them a more sensible 
policy option in many contexts.  
Secondly, it adds to the literature on the effectiveness of SBCC interventions. 
Much of the encouraging literature on behaviour change interventions cited above, is 
based on interventions implemented in Latin America or Asia. However,  behaviour 
change interventions have often performed differently in Africa as compared to other 
world regions and this study may further contribute to the exploration of context-
specific policies. Likewise, the external validity of this study is most likely limited to 
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rural areas in Africa and programme impacts might differ in urban areas, other 
continents and possibly even different countries.  
 
3. Data 
The data for this study has been collected through a dedicated household survey with 
1,661 households in different districts of Manica province where the SBCC project 
was implemented. The survey took place approximately one year after the start of 
the project, between January and March 2018.  
 
3.1 Sampling 
A two-stage random sampling process was performed treating the Mozambican 
localities29 as Primary Sampling Units (PSU) and the enumeration areas (EAs)30 
defined by Mozambique’s National Institute of Statistics (INE) as Secondary 
Sampling Units (SSU). Given that treatment assignment for the SBCC intervention 
was not randomised, a major objective of the sampling design was to draw a sample 
of comparable households from areas that were exposed to the intervention and 
similar areas that were not exposed to the intervention and could therefore be used as 
a comparison area. Pre-intervention census data31 was used in order to identify 36 
enumeration areas spread across 9 localities32 with similar pre-intervention 
characteristics.  
                                               
29 A locality is the smallest administrative unit in Mozambique. The contries’ administrative divisions are (in 
descending order): province (província), district (distrito), administrative post (posto administrativo), localities 
(localidade).  
30 Enumeration areas comprise approximately 80-100 households and are defined by the National Institute of 
Statistics for the organisation of the census. In rural areas they often correspond to small villages / settlements 
and/o are defined using natural geographical boundaries, like rivers, roads, forests, etc. However, enumeration 
areas are not administrative divisions.  
31 The latest available census data at the time of the sampling was the 2007 census. The following variables 
collected during the census were used for the selection of sampling areas: Share living in households with poor 
structure, Share living in households that own a radio, Share living in households that own a computer, Share living 
in households that own a car, Share of recent mothers (women who had children within 12 months before the 
research) with low education level, Share of illiterate recent mothers, Share of recent mothers that are employed. 
32 During the fieldwork, 5 of the 36 selected enumeration areas proved inaccessible for the enumerators: two 
EAs were affected by an armed conflict and considered unsafe by local authorities, one EA was part of a 
community which had completely migrated to another area due to lack of water, one EA could not be properly 
localised by the enumerators due to accuracy issues with the EA’s official map, and one EA had become 
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All households living in the selected EAs who met the eligibility criteria 
(having at least one woman who is either pregnant or the mother of children younger 
than 3) were invited to participate in the household survey. All 2,454 households in 
these areas were visited during a short screening survey. If there was a child under 3, 
the child’s mother (or main female caretaker) would be invited to participate in the 
survey interview. In households with more than one eligible woman, enumerators 
would randomly select one of the eligible women on the spot. In total, this yielded a 
sample of 1,678 women. The sample can be considered as representative for the 
target population of the SBCC project in Manica province.  
 
3.2. Survey questionnaire 
The core of the survey consisted of approximately 50 questions on knowledge, 
attitudes, risk perceptions and practices covering the four priority areas of the SBCC 
intervention in Manica (malaria, WASH, infant nutrition, maternal care/nutrition), i.e 
10-14 questions per topic. Knowledge questions included for example open-ended 
questions on the causes of malaria and diarrhoea, as well as the recommended 
duration of exclusive breastfeeding. Practices questions covered e.g. self-reported 
mosquito bed net usage, observed availability of soap to wash hands, as well as a 
detailed questionnaire on the youngest infant’s intake of foods and liquids in the 24 
hours before the interview.  
 Based on these questions, a number of indexes were constructed as aggregate 
measures on child health and nutrition practices. The overall knowledge index 
covers 4 key knowledge questions for each of the 4 topic areas (16 questions in 
total), and the practices is based 4 questions on health and nutrition practices per 
topic, excluding maternal health due to the short follow-up period between trainings 
for this topic and the household survey (12 questions in total). Moreover, knowledge 
and practices indexes were also created for each single topic area, based on the very 
same questions used for the overall indexes. A respondent would earn index points 
for a certain question, when she responds to a question correctly, i.e. when the 
answer is in line with recommended practises. Each question is weighted equally 
                                               
inaccessible after a bridge collapsed due to heavy rainfalls. All these EAs have been replaced by another 
randomly selected EA in the same locality.  
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when constructing the index, and all indexes are brought to a scale from 0-100 to 
facilitate the interpretation of the results. 
 The survey also included approximately 50 questions on demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics of the household, as well as its exposure to the health 
committee trainings. This information was crucial in order to match treated and 
comparison households to each other (see section 4). The duration of most 
interviews ranged between 60 and 90 minutes.  
 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 describes the socioeconomic situation among the women in our sample. It 
illustrates that education levels are generally low, with only 42.6 percent of the 
sample being literate and 26.4 percent speaking Portuguese, the official language in 
Mozambique (the mother tongue of 94 percent of the interviewed women are local 
languages such as Tonga, Ndau or Shona). 93.9 percent of the respondents are 
married, and 38.4 percent live in polygamous relationships. For 70.8 percent, 
agriculture is the main source of income, and the great majority of households do not 
own basic furniture, such as a table, bed, sofa or lamp. Most of the houses are built 
out of relatively fragile materials, such as mud or mud bricks, with roofs made of 
















Table 5.1: Socioeconomic characteristics – SBCC impact evaluation sample 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
error   Variable Mean 
Standard 
error 
Literacy 0.426 0.012 
 
Time to closest road (minutes) 46.89 1.77 
Secondary Education 0.266 0.011 
 
Time to closest hospital 
(minutes) 
115 2.16 
Speaks Portuguese 0.264 0.011 
 
Walking = main means of 
transportation 
0.811 0.01 
Partner literacy 0.776 0.01 
 
Asset ownership (household level) 
 
Lives with partner 0.88 0.008 
 
Motorcylce 0.12 0.008 




Table  0.46 0.012 
Polygamous household 0.384 0.012 
 
Chair  0.597 0.012 
Age 26.85 7.04 
 
Bed 0.24 0.01 
Number of children  3.44 0.05 
 
Sofa 0.033 0.004 




Lamp 0.104 0.007 
Cattle ownership  0.403 0.012 
 
Mobile phone 0.275 0.011 




Computer 0.008 0.002 
Improved floor (concrete 
or similar) 
0.177 0.009   Radio access 0.58 0.012 
Source: own elboration based on SBCC impact evaluation survey 
 
3.4. Definition of treatment and comparison areas.   
In our analysis, an enumeration area is considered as treated if at least 20% of the 
households in the area reported to have participated in a health committee training. 
We expect that in all EAs, there are some HHs which are wrongly recorded as 
having been trained by a health committee, e.g. because of misunderstandings the 
question, or data entry issues. Therefore, it is unreasonable to categorise an area with 
only one trained household as a treatment area.  
 The 20-percent-threshold is motivated by an analysis of the distribution of 
households in each EA which self-reported to have participated in a health 
committee training (see figure 1). Indeed, the distribution shows a peak at 0, i.e. for 
areas where no one reported to be trained, and other peaks around 0.07, 0.1 and 0.15, 
i.e. areas where very few community members reported to have been trained. 
However, as health committees had been instructed to invite all eligible households 
in a certain community to participate in trainings, it is reasonable to assume that 
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these enumeration areas were not in the catchment area of any health committee. 
Sensitivity analyses show that the results are unaffected by the choice of this 
threshold. Based on this definition, the sample can be subdivided into three groups 
which are presented in table 2 and represent the basis for our impact estimates 
presented in section 4.   
 
Figure 5.1: Distribution of the share of households trained by health committees 
across enumeration areas  
 
 




Group 1: Treatment area & treated by HC 372 22.2 
Group 2: Treatment area & not treated by HC 389 23.2 
Group 3: Comparison (no treatment) 917 54.65 
Total 1,678 100 
 
 It should be noted that in a number of enumeration areas, respondents reported 
to have been trained by health committees who were affiliated to a local NGO the 
Fundação para o Desenvolvimento da Comunidade (FDC), but not by WFP-led health 
committees. An analysis of the NGO’s training material revealed that the topics 
covered were remarkably similar to the WFP’s curriculum as outlined in table A2. 
This is most likely due to the fact that both curricula were developed in close 
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training materials before they are used in the field. Areas which were trained by FDC-
sponsored health committees are therefore also considered part of the treatment group. 
This implies that the results in this paper do not reflect the treatment effects of the 
specific WFP intervention, but rather of health committee trainings and subsequent 
spillover / social learning effects in general.   
 
3.5 Ethical review 
The household survey was reviewed by the Comité Nacional de Bioética para a 
Saúde (CNBS), which is the official review board of the Government of 
Mozambique in charge of approving studies involving human subjects on 
Mozambican territory. The CNBS has approved the household survey on the 10th of 
October 2017.  
 
4. Methods 
As the treatment for the SBCC intervention was not randomly assigned, this study 
uses inverse-probability-weighted (IPW) regressions in order to balance the 
observable characteristics between treatment and comparison groups and 
subsequently estimate the treatment effects. IPW estimators have been proposed by 
Hirano and Imbens (2001), Hirano et al. (2003) or Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). 
Unlike standard propensity matching techniques (e.g. nearest neighbour matching, 
radius matching) which only allow simple treatment-control comparisons, IPW 
allows for the comparison of more than two groups and is therefore particularly 
attractive for this study.  
In an IPW setting, the following steps need to be implemented in order to 
estimate the treatment effects: First propensity scores are estimated for all treatment 
levels simultaneously, using a multinomial logit model. Secondly, an area of 
common support is determined, defined by the area in which the density functions of 
the propensity scores for all three treatments is non-zero. Third, weights are 
calculated for the subset of observations which are on common support. These 
weights correspond to the inverse of the predicted probability of being in a certain 
treatment group. Fourth, balancing checks are performed in order to ensure that the 
groups do not differ in any observable characteristics. Fifth, OLS regressions 
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weighted by the inverse of the probability of being treated are estimated in order to 
determine the treatment effects for the different groups. In case the balancing checks 
in step 4 revealed that balancing could not be achieved for a subset of variables, 
these variables can be included as controls in the IPW regressions (inverse-
probability-weighted regression adjustment).  
Table presents the results of the multinomial logit regressions which were 
used to predict the propensity scores for comparison 1 and 2 respectively. In order to 
select the variables that are included in the model, the guidance provided by 
Caliendo & Kopeinig (2005) has been followed. Starting with a parsimonious model, 
additional covariates were included one-by-one and retained if they were statistically 
significant in predicting at least one of the treatments at 5% significance level. 
Subsequently squares and interaction terms between variables were also added to the 
model which improved its fit and balancing (see below). 
The regressions show that distance to the closest road is positively associated 
with all treatments, suggesting that health committees were successful in targeting 
the more remote households (distance to closest hospital is negatively associated to 
treatment, but the coefficients are much smaller). Moreover, households whose main 
source of income is agriculture are more likely to be treated, while cattle ownership 
is negatively associated with treatment. Moreover, having some education, as 
compared to no education, is negatively associated with treatment. All this would be 
in line with a pro-poor assignment of treatment where farming families without 
cattle and less educated individuals are more likely to participate. On the other hand, 



















Treated Spillover     Treated Spillover 
 
  
     








Distance to closest road available year-
round (minutes walking) 
0.0258*** 0.0150*** 
 




Literacy -0.00142 0.128 
 




Speaks Portuguese -0.296 -0.417 
 




Number of children -0.0201 -0.126*** 
 




Poligamy 1.047*** 0.982*** 
 














Walking is main means of transport -0.327 -0.703** 
 




Agriculture is main source of income 0.600** 0.779*** 
 
Distance to hospital x Walking is 





Improved Roof 2.364** 5.356*** 
 






Improved Walls -1.357*** -0.329 
 






Overcrowded -1.679** 0.672* 
 
















Complete first cycle of primary 
education (5th grade) 
-1.270*** -0.450** 
 






Complete second cycle of primary 
education (7th grade) 
-0.628** -0.694** 
 
Distance to closest road x 





Complete first cycle of secondary 
education (10th grade) 
-1.248*** -0.851** 
 
















HH owns bicycle 0.0872 -0.0477 
 
Portuguese speaking x 





HH owns fridge 1.678*** 1.908*** 
 






HH owns motorcycle 0.504** 0.304 
 




HH owns table -0.130 -0.0268 
    
  (0.193) (0.186)         
Number of observations 
     
1,657 
Pseudo R2           0.2081 
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After estimating the multinomial logit models and predicting the propensity 
scores, it is important to verify whether there is an overlap in the distribution of the 
propensity scores for all observations (common support). Following Smith and Todd 
(2005), the area of common support is defined as the area where the density of the 
propensity score distribution is non-zero for all three groups, i.e. for each treated 
observation with a propensity score x, there must also be a control observation with a 
non-zero probability of being treated. In this analysis, the density of the distribution 
is considered non-zero if it surpasses the threshold of 0.00001. Based on this 
criterion, only one observation needed to be trimmed due to lack of common 
support. However, given the sample size of 1,680, the exclusion of this observation 
is considered negligible. 
 
Figure 5.2: Density of the propensity score distributions for the propensity of being part of the group 
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Figure 5.3: Density of the propensity score distributions for the propensity of being part of the group 
of indirectly exposed households 
 
 
Subsequently, the inverse-probability-weights for all observations on 
common support are calculated. Following Hirano and Imbens (2001) and Hirano et 
al. (2003), the inverse probability weight for individual i, regarding the treatment 
intensity k (either direct treatment, or indirect exposure through social learning) can 
be calculated as: 
 





where =<# indicates the treatment status of individual i, and (̂<	(C#) is the estimated 
propensity score for i regarding treatment k.   
 Just as for standard propensity score estimators, IPW estimators only yield 
consistent results if the covariates included in the propensity score estimation are 
balanced across groups (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983, Austin&Stewart 2015). This 
implies that the expected value of all covariates C# should be equal across groups 
after conditioning on the propensity scores (̂<	(C#) 
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In IPW studies, the balancing property is most commonly assessed by comparing 
the standardized differences in the group means of all covariates which were used in 
the propensity score estimation (Austin & Stewart 2015). A standardized difference 
which is larger than 0.1 can be considered as an indication for an imbalance between 
the weighted groups (Normand et al. 2001, Austin et al. 2009). Table 4 presents the 
results of the balancing tests. The tables indicate that although observable 
differences between groups have been reduced substantially through the propensity 
score weighting, for about a third of the variables the standardised difference is 
larger than 0.1. These variables are additionally included as control variables in the 
inverse probability weighted regressions.  
Following Hirano & Imbens (2001), the treatment effects are estimated 
through k linear regressions where the inverse of the estimated propensity scores are 
used as weights. In this case k=2, as there are two “treatment groups”: the 
households which are trained themselves, and those who are potentially exposed 
through spillovers. We estimate one regression which compares trained households 
to the comparison group, and another regression comparing households susceptible 
to spillovers to the comparison group.  
 
I# = 	J<K + J<+=<# +	L<	M# + N<#						[&O4PℎR = 	;#<] 
 
	I# is an outcome of interest for individual i. =<# indicates whether i has been part of 
treatment group k. 	M# represents the subset of control variables which are not 
balanced after conditioning on the propensity score. J<+	is the Average Treatment 
Effect on the Treated (ATT) for being treated with treatment k.  
In order to correctly estimate the standard errors of these linear regression 
coefficients, one also needs to take into account the estimation uncertainty that is 
created through the estimation of the propensity scores. Both estimations (propensity 
score estimation and linear regressions) have therefore been conducted in one step, 
based on a Generalised Methods of Moments approach as suggested by Hirano et al. 
(2003) and Wooldridge and Imbens (2009)33. The standard errors have been 
clustered at the community level. 
                                               
33 The estimations have been implemented through the Stata module teffects ipwra. 
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IPW regressions, just as any propensity-score based estimators, rely on the 
assumption that selection into treatment is only based on observable variables. 
Selection on based on unobservables which are not included in the propensity score 
estimation may bias the results and therefore not yield valid impact estimates. In the 
context of this study, selection into treatment occurs in two steps: first, a health 
committee needs to choose an area to be covered by the trainings. Secondly, 
households within the selected areas need to accept the committee’s invitation to 
participate in the trainings. In order to avoid any bias in relation to the first step, the 
sampling procedure attempted to select very similar enumeration areas for the survey 
to be carried out. Moreover, variables on the remoteness of an area (distance to the 
closest capital and distance to the closest road) have been included in the estimation 
of the propensity score. In order to control for selection in the second step 
(households chosing to participate), a large number of control variables on the 
education, socioeconomic characteristics and demographic composition of the 
households have been included in the propensity score estimation. However, it is 
important to acknowledge that we do not have any data on previous knowledge on 
the contents of the trainings. It might for example be that households which already 
have a solid knowledge about nutrition are less likely to enrol. If this was the case, 
our impact estimates for the indirectly exposed group might be upward-biased: we 
would compare a pre-selection of untreated households in the treatment area which 
were already better informed before the intervention, with all households in the 
comparison group.  
However, the qualitative information from the formative research does not 
suggest that there were major knowledge differences between community members: 
the study indicated that knowledge about the intervention’s topics was homogenous 
and generally very low in the all potential treatment areas (World Food Programme 
2015). A robustness check with placebo outcomes does also not suggest that 








Table 5.4: Balancing of covariates  
 
HHs trained by health committees (as 
compared to control) 
 
Untreated HHs in treated areas (as 
compared to control) 
 
Standardized 
Dfiference Variance Ratio 
 
Standardized 
Difference Variance Ratio 
 
Raw Weighted Raw Weighted   Raw Weighted Raw Weighted 
          
Distance to closest hospital (minutes 
walking) 
0.12 -0.11 0.75 0.96 
 
-0.03 0.07 0.75 1.09 
Distance to closest road  (minutes 
walking) 
0.56 0.07 2.36 1.46 
 
0.31 0.01 2.24 0.96 
Literacy -0.30 0.10 0.89 1.02 
 
-0.21 0.00 0.94 1.00 
Speaks Portuguese -0.33 0.09 0.70 1.08 
 
-0.41 -0.03 0.61 0.97 
Number of children 0.13 -0.11 1.00 0.87 
 
-0.10 0.06 0.99 1.13 
Poligamy 0.32 0.01 1.17 1.01 
 
0.38 0.00 1.17 1.00 
Cattle ownership -0.09 0.10 0.98 1.01 
 
-0.37 -0.07 0.81 0.98 
Walking is main means of transport 0.15 -0.09 0.77 1.14 
 
-0.02 0.06 1.03 0.90 
Agriculture is main source of income 0.28 -0.09 0.76 1.07 
 
0.24 0.01 0.80 0.99 
Improved roof 0.10 0.04 3.08 1.56 
 
0.11 0.02 3.52 1.26 
Improved walls -0.59 0.14 0.35 1.17 
 
-0.41 0.07 0.55 1.09 
Overcrowded -0.14 0.00 0.25 0.97 
 
0.17 0.00 2.41 1.01 
Alphabetisation -0.22 0.02 0.63 1.04 
 
-0.18 0.02 0.69 1.04 
Complete first cycle of primary 
education (5th grade) 
-0.36 -0.04 0.59 0.96 
 
-0.04 -0.03 0.96 0.97 
Complete second cycle of primary 
education (7th grade) 
-0.03 -0.16 0.96 0.75 
 
-0.13 -0.05 0.81 0.92 
Complete first cycle of secondary 
education (10th grade) 
-0.13 0.25 0.54 2.28 
 
-0.06 0.02 0.77 1.09 
Complete secondary (12th grade) and 
higher 
-0.09 0.11 0.56 1.80 
 
-0.09 -0.03 0.53 0.85 
HH owns bicycle 0.25 -0.04 1.16 0.97 
 
0.17 -0.09 1.12 0.94 
HH owns fridge -0.04 0.08 0.82 1.35 
 
0.01 -0.05 1.06 0.81 
HH owns motorcycle 0.10 -0.09 1.25 0.82 
 
0.05 -0.04 1.12 0.91 
HH owns table -0.03 0.15 1.00 0.99 
 
-0.10 -0.10 0.98 0.98 
HH owns chair 0.09 0.15 0.96 0.91 
 
-0.06 -0.12 1.02 1.04 
HH owns bed -0.07 0.16 0.92 1.15 
 
-0.02 -0.03 0.98 0.96 
HH owns sofa 0.00 0.34 0.98 2.67 
 
-0.08 -0.10 0.66 0.64 
HH owns lamp -0.41 0.20 0.25 1.51 
 
-0.30 -0.01 0.43 0.98 
HH owns phone 0.52 -0.02 1.59 0.98 
 
0.36 0.00 1.48 1.00 




Table 5.4 (continued from last page) 
 
HHs trained by health committees (as 
compared to control) 
 
Untreated HHs in treated areas (as 
compared to control) 
 
Standardized 
Dfiference Variance Ratio 
 
Standardized 
Difference Variance Ratio 
 
Raw Weighted Raw Weighted   Raw Weighted Raw Weighted 
          
HH has radio access 0.04 0.06 0.99 0.98 
 
-0.01 -0.03 1.00 1.01 
(Distance to closest road)^2 0.33 0.09 5.38 3.46 
 
0.27 -0.01 3.33 0.96 
Distance to closest hospital x 
Poligamy 
0.20 0.04 0.93 1.03 
 
0.20 0.04 0.93 1.06 
Distance to closest hospital x 
Walking is main means of transport 
0.16 -0.07 0.83 0.97 
 
-0.02 0.12 0.82 1.14 
Distance to hospital x Improved 
Roof 
0.09 0.00 3.46 1.05 
 
0.01 -0.03 0.44 0.35 
Distance to hospital x Improved 
walls 
-0.47 -0.05 0.16 0.78 
 
-0.42 0.10 0.19 1.29 
Distance to hosptial x Bicycle 0.23 -0.01 1.10 0.85 
 
0.14 -0.08 0.94 0.78 
Distance to hospital x Bed 0.11 0.01 1.54 1.06 
 
0.08 -0.05 1.20 0.87 
Distance to hospital x radio access 0.06 -0.08 0.86 0.88 
 
-0.05 -0.06 0.76 0.91 
Distance to road x agriculture main 
income source 
0.47 0.08 2.15 1.43 
 
0.30 0.01 2.24 0.95 
Distance to road x fridge 0.07 0.02 5.29 2.16 
 
-0.06 -0.03 0.62 1.30 
Distance to road x radio access 0.39 0.00 2.76 1.26 
 
0.12 0.00 1.18 0.82 
Speaks Portuguese x agriculture 
main income source 
-0.14 -0.07 0.71 0.85 
 
-0.31 -0.04 0.41 0.92 
Speaks Portuguese x Improved 
Walls 
-0.30 0.23 0.34 1.71 
 








Tables 5-7 present the results of the inverse probability weighted regressions. For 
households which were directly exposed to the health committee trainings, both the 
overall knowledge and practices indexes, as well as the topic-specific indexes 
improved substantially, with increases in the range of 5.9 to 16.4 index points. The 
only exception is the IYCF knowledge index where no significant impacts were 
detected.  
Moreover, the estimates point to the presence of social learning effects for 
those who live in treated areas, but were not trained by health committees 
themselves. For these households the malaria knowledge index, maternal care 
knowledge index and WASH practices index improved in the range of 6.8 to 10.6 
index points. For the malaria knowledge index, the estimated spillover effect 
amounts to 49 percent of the treatment effect of the directly treated group suggesting 
an information loss of 51 percent during the social learning process. For the maternal 
care index the spillover effect amounts to 66 percent, and for WASH practices it 
amounted to 68 percent of the direct treatment effect. However, no statistically 
significant spillover effects were detected for WASH knowledge, child feeding 
knowledge, child feeding practices or malaria practices.  
 
Table 5.5: Impact of health committee trainings and spillovers on health knowledge and practices (indexes) 
 














Overall knowledge index  10.44*** 2.56 3.84 2.89 52.04 
Overall practices index  8.55*** 1.54 3.77* 2.24 46.31 
Malaria Knowledge Index 16.38*** 3.92 7.99** 3.40 48.59 
WASH Knowledge Index 8.69** 3.56 0.20 3.99 43.65 
IYCF Knowledge Index 0.69 2.37 -3.48 3.06 68.75 
Maternal Knowledge Index 16.02*** 3.91 10.64*** 3.81 47.17 
Malaria Practices Index 5.99* 3.10 1.49 3.65 64.67 
WASH Practices Index 9.80*** 1.97 6,75** 3.13 37.36 
IYCF Practices Index 10.36*** 3.97 2.58 3.95 36.26 
Note: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, * denotes significance at the 
10% level. Standard errors are clustered at the community-level. All indexes are calculated on a scale of 0-100, with 
100 being the maximum score which can be achieved.  
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These findings are also confirmed when considering the single outcomes on 
which the knowledge and practices indexes are based. For the group of households 
which was directly trained by the health committees, the regressions showed 
statistically significant improvements for 19 of the 36 knowledge outcomes (table 6). 
For the indirectly exposed group, 10 of the 36 knowledge outcomes were statistically 
significant. With one exception, all of these 10 outcomes also were significant for 
the directly exposed group. This pattern is much in line with social learning 
processes in the communities that were exposed to the intervention. The magnitude 
of the treatment effects in the spillover group on average amounts to 61 percent of 
the treatment effect in the directly exposed group. 
A similar picture emerges when considering the practices outcomes presented 
in table 8. There are statistically significant improvements for 8 out of the 12 
practices outcomes in the group of households which were directly trained by the 
health committees, and 4 out of 12 for the indirectly exposed households. For those 
outcomes which do show significant results in the indirectly exposed group, 
treatment effects on average amount to 96 percent of the effects in the directly 
exposed group. This suggests that for the practices where social learning does take 
place (handwashing, latrine usage, exclusive breastfeeding for children under 6 
months and dietary diversity for children over 6 months of age), information loss is 
close to zero.   
There are two unexpected findings. First, the results in table 6 show a 
statistically signicificant reduction in the share of respondents who are able to list at 
least one water treatment method. Secondly, the regression results suggest that the 
intervention negatively impacted women’s confidence that their own breastmilk 
contained all necessary nutrients for infants younger than 6 months. An explanation 
for these paradoxical findings could be that either the intervention itself or the 
questions as they were phrased in the impact evaluation survey caused 
misunderstandings regarding these two outcomes. It might for example be that the 
interventions’ focus on nutritional diversity for children over 6 months led to the 
view that children under 6 months also should have a diverse diet. Another 
explanation is that interviewees were not sufficiently clear that the question referred 
to children under the age of 6 months only. In any case, it is reassuring that there is a 
positive impact in the use of recommended child feeding practices, as illustrated in 
table 7.  
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Overall, these findings are in line with both, the Bayesian updating model 
and the Generalised DeGroot Model. In both theoretical frameworks, the SBCC 
intervention can be understood as a new signal provided to a number of seeds in the 
treated networks. Under Bayesian updating, the seeds would be expected to give a 
higher weight to the new information than those who are only indirectly exposed to 
the intervention, as the former are closer to the source and therefore attribute a 
higher weight to the new information in the updating process (weights in the 
Bayesian learning model depend on the estimated variance of the signal). This is in 
line with the consistently higher treatment effects for the directly exposed 
households as compared to the indirectly exposed households.  
However, it is important to underline that those who are indirectly exposed to 
the intervention also receive the new signal and do engage in updating. Although the 
treatment effects are lower and we observe fewer statistically significant results for 
those households, there is clear evidence that those households also benefit from the 
intervention. This is true for both knowledge and practices outcomes. Overall, the 
results can be interpreted as evidence of social learning processes in the treated 




































Malaria      
Knows at least 3 malaria symptoms 0.20*** 0.05 0.13** 0.05 0.59 
Mentions fever as malaria symptom 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.06 0.63 
Mentions feeling cold as malaria symptom -0.07 0.06 -0.07 0.07 0.48 
Mentions other (correct) symptom 0.06*** 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.90 
Knows at least 3 malaria prevention methods 0.34*** 0.07 0.22*** 0.08 0.27 
Bednet listed as malaria prevention method 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.88 
Keeping house clean listed as malaria prevention method 0.14*** 0.05 0.12** 0.05 0.30 
Avoiding puddles / stuck water as malaria prevention method 0.22*** 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.15 
Other methods to deter mosquitos listed as prevention 
method 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.35 
Knowledge of malaria transmission cause 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.84 
Has realistic risk perception of malaria 0.08 0.08 -0.02 0.05 0.25       
WASH      
Knows at least 3 crucial times for handwashing 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.31 
Handwashing: lists 'after defecation' as crucial moment 0.05 0.05 0.06* 0.04 0.76 
Handwashing: lists 'before preparing food' or before eating as 
crucial moment 0.13*** 0.04 0.11*** 0.04 0.78 
Handwashing: mentions option in relation to childcare 0.06 0.07 -0.05 0.08 0.28 
Knows 3 causes of diarrhoea 0.21*** 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.29 
Diarrhoea causes: mentions contaminated water -0.16 0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.92 
Diarrhoea causes: mentions lack of handwashing/hygiene 0.23*** 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.41 
Diarrhoea causes: mentions spoiled food 0.11** 0.06 -0.02 0.06 0.42 
Diarrhoea causes: mentions contact to other infected people -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03 
Knows at least one water treatment methods -0.06*** 0.02 -0.12*** 0.04 0.92 
Has realistic risk perceptions of diarrhoea 0.10 0.08 -0.01 0.06 0.22       
Infant and young child feeding      
States that breastmilk contains all necessary nutrients <6 
months -0.17*** 0.05 -0.16*** 0.04 0.86 
States that exclusive breastfeeding should be until 6 
months 0.11** 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.74 
Knows first breastfeeding within hour after birth 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.38 
Considers complementary breastfeeding until age 2 -0.01 0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.77       
Maternal care and nutrition      
Considers important to eat more during pregnancy -0.05 0.04 -0.06 0.05 0.82 
Knows 3 maternal care measures 0.31*** 0.07 0.21*** 0.06 0.19 
Maternal care: mentions extra rest / avoid heavy work 0.12*** 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.76 
Maternal care: mentions extra meal / diverse diet 0.23*** 0.05 0.09* 0.05 0.38 
Maternal care measures: take antimalarials 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 
Knows 3 pregnancy emergencies 0.18* 0.09 0.15* 0.08 0.16 
Pregnancy emergencies: lists bleeding 0.16** 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.29 
Pregnancy emergencies: lists fever 0.22*** 0.07 0.19*** 0.06 0.33 
Pregnancy emergencies: lists other correct option 0.15** 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.45 
Opinion: At least 3 prenatal consultations necessary 0.21*** 0.06 0.13* 0.07 0.72 
Note: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, * denotes significance at the 10% 
level. All outcomes are binary (0/1) and treatment effects can thus be interpreted as the increase in the share of respondents 
























Malaria      
Mosquito net observed & hanging (not observed = 0) -0.050 0.043 -0.013 0.048 0.451 
Child slept under bednet 0.072*** 0.025 0.024 0.032 0.835 
Use of mosquito net during pregnancy 0.136*** 0.039 0.043 0.045 0.614 
Took antimalarials during last pregnancy 0.09** 0.038 0.029 0.045 0.668 
WASH       
Closed latrine used for defecation 0.194*** 0.037 0.083* 0.044 0.556 
Soap was available to wash hands 0.065** 0.035 0.131*** 0.040 0.257 
Always treats water 0.004 0.019 0.027 0.025 0.071 
Mentioned prudent child defecation practice 0.047 0.031 -0.043 0.038 0.777 
Washed child's and own hands after child's defecation 0.207*** 0.035 0.189*** 0.041 0.184 
Infant and young child feeding      
Minimumn dietary diversity for infants achieved 0.123*** 0.033 0.045 0.035 0.217 
FCS is acceptable or borderline 0.065 0.042 -0.020 0.046 0.520 
Excl. breastfed (<6mo)/3 recommended foods (>6mo) 0.140*** 0.036 0.090** 0.040 0.333 
Note: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, * denotes significance at the 10% 
level. All outcomes are binary (0/1) and treatment effects can thus be interpreted as the increase in the share of respondents 
who answered the respective question correctly. 
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5.3 Robustness checks 
A number of robustness checks have been performed in order to corroborate the 
results presented above. First, we run the regressions presented in tables 5-7, but 
using placebo outcomes that should not be affected by the treatment. This test 
addresses potential concerns that even after propensity score weighting there may 
have been unobservable differences between the treatment and comparison group 
which are affecting the results, e.g. due to self-selection into treatment of more/less 
knowledgeable households. In order to define suitable placebo outcomes, we use the 
fact that the health committee trainings on maternal care and maternal nutrition had 
only been conducted very shortly before the endline evaluation survey (see table A1 
for an overview on the timing of the intervention). Nevertheless, these outcomes had 
been included in the survey. While we do expect impacts on the knowledge 
questions relating maternal care, it is unreasonable to expect any direct impacts on 
maternal care practices, as these would only materialise during the next pregnancy 
of the affected women. The results of these regressions are presented in table A2. 
Indeed, we do not find any statistically significant impacts at the 5% level, for 
neither the directly exposed households nor the untreated households living in 
treated areas for these placebo outcomes.    
A second robustness check was related to the definition of treated and 
comparison areas based on actual exposure to the intervention (see section 4.2). 
Instead of using a minimum threshold of 20% of households reporting to have 
participated in health committee trainings for a certain area to be considered as 
treated, a minimum threshold of 10% is used as a robustness check. These results are 
presented in tables A3-A5. The statistical significance and magnitude of the effects 
are as good as unaffected by this alternative definition of treatment and comparison 
areas. If anything, the treatment effects for the indirectly exposed households 







Three main conclusions can be drawn based on the results presented above.  
• First, there is clear evidence that health committee trainings have improved 
knowledge and practices in the four priority areas of the SBCC intervention 
among those mothers who were directly exposed to the intervention.  
• Secondly, there is also evidence for the existence of social learning effects. 
Women in treated areas which were not trained by health committees also 
improved knowledge and practices related to child health and nutrition. This 
finding confirms the predictions of both a Bayesian learning model and a 
DeGroot learning model. It shows that social learning processes are not only 
important in the field of agriculture and finance, but they can also play an 
important role in the diffusion of technologies to improve child health and 
nutrition, and alter individual risk perceptions and/or decision-making 
processes on preventive health behaviours.   
• Third, social learning effects were only observed for approximately half of 
the outcomes which had improved in the directly exposed group. For this 
subset of statistically significant outcomes, the treatment effects on average 
corresponded to 61 percent for the knowledge outcomes and 96 percent for 
the practices outcomes. This suggests that social learning may not work for 
all health and nutrition topics, and that information loss may occur during the 
social learning processes.   
 
Overall, interventions like the SBCC project in Mozambique can be considered as a 
promising option in order to improve the uptake and use of health technologies in 
poor and relatively uninformed communities. Due to the social learning effects 
documented in this study, the benefit-cost ratios of such interventions might be even 
larger than expected, as not only the participants but also their fellow community 
members benefit. Studies which do not take into account network spillovers may 
therefore underestimate the true effect of interventions that aim at fostering the 
uptake of health technologies.
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Table 5.A1 - Timeline of the SBCC intervention & household survey 
Time period Project phase 
2015 Formative research (qualitative) 
2016 Development of Training Material  
Febuary - July 2017 Training of health committees in Malaria prevention & 
WASH 
March - August 2017 Training of community members in malaria prevention & 
WASH 
September - December 2017 Training of health committees in Infant and Young Child 
Feeding (IYCF) and Maternal Care and Nutrition 
October - December 2017 Training of community members in IYCF 
December 2017 - March 2018 Training of community members in maternal health and 
nutrition 






















Table 5.A2: Topics covered through SBCC trainings 
Topic 
No. of 
manuals Sessions Topics covered 
Activities 




1   6 
Health care in the first 2 years of growth and its 
benefits 2 1 hr. 
Adequate nutrition during pregnancy 4 2 hrs. 
Essential care from the family and the 
community to the pregnant woman 3 1h30 
Behaviours and negative situations during 
pregnancy 3 1h30 
Follow-up of pregnancy. Some attentions during 
prenatal care 3 1h30 
Provide an appropriate environment for pregnant 





The health benefits and essential health care of 
the child from pregnancy to 2 years of age 5 1h30 
Beginning of breastfeeding in the first hour after 
delivery, colostrum and exclusive breastfeeding 4 1h20 
Breastfeeding and breastfeeding techniques 3 1h30 
Adequate supplementary feeding for children 





The benefits of health and health care in the first 
2 years of growth 2 1h30 
Essential care with sanitation 3 2 hrs. 
Essential moments for washing hands with soap 4 1h10 
The right way to wash your hands: use of tip tap 
and soap 2 2 hrs. 
Benefits of complying with handwashing 
correctly 2 2 hrs. 
Treated and safe water 4 1 hr. 
IYCF 
practices 1 6 
The health benefits and essential health care of 
the child from pregnancy to 2 years of age 5 1h30 
Beginning of breastfeeding in the first hour after 
delivery, colostrum and exclusive breastfeeding 4 1h20 
Breastfeeding and breastfeeding techniques 3 1h30 
Adequate supplementary feeding for children 
aged 6-24 months 3 1h40 
Food groups suitable for children 6 - 24 months 
of age and culinary demonstrations 3 2 hrs. 
Food groups suitable for children 6 - 24 months 























(Spillovers) Standard Error 
Mean control 
group 
      
Gave birth at a public or private health facility 0.112 0.076 0.013 0.069 0.607 
Pregnant at time of interview 0.008 0.021 0.007 0.025 0.047 
Took antimalarials pregnancy 0.085* 0.044 0.020 0.052 0.683 
Note: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, * denotes significance at the 10% level. Standard 
errors are clustered at the community-level. All indexes are calculated on a scale of 0-100, with 100 being the maximum score which can 












Table 5.A4: Robustness check - alternative definition of treated and comparison areas (10% cut-off for definition of treatment 
areas) 
 
ATT Participants in 
health committee 





effect) Standard Error 
Mean control 
group 
Overall knowledge index  9.81*** 2.22 4.33** 2.15 51.63 
Overall practices index  7.16*** 1.86 1.45 2.14 47.31 
Malaria Knowledge Index 17.95*** 3.59 10.89*** 2.53 45.82 
WASH Knowledge Index 9.86*** 3.02 4.21 2.89 41.61 
IYCF Practices Index -2.51 2.56 -4.48 2.76 71.06 
Maternal Knowledge Index 13.95*** 3.82 6.71* 3.47 48.04 
Malaria Practices Index 2.37 3.00 -3.97 3.01 67.77 
WASH Practices Index 11.45*** 1.99 7.71*** 2.70 35.45 
IYCF Practices Index 6.53 4.55 -1.48 4.50 39.65 
Note: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, * denotes significance at the 10% level. All indexes 


















Malaria      
Knows at least 3 malaria symptoms 0.21 0.05 0.14*** 0.05 0.56 
Mentions fever as malaria symptom 0.00 0.08 -0.06 0.06 0.70 
Mentions feeling cold as malaria symptom 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.39 
Mentions other (correct) symptom 0.052** 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.90 
Knows at least 3 malaria prevention methods 0.35*** 0.07 0.23*** 0.06 0.23 
Bednet listed as malaria prevention method -0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.90 
Keeping house clean listed as malaria prevention method 0.11* 0.06 0.10** 0.05 0.32 
Avoiding puddles / stuck water as malaria prevention method 0.20*** 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.16 
Other methods to deter mosquitos listed as prevention method 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.32 
Knowledge of malaria transmission cause 0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.87 
Has realistic risk perception of malaria 0.14** 0.06 0.10** 0.04 0.18       
WASH      
Knows at least 3 crucial times for handwashing 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.30 
Handwashing: lists 'after defecation' as crucial moment 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.76 
Handwashing: lists 'before preparing food' or before eating as 
crucial moment 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.82 
Handwashing: mentions option in relation to childcare 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.24 
Knows 3 causes of diarrhoea 0.21** 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.28 
Diarrhoea causes: mentions contaminated water -0.03 0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.44 
Diarrhoea causes: mentions lack of handwashing/hygiene 0.20*** 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.42 
Diarrhoea causes: mentions spoiled food 0.10* 0.06 -0.04 0.05 0.42 
Diarrhoea causes: mentions contact to other infected people -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03 
Knows at least one water treatment methods -0.065** 0.03 -0.086** 0.04 0.92 
Has realistic risk perceptions of diarrhoea 0.16** 0.07 0.09* 0.05 0.16       
Infant and young child feeding      
States that breastmilk contains all necessary nutrients <6 
months -0.23*** 0.04 -0.19*** 0.04 0.91 
States that exclusive breastfeeding should be until 6 months 0.09** 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.75 
Knows first breastfeeding within hour after birth 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.41 
Considers complementary breastfeeding until age 2 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.77       
Maternal care and nutrition      
Considers important to eat more during pregnancy -0.06 0.05 -0.09 0.05 0.83 
Knows 3 maternal care measures 0.31*** 0.06 0.20*** 0.05 0.16 
Maternal care: mentions extra rest / avoid heavy work 0.09** 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.78 
Maternal care: mentions extra meal / diverse diet 0.26*** 0.06 0.13** 0.05 0.35 
Maternal care measures: take antimalarials 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.03 
Knows 3 pregnancy emergencies 0.21*** 0.08 0.19*** 0.06 0.11 
Pregnancy emergencies: lists bleeding 0.13* 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.30 
Pregnancy emergencies: lists fever 0.27** 0.06 0.26*** 0.06 0.25 
Pregnancy emergencies: lists other correct option 0.181*** 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.42 
Opinion: At least 3 prenatal consultations necessary 0.09* 0.05 -0.04 0.06 0.82 
Note: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, * denotes significance at the 10% level. All outcomes 






Table 5.A6: Robustness check - alternative definition of treated and comparison areas (10% cutoff for definition of treatment 


















Malaria      
Mosquito net observed & hanging (not observed = 
0) -0.04 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.45 
Child slept under bednet 0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.04 0.88 
Use of mosquito net during pregnancy 0.02 0.05 -0.112** 0.05 0.71 
Took antimalarials during last pregnancy 0.095* 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.67 
WASH       
Closed latrine used for defecation 0.17*** 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.57 
Soap was available to wash hands 0.12* 0.06 0.17** 0.07 0.21 
Always treats water 0.01 0.02 0.041* 0.02 0.06 
Mentioned prudent child defecation practice 0.01 0.03 -0.078** 0.04 0.81 
Washed child's and own hands after child's 
defecation 0.27*** 0.05 0.23*** 0.08 0.12 
Infant and young child feeding      
Minimumn dietary diversity for infants achieved 0.08 0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.26 
FCS is acceptable or borderline 0.04 0.05 -0.07 0.05 0.55 
Excl. breastfed (<6mo)/3 recommended foods 
(>6mo) 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.38 
Note: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, * denotes significance at the 10% level. All 
outcomes are binary (0/1) and treatment effects can thus be interpreted as the increase in the share of respondents who answered the 
respective question correctly. 
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6. Conclusion  
 
This thesis contributes to the evidence on the effectiveness of different incentives to 
promote healthy nutrition behaviour.  
The first paper investigates on the impact of the Brazilian conditional cash 
transfer programme Bolsa Familia on food consumption and nutritional outcomes. It 
shows that Bolsa Familia beneficiaries use the bulk of the cash transfers for 
additional food purchases. Moreover, there is suggestive evidence that households 
may have disproportionately increased their consumption of dairy and sweets in 
response to the cash transfers, although this is sensitive to the choice of the outcome 
variable. There is suggestive evidence that this has led to an increase in overweight 
among children, however, this finding is not robust to multiple hypothesis testing. 
The analysis does not detect any impact of Bolsa Familia on undernutrition.  
The second paper assess the nutrition-related impacts of a subsidised health 
insurance programme for low-income households in Mexico, Seguro Popular. While 
the study does not detect an overall impact of the programme on nutrition-related 
outcomes, it does document an increase in obesity for those who were already 
overweight at baseline, suggesting the possibility of a moral hazard effect. 
Moreover, the paper suggests that beneficiary households may have decreased the 
relative consumption of carbohydrates and increased the consumption of meat. 
Overall, the paper does not provide any evidence that health insurance alone can 
reduce overweight or obesity.   
Paper 3 has shown increasing gender-based disparities in obesity, with 
women being more heavily affected than men. In the MENA region, these “gender 
obesity gaps” are also significantly associated with low levels of economic 
participation of women (female labour force participation) and political participation 
(share of female MPs). However, there is no such correlation in the rest of the world. 
The study therefore confirms the importance of social incentives and norms in 
shaping nutritional outcomes, while at the same time illustrating the context-
dependence of nutritional incentives. 
The fourth paper evaluates the effectiveness of a social and behaviour change 
communication initiative, and in particular investigated on the presence of social 
learning effects in covered villages. The paper shows that the provision of trainings 
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on child health and nutrition positively affects related knowledge and practices in a 
sample of extremely poor households in rural Mozambique. Beyond that, the 
intervention also had a positive impact on neighbouring households which did not 
participate in the trainings themselves, suggesting the presence of intra-communal 
social learning. 
 
1. Discussion of the findings and implications for research 
How do the findings of this thesis relate to previous research? The first paper on the 
nutritional impact of Bolsa Familia in Brazil confirms the first research hypothesis 
(H 1.1: The Bolsa Familia conditional cash transfer programme in Brazil has lead 
to an increase in food expenditure) and is therefore in line with the well-established 
finding that social cash transfers lead to an increase in total consumption 
expenditure, as well as food expenditure (see e.g. Bastagli et al. 2016). This finding 
is also robust to multiple hypothesis testing. Moreover, the paper provides 
suggestive evidence for a disproportional increase in the consumption of sweets and 
dairy products in response to the cash transfers.  
 However, the paper’s second research hypothesis (H 1.2: The programme 
has led to a reduction in undernutrition) is not confirmed. The analysis did not 
reveal any statistically significant effects on wasting, stunting, height-for-age, 
weight-for-age or weight-for-height. While this finding is unexpected given the 
significant increase in food expenditure in response to the programme, it should be 
noted that a number of previous cash transfer evaluations were also unable to detect 
any impact on undernutrition. According to Bastagli et al.’s (2016) review, only five 
out of 13 cash transfer evaluations found an impact on stunting, one out of 5 for 
wasting, and zero out of seven for weight-for-age z-scores. Possible explanations for 
the lack of significant (observed) effects include an insufficient follow-up period 
between intervention and evaluation, as well as the susceptibility of anthropometric 
data to measurement error. It should be noted that the only impact evaluation of 
Bolsa Familia which did assess anthropometric outcomes (De Brauw et al. 2010) did 
not detect an impact on BMI-for-age z-scores, but no effects on undernutrition as 
measured by stunting, wasting, height-for-age z-scores, or weight-for-age z-scores.  
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(De Brauw et al. 2010). Their study detects a statistically significant effect on BMI-
for-age z-scores among children, but no effect on undernutrition as measured by 
stunting, wasting, height-for-age z-scores, or weight-for-age z-scores. 
 to observe the slow changes to height and weight, and the fact that anthropometric 
outcomes are particularly susceptible to measurement error (especially for younger 
children). Recent evidence also illustrates that cash transfers are more effective in 
reducing undernutrition when combined with training sessions, or social and 
behaviour change communication (SBCC) campaigns (Field & Maffioli 2020). 
 Lastly the paper provides suggestive evidence that Bolsa Familia has led to 
an increase in overweight. The third hypothesis tested in the paper (H 1.3: The 
programme has led to an increase in overweight and obesity among its 
beneficiaries) can at least not be rejected. This finding is in line with the papers from 
Attanasio et al. 2005, Fernald et al. 2008b, Forde et al. 2012, Leroy et al. 2013 which 
suggest that cash transfers may increase overweight and obesity. On the other hand, 
the finding contradicts the studies by Fernald et al. (2008a) and Levasseur 2019 
which found that the conditional cash transfer programme Oportunidades in Mexico 
has reduced overweight and obesity.  A possible explanation for this, is that the 
Mexican Oportunidades is already “obesity-sensitive”, while Bolsa Familia is not. 
The Mexican conditionalities include e.g. the regular participation in trainings 
sessions (pláticas) which provide inter alia information on healthy diets. Explicitly 
testing the effectiveness of obesity-related conditionalities, as under Oportunidades, 
should therefore also be considered a priority for further research. Lastly, it should 
be noted that all available studies on the issue have been conducted in Latin 
America. Apart from this paper on Brazil, there is evidence from Mexico, as well as 
Colombia. Future research projects on the issue could prioritise gathering evidence 
from other continents, most notably the middle-income countries in Africa and Asia 
in order to verify the external validity of the Latin American studies.  
Paper 2 has not detected any statistically significant evidence for an effect of 
health insurance on nutritional outcomes, on average. The first hypothesis tested in 
this paper (H2.1: The Mexican health insurance programme Seguro Popular has 
reduced undernutrition among its beneficiaries) therefore needs to be rejected. Our 
results suggest that the expansion of health insurance to low-income households in 
Mexico did not exert an average effect on undernutrition among children in Mexico. 
This finding is not in line with the findings of Wagstaff & Pradhan (2005) who 
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showed that poverty-targeted health insurance in Vietnam did lead to improved 
anthropometric outcomes. A possible explanation for the different results may lie in 
the fact that Vietnam experienced much lower levels of income and a higher 
prevalence of food insecurity during the survey period.  
The second hypothesis (H2.2: Seguro Popular has reduced overweight and 
obesity among its beneficiaries) also needs to be rejected. Our paper did not detect 
any statistically significant impact on overweight and obesity. This finding 
contradicts two studies from the US based on data from the 1980s and 1990s which 
showed that health insurance coverage lead increases overweight and obesity 
(Bhattarchya et al. 2009, Rashad and Markovitz 2009), possibly due to a moral 
hazard effect. However, our finding is in line with studies based on more recent data  
which did not detect any impact on overweight/obesity, or even a reduction in 
overweight and obesity (Simon et al. 2016, Rhubart 2018). Overall, the more recent 
studies, including our analysis on Seguro Popular, suggest that health insurance does 
not improve nutrition-related diseases such as overweight and obesity by itself. 
Complementary interventions, as e.g. free nutrition-related counselling covered by 
the health insurance packages, might thus be needed in order to increase preventative 
efforts. 
Laslty, we cannot rule out that our finding of zero impact may also be due to 
low statistical power or the relatively short time frame between survey waves in our 
study setting. Additional research based on a larger sample of analysis, e.g. drawing 
on the forthcoming fourth survey wave of the MxFLS would be important in order to 
corroborate the results based on the second and third wave of the survey.  
Paper 3 has shown based on country-level macro data that the increasing 
“gender obesity gaps” in the MENA region are associated with low levels of 
economic and political participation of women (as measured by the female labour 
force participation and the share of female MPs) – an effect which is also robust to 
the inclusion of country-level fixed effects. The first research hypothesis for this 
paper (H 3.1: The political and economic participation of women leads to lower 
levels of overweight and obesity among women in the MENA region) has thus been 
confirmed. The findings are in line with previous research which showed that the 
empowerment of women can lead to a reduction of undernutrition (Malapit and 
Quisumbing 2015, Malapit et al. 2013, Cunningham et al. 2014), as well as the 
literature indicating a negative association between women empowerment and 
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gender obesity gaps (Wells et al. 2012 and Garawi et al. 2014). The fixed effect 
estimates in our paper suggest that there is indeed a causal relationship between 
female economic/political participation and gender obesity gaps.  
However, the second research hypothesis for this paper was rejected (H 3.2: 
The effect of political and economic participation on overweight and obesity does 
not differ between the MENA region and other parts of the world.) Indeed, our paper 
shows that the worldwide association between women empowerment and gender 
obesity differences, which was also described by Wells et al. (2012) and Garawi et 
al. (2014), is entirely driven by the MENA region. Once the MENA region is 
partialled out, the worldwide association between empowerment and obesity 
disappears. 
As a next step, it would be important to investigate whether this cross-
country pattern also holds at the individual or household level. An analysis of 
microdata could also help to corroborate the initial that the relationship between 
empowerment and lower gender obesity gaps is indeed causal. Secondly, it would be 
relevant to test whether empowerment also influences gender gaps in other measures 
of health. Third, it may be interesting to investigate further why the relationship 
between empowerment and gender obesity gaps only holds in the MENA region, but 
not in other parts of the world. 
Paper 4 has confirmed the research hypothesis 4.1. (H 4.1: Social learning 
has contributed to the adoption of recommended nutrition-practices among non-
participants of an SBCC campaign, who live in the proximity of participating 
households),  and provided empirical evidence that behaviour change campaigns 
may create spillovers to non-participants. The paper thus confirms that previous 
findings on social learning from the fields of agriculture (Bandiera & Rasul 2006, 
Conley & Udry 2010) as well as microfinance (Banerjee 2013), and the initial 
evidence on social learning and spillover effects regarding preventative health 
behaviours (Miguel & Kremer 2003, Hoddinot et al. 2017). It also confirms the 
predictions of theoretical SBCC models (e.g. Michie, van Stralen and West  2011) 
which underline the importance of social network interactions in the context of 
behaviour change campaigns. Moreover, it adds to the generally encouraging 
literature on the potential of SBCC campaigns to change behaviours (e.g. Kim et al. 
2019, Luby et al. 2018, Null et al. 2018, Menon et al. 2016), and underlines that 
these interventions may have a wider reach than among the direct participants of 
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trainings and/or counselling interventions. The social benefit of these interventions is 
therefore larger than shown in impact evaluations which only focus on the 
participants of the trainings. It is important to take this into account in both impact 
evaluations and cost-benefit-assessments of related interventions. 
Lastly, hypothesis 4.2 has also been confirmed (H 4.2 : Changes in 
knowledge and practices are more pronounced among individuals who were directly 
exposed to trainings within the SBCC campaign, as compared to those who were 
only exposed to spillovers / social learning effects.) Indeed, the treatment effects 
among those households who were exposed to the intervention through spillovers are 
consistently smaller than for those who participated in the trainings themselves. This 
is also in line with previous studies on social learning (e.g. Bandiera & Rasul 2006, 
Conley & Udry 2010). For the SBCC literature and models, this implies that social 
network effects alone cannot be expected to induce health-related behaviour change 
to the same extent than targeted trainings. The paper also suggests that social 
learning effects on certain nutrition-related topics are larger than for others. It would 
be interesting to investigate on the determinants of these patterns, as well as their 
impact on nutritional outcomes which has not been feasible within this study. 
 
2. Implications for policy 
In terms of policy implications, paper 1 shows that social assistance cash 
transfer programmes increase their beneficiaries’ food consumption expenditure, but 
may also change food consumption choices (increase in spending on dairy and 
sweets) and potentially contribute to an increase in overweight among children. 
While the increase in overall food expenditure is intended within these programme’s 
focus on poverty reduction, the latter effect is unintended and might need to be 
addressed by accompanying measures. Recent papers from Mexico show that cash 
transfers may reduce obesity if they are linked to nutrition-related information and 
training. Combining cash transfer programmes with complementary information and 
education sessions may therefore be a viable option to simultaneously reduce 
poverty and obesity.   
Paper 2 has shown that the provision of free health insurance alone may not 
be sufficient in order to reduce overweight and obesity among low-income 
households. It may therefore need to be combined with other supply-side 
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interventions (e.g. offers for regular nutrition-related checkup, counselling, and/or 
treatment) in order to be effective. Moreover, policy makers should be aware of the 
risk of moral hazard effects and ideally combine insurance coverage with other 
measures that may reduce these effects.  
Paper 3 has illustrated a negative association between female empowerment 
and gender obesity gaps. As mentioned above, additional research on the causality of 
this pattern is required. However, if the initial evidence on causality is corroborated, 
this implies that policies to empower women can also reduce gender-based obesity 
gaps and, potentially, reduce other gender-based health disparities.   
Paper 4 has shown that social and behaviour change communication 
campaigns can play an important role in improving both knowledge and practices of 
parents regarding child nutrition. This is not only true for the direct participants of 
these programmes, but also for neighbouring households. It should be noted that the 
evaluated intervention has been implemented in rural communities in Mozambique, 
which are characterised by extreme poverty and generally low levels of education, 
where less than half of the interviewed adults are literate. This underlines the 
potential of interpersonal communication to improve nutrition, even within 
marginalised populations which may not be easily reached by other interventions 
(e.g. paper-based information, mass-media campaigns).   
 
 
